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A B S T R A C T 
This thesis examines the 'organic'theory of the state' with reference 
to Plato, John of Salisbury and Bernard Bosanquet. According t o the 
analysis of t h i s theory, drawn from the analogy with the human organism, 
the health of the whole depends on the healthy discharge by each part 
of i t s own proper function. Thus, the part i s not only subordinate to 
the whole, but cannot exist apart from i t . The following problem i n 
pa r t i c u l a r i s examined; i s the 'organic theory' a pr a c t i c a l one i n 
terms of o f f e r i n g a solution to the problem of p o l i t i c a l obligation, 
or i s i t a mere abstraction ? 
For varying reasons the conclusion i s reached that 
the l a t t e r i s the case i n a l l three w r i t e r s . Plato's 'Republic' i s of 
course admitted to be an ide a l , but i n some ways he i s not organic 
enough. Unity i s insisted upon to such a degree that the diverse 
contribution of the parts i s neglected, so that a t r u l y common purpose 
i s lacking. 
i 
John of Salisbury poses a particular problem, namely 
that at a time when p o l i t i c s and r e l i g i o n were not separated, i t i s 
impossible to t a l k about the state i n the usual secular sense. Moreover, 
does a Christian owe l o y a l t y f i r s t to the state, then to God, and does 
he f u l f i l l himself only w i t h i n the state and not the Church ? Where 
there i s no d e f i n i t i o n of terms the 'organic theory' can mean a l l things 
to a l l men, and can have no pr a c t i c a l relevance. 
F i n a l l y , Bosanquet's idea of the state as a union of 
di f f e r e n t minds i n a common purpose f a i l s because he does not 
distinguish the ideal state from that of the real world of p o l i t i c a l 
i 
struggle, economic r i v a l r y , r eligious differences etc. I t too belongs 
to the world of abstract thought. 
P A R T 1 
P L A T O 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
THE ORGANIC THEORY OF THE STATE WITH REFERENCE TO 
PLATO, JOHN OF SALISBURY AND BERNARD BOSANQUET. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The fact that the 'organic theory of the state' has not only survived 
the change from the Greek c i t y - s t a t e , through the medieval 
'commonwealth', to i t s vigorous re-appearance i n the a l b e i t opposed 
theories of Fascism and 'State-Capitalism', (U.S.S.R. China e t c . ) , 
t e s t i f i e s both to i t s strength and weakness. Can the same theory of the 
state be shared by minds conditioned by slavery, serfdom and modern 
capitalism, without being so vague that i t breaks down as soon as the 
concrete relationship between the various members and.the state i s 
examined ? What i s common, however, to a l l three epochs, namely 
economic revolutions bringing new classes i n t o existence, inevitably 
throw doubt on the values and customs of the old society. But newly-won 
freedom i s often an object of fear, so that anyone proposing guiding 
rulers of conduct, i.e the suppression of individual i n i t i a t i v e arid i t s 
transference to a seemingly permanent i n s t i t u t i o n capable of un i t i n g i t s 
members, w i l l be s a t i s f y i n g a basic human need. Of course, the c i t i z e n 
body i s confronted with the paradox that freedom i s only discovered, not 
lo s t i n the state, but the organic theorist does not conceal that the 
state i s something for which man exists and not vice-wersa. 
This attempt to l i n k indissolubly the state and the 
individual demands above a l l the destruction of ind i v i d u a l freedom, and 
by the same token a l l ideas of an equalitarian theory of j u s t i c e . The 
organic theorist's argument does not rest upon the s i m i l a r i t y between 
the state and i n d i v i d u a l , but upon the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n between, the two 
i.e that the state jLs a re a l and perfect i n d i v i d u a l . * 
* This i s certainly true i n the case of Plato and John of Salisbury, 
although i n the former, Bosanquet's idea of the state as a mental 
structure, a union of d i f f e r e n t minds i n a common purpose i s 
foreshadowed. In t h i s instance, the state i s hot ah organism, i.e 
a physical e n t i t y , but l i k e an organism. 
The consequences of such a thorough-going analogy are so disastrous that 
only a brave few dare give i t e x p l i c i t formulation. Plato, i t may be 
noted, assumes foreknowledge of the analogy on the part of his readers, 
i n an attempt to avoid t h e i r e ^ i t y , for what must be concealed above 
a l l from liberal-minds i s the- acceptance of inequality as a ju s t and 
necessary factor i n human society. Everything follows from t h i s . Just 
as the various members of the body have d i f f e r e n t functions of varying 
importance, likewise the state can suffer the amputation of some of i t s 
members, although the l a t t e r have no existence outside the whole. Their 
interests are inextricably bound up i n the state, by which i s meant that 
an individual '.s opinion can never come int o c o n f l i c t with that of the 
state, or i f i t does, i t i s the result of an ignorance which i s unable 
to see where l?-h& true interests l i e . By equating morality with 
function, j u s t i c e i s merely the f o r c i b l e maintainance of t h i s i n i t i a l 
inequality. 
These are the principles of the organic theory of the 
state. They have not changed i n nearly two thousand f i v e hundred years, 
and w i l l probably only be abandoned when the state i t s e l f ceases to be 
necessary. Of course, there i s one school of philosophy which holds that 
the state has always been authoritarian and repressive, and that the 
time has long since arrived for i t s destruction, and replacement by some 
form of non-governmental cooperation between free individuals, namely 
philosophic anarchism. This seems to me, to be the true opposite of the 
organic theory, the former claiming that the state negates a l l those 
q u a l i t i e s which distinguish man qua man, the l a t t e r postulating i t s e l f 
as the only organ of man's economic, moral and s p i r i t u a l f u l f i l l m e n t . 
The democratic theory f a l l s between these two, the essential feature of 
which i s to l i m i t the t o t a l i t a r i a n tendencies i n the state, by allowing 
the majority to elect the governing minority. 
I t is. precisely t h i s governing minority which engages 
the undivided attention of those upholders of an organic analogy. 
Although government by the people Is inevitably discarded, government 
f o r , to w i t , i n the interest (supposed) of the whole, becomes the 
'sine qua non' of the ideal state. A s t a t i c and arrested state, i n 
which the s l i g h t e s t change i n the status quo, assumes the proportions 
of a disaster, depends above a l l on the a b i l i t y of i t s leader(s). This 
explains Plato's preoccupation with the educating and t r a i n i n g of the 
Philosopher-Kings, John of Salisbury's grave concern that the King must 
at a l l times consult w i t h the priest-hood, and to a lesser extent 
Bosanquet's desire f o r a ' p u r i f i c a t i o n ' of the General W i l l as 
exhibited i n i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the state, the Church etc. The 
l a t t e r , unlike Plato and John of Salisbury, at times shows an 
i n c l i n a t i o n f o r l i b e r a l reform, but the state i s alone regarded 'as the 
supreme community and guardian of moral values'. 
We have seen therefore, that i n spite of the intervening 
centuries, a l l three writers are fascinated by comparison between the 
body-politic and the body-natural. Superficial s i m i l a r i t i e s are however, 
easier to f i n d than the corresponding differences. Can we r e a l l y suggest 
that an individual i s on a level with a hand, i.e that he i s not an end 
i n himself 'in i n i t i o ' , and that what forms of association he creates 
afterwards i s ah e n t i r e l y separate question ? 
I t nevertheless remains true that a member of a state accepts almost 
unconsciously an unwritten law of reciprocal r i g h t s and duties towards 
that body. I n practice i t i s impossible fo r him to contract out of 
society, but on what terms was membership of the state accepted i n the 
f i r s t instance ? The organic theorist regards as heresy any suggestion 
of a contractualist or u t i l i t a r i a n explanation;* i t i s f o r him nothing 
more or less than the expression of man's innermost being. But here we 
face an enormous d i f f i c u l t y . Is i t an ideal state or that imperfect 
and often deficient state i n the real world ? 
* To use another analogy; i f a bric k i s taken from a wal l i t remains 
a brick. 
I f the organic theorist can be faulted with not 
having distinguished at a l l times the ideal and the actual, he 
does exploit man's variety of aptitudes to the f u l l . He asserts 
that the parts, by reason of t h e i r difference, are complementary 
to each other, and mutually dependent. We may suspect an aesthetic 
motive here. Heraclitiis applied i t to the physical world; 'Underlying 
opposites there i s a unity, underlying change a s t a b i l i t y ' . The 
'social s c i e n t i s t ' to use a modern term, t r i e s to weave the same 
unity out of diverse elements i n t o the all-embracing, s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t 
state. 
vA* •"'"I 
(1) 
PART ONE : PIATO: 
'No greater e v i l can affect the state than whatsoever divides i t and 
makes i t Many instead of One, and no greater good than whatsoever binds 
i t together and makes i t One'. ,„ ... 
(Republic 462A). 
The problems of the One and the Many, of unity i n 
diversity^of permanence i n an everchanging world, were inherited by 
Plato from the r a t i o n a l , evolutionary and hylozoistic Milesian 
philosophy. Platonism i s an attempt to answer those questions raised 
by the 'natural philosophers', not on t h e i r own ground, but i n the 
l i g h t of that e t h i c a l and moral world discovered by Socrates, and the 
Parmenidean reaction to the TrcxvTc* ^fci rtcxi o i t t v / ^ t v ^ t . ' 
philosophy of Heraclitus. The search for beginnings was transformed i n t o 
^gTsearch f o r ends {of Socrates' 'conversio^*. For Socrates t h i s question 
took the form of the best l i f e to be led by the i n d i v i d u a l , but Plato 
saw i t i n terms of discovering the 'ideal state', which the individual 
would not only accept, but recognise as the indispensable focal point 
of his own existence. However, the search for beginnings and ends i s the 
outward manifestation of a desire to discover some underlying r e a l i t y and 
order behind the seeming iinpermanence of the sensible world.Such was 
the uncertainty of the times that only a r u l i n g class of genuine 
philosophers i n the Platonic sense could solve the wrangles of 
fi f t h - c e n t u r y Athenian p o l i t i c s , and provide the basis of a true 
TTo^t/T Ik 0 TcWw which would lead to the rediscovery of the principles 
(1) ^ of unity v . 
* (Phaedo 95 c f f ) 
How f a r t h i s i s an authentic account i s debatable. 
(2) 
The breakdown of the old a r i s t o c r a t i c values as a r e s u l t of 
the economic revolution during the s i x t h century B.C, was not 
accompanied by an immediate and l a s t i n g substitute. Apart from the 
relig i o u s sects, notably the Pythagoreans, Godless s c i e n t i s t s such 
as Anaxagoras, and Democritus, the 'sophist movement' represented by 
Protagoras and Gorgias, and of course Socrates himself added impetus 
to: the constant questioning of e t h i c a l standards, of which the most 
famous examples are P e r i c l e ' s 'Funeral Speech' and the 'MeliafV 
dialogue. Fof example, i n the f i f t h century, 'o?jO<LT iT| ' has always 
a p o l i t i c a l connotation, although i t was never devoid of i t s o r i g i n a l 
Homeric interpretation as 'excellence'. Plato i n the 'Republic' by 
postulating four virtues suggests the influence of the Pythagorean 
Ttl<jO^|f wv/o^ i"!''an intermediate e t h i c a l code which substituted for 
blue-blood as a q u a l i f i c a t i o n to rule, a disc i p l i n e d l i f e which made a 
man|^ >ok/i|^o& J<*V&jo'<^"«&3^fiand Q\\A<A\.Q<O . A l l these e s s e n t i a l l y 
a r i s t o c r a t i c virtues are included within the t o t a l i t y of 'of|°*lT |T| 1 . 
However, Plato's thought i s as always enriched by that other stream of 
thought represented by Socrates, especially by the l a t t e r ' s confrontation 
with the Sophists, who: made 'Co ^ t e f ' i n the sense of i n t e l l e c t u a l a g i l i t y 
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of '0(p4,TY)'. But i n each case, the quality of 
indicates inevitable superiority i n i t s possessor, and Plato i s quick to 
see i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s as a p o l i t i c a l weapon i n establishing the 
unchallengeable authority of the r u l i n g caste of Guardians.. 
The early dialogues and i n pa r t i c u l a r , the 'Protagoras', 
'GGo.rgias' and 'Menp' take up the central problem in Plato's thought, to 
wit that of discovering the true ' •fto\(T<KVJ Y ^ ^ ^ l r j ' and i t s r e l a t i o n 
to O\^4~T*\ i s virtue teachable ? ^ Protagoras asserts that he 
professes t h i s a r t , by which he makes people good c i t i z e n s . He also claims 
that the c i t i z e n s of a given community are capable of educating the 
young i n goodness and that no experts are necessary. Although the 
(3) 
dialogue has no satisfactory conclusion, Socrates thinks that v i r t u e , 
being knowledge i s teachable, but he doubts whether those who claim to 
teach i t , are capable of doing so. I t i s interesting however, that Plato 
allows Protagoras to put democracy's case i n the myth of Prometheus. In 
doing so, Protagoras states that every man has a 'share of Justice and 
c i t i z e n s k i l l ' . Man i s therefore a 1 Tto^iTiKov/ ^ W'V 1 and the state his 
natural home, although the freedom of the individual to express his 
opinion i s s t r i c t l y safeguarded. Plato thus owes much to Protagoras' 
thought, although the debt i s hard to recognise through the perversion 
of the l a t t e r ' s l i b e r a l ideas. 
In the 'Georgias ' ,. Plato i s not concerned with TloXtt, ~^\/V\ 
i.e. the art of making man a worthy member of the community, but only 
with jDtjK*7 T4X F which was called the l 4 * W ^ . Socrates 
claims that i t i s not a T^^'V] at a l l , but only a manufacturer of 
conviction, (TT^i^ow^ 6 *J|Ju>v>^ yo&)» a n d t n e fact that i t cannot be 
concerned with i t s e t h i cal implications and consequences, reduces i t to 
the level of a* kviuci/l ( Tj?i p ) ( far removed from the end of the true 
'art' which must always be j u s t i c e . Once again, Plato allows a real 
argument to develop i n 'Gallicles' claims to represent the r i g h t of the 
superman, admitting no self control or obligation to others, i . e . the 
complete opposite of an organic theory^ Socrates answers by appealing to 
Orphic/Pythagorean sanctions, defining ,ff'a||)^oa~\JVft, as obedience to a 
rule and standard which i s beyond t h i s l i f e , i . e . the basis of his 
argument that i t i s better to suffer i n j u s t i c e that to i n f l i c t i t . Equally 
important i s the p r i n c i p l e of 'ToT^iV and 1 ^Roff^oS , an order beyond 
which nothing i n human society or the universe must go. I t i s the 
pri n c i p l e which gets things i n t o proportion ( '^rjOtoTfjj') and t h i s i s 
where happiness l i e s . The true ' TCo\iT»Kyj TA,)^^ ' w i l l thus impose 
' Ko(TjJ09 ' on disordered material i.e. weave a unity out of dissident 
elements. 
In the 'Meno1, Socrates argues against the suggestion that 
there are d i f f e r e n t types of oC.p4,rr| applicable to men, women and 
children, because he was always t r y i n g to achieve something universally 
(4) 
v a l i d i n the ethical sphere. Plato went a stage further and t r i e d to put 
ethical t r u t h on the same plane of geometric t r u t h . The equality of 
women put forward i n the 'Republic' more from p o l i t i c a l considerations, 
e.gthe unity of the state, the importance of i n t e l l i g e n t breeders etc, 
has i t s basis i n th i s idea of Socrates that the o(p^T V) of men and women 
is the same. I n the 'Meno', i t i s never proved that 'virtue i s knowledge', 
and that there can be teachers of O^^iTJj . Nor i s the relationship 
explained betweenoj>©^ ^ o^bf } Cfti<r~vj|^ i and ^ p4/Tvj . The arguments of 
these e a r l i e r dialogues are deliberately l e f t hanging, foreshadowing the 
'Republic'. One thing i s however certain, that O^p^Tirj i s i n no way to 
be i d e n t i f i e d with the cleverness of the Sophist. The 'Republic' (538 - 40) 
w i l l make a provision that the young men are kept from being intoxicated 
with the power of argument, u n t i l they are mature adults, who w i l l not 
abuse i t i n the manner a t t r i b u t e d to Socrates' enemies. But as we shall 
see, v i r t u e i d e n t i f i e d with knowledge i s the characteristic of the r u l i n g 
class only, whereas thec/^ttvjof the ruled bears most resemblance to an 
extremely passive form of 0~c(^^>off'UVV\ , while out of se l f - c o n t r o l and 
knowledge comes a t h i r d o(J5*ftv) , j u s t i c e - the healthy condition of the 
whole attained by each member's f u l f i l l m e n t of his unequal function. 
The importance of the theory of the soul i n Plato's p o l i t i c a l 
philosophy, demands a b r i e f examination of i t s h i s t o r i c a l development. In 
Homer's time, everybody, even atheists, accepted the existence of the 
soul, but not i t s immortality. The normal conception was a wraith, mostly 
insubstantial, but with the appearance of a person, which came to l i f e as 
i t were, when offered bull's-blood. Among the Ionian s c i e n t i s t s however 
there was complete agreement that the soul i s a physical substance, 
(cttvjpotr XKV4,vjJo() , and l i k e the body needs sustinence, which i t obtains 
by the process of breathing. Death i s merely the cessation of t h i s process. 
C.F. (t o breathe one's l a s t ) . Anaximefles t e s t i f i e s to the intimate 
connection between the soul of man and the soul of the cosmos, conceived 
as a l i v i n g organism.* The cosmos too has i t s own rhythm of l i f e and i t s 
* Any theory which deviated from t h i s tendency to regard the world as a 
l i v i n g body £co. The Atomists, did not take f i r m rest i n the ancient 
world. 
(5) 
3 laws are basically organic. We s h a l l see Plato making use of the same 
macrocosmic analogy i n the 'Timaeus'. 
According to Orphic/Pythagorean doctrine, l i f e i s a penance by 
which man atones f o r the sin of the Titans. The immortal part of him i s 
entombed i n the mortal; so that his d i v i n i t y i s constantly exposed to 
corruption. A l l l i f e i s a rehearsal for death when the virtuous soul, 
a f t e r the necessary number of incarnations, rejoins the company of the 
immortal gods and heroes. However, t h i s dualism i s something new i n 
Greek thought. Nowhere i n Milesian philosophy, or i n the Homeric poems, 
i s there anything similar to t h i s conception of the soul as generically 
d i f f e r e n t from the body, or that i t i s i n the very nature of the former 
to r u l e the l a t t e r *. According to the €*ni|U€^ £cofTv|J theory of 
the Pythagoreans, the soul must reproduce on the microcosmic scale the 
'harmonia' of the macrocosm, but gradually, as a result of Socrates' 
reaching out against science, the ' s p i r i t u a l ' soul replaced the e a r l i e r 
organic conception of the soul as a physical e n t i t y . 
The question as to whether Socrates believed i n a ' s p i r i t u a l ' 
or 'moral' soul, as opposed to one that might be termed 'metaphysical', 
i.e. immortal^reflects the more general problem of distinguishing the 
h i s t o r i c a l Socrates from that wraith fed on pure Platonism. In the l i g h t 
of Socrates' antipathy to science, and more especially to reasoning based 
on a p r i o r i ' p r i nciples, we may inte r p r e t his 'doctrine' of the soul as 
the r e f l e c t i o n of his b e l i e f i n the autonomy of ethics, by which he 
demonstrates the self - s u f f i c i e n c y of the individual and his r i g h t to be 
treated as an end i n himself, precisely because he equated the soul with 
the faculty of human reason. Plato's philosopher, on the other hand i s 
quite the reverse. Only the state i s s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t and an e n d - i n - j t s e l f , 
and the universal application of the theory of 'tending the soul' i s the 
prerogative of the r u l i n g minority. 
* I agree with Thomson 'The F i r s t Philosophers' p.244, that i t was 
probably i n the mines that men f i r s t thought of l i f e as a prison and 
the body as the tomb of the soul.. 
(6) 
The new pri n c i p l e of morality which Socrates had discovered, of 
the perfectible human soul had at l a s t offered a solution to the great 
debate, and especially to those Sophists^ tf Callicles^who 
argued that since the laws of the state exist ' Jo^/ifi by convention^ 
i t i s the natural r i g h t of the stronger to break loose. Plato accepts 
that the laws of society are conventional, but under the influence of the 
Socratic doctrine of the soul, i . e . that the s p i r i t matters more than the 
fle s h , argues that the laws are also an expression of the s p i r i t u a l 
nature of man, which i s at the same time s o c i a l . * However, t h i s form of 
naturalism i s so vague that i t may be used to defend anything. There i s 
nothing that has ever occurred to man which could not be claimed to be 
natural; f o r i f i t were not i n his nature, how could i t have occurred to 
him ? I t i s precisely t h i s vagueness i n theory which bedevils the organic 
state i n practice. There i s however one major difference between the 
Socratic and Platonic soul. Whereas Socrates regarded the soul as 
i n i t i a l l y a 'tubula rasa', Plato offers a theory of i t s innate imperfection, 
which i s indicative of i t s lack of se l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , and i t s necessary 
correction only w i t h i n the state. Thus, we witness something l i k e a 
theory of 'original s i n ' , as a result of man's f a l l from the 'Golden Age 
of Cronos'. 
The organic analogy between the t r i - p a r t i t e soul and state w i l l 
be discussed i n d e t a i l below. Here, i t i s my int e n t i o n to end t h i s 
survey of the 'philosophic' soul, w i t h an account of Plato's f i n a l version 
as presented i n the 'Timaeus1. The extreme dualism of the 'Phaedo1, to 
w i t , the world of the senses and that of the i n t e l l e c t , i s amended, by 
f a l l i n g back on the micro/macrocosmic analogy, so frequently used by the 
Pre-Socratics. The problem i s to postulate a cause of motion, i n sensible 
objects, and the solution i s to replace the soul defined as the 'knowing 
f a c u l t y 1 (of the 'Phaedo'), with one, the essence and.definition of which, 
( O o f ' ^ K f l r t A d y o i ) i s the pdwer of moving i t s e l f ( K\\/V^O-<L03$ 
<L\J £(/0T^3 )• Moreover, just as the individual has a soul, t h i s 
* The state and i t s laws exist. 'fl/jo^n. ' f o r Plato. 
( 7 ) 
presupposes a macrocosmic equivalent. Indeed, the world i s described as a 
l i v i n g being endowed with soul. ( |^cW \ ). The 
essential kinship between the two souls i s emphasised, the human variety 
created from an i n f e r i o r mixture of the same ingredients namely, Being, 
Some and Other. How f a r Plato regards the world as an organism can be 
judged by his statement that although the i n t e l l e c t alone i s immortal, 
being the divine part of the soul, the soul i t s e l f i s present i n the 
highest to the lowest of l i v i n g things, and even plants possess the lowest 
part of i t . i . e . nothing i s t o t a l l y inanimate. We must remember of course, 
that Plato himself emphasises that the myth i n the 'Timaeus' i s a 
'probable story", ( tl |< \J3& |VV)cro£ ) , the subject being i n a category of 
things that cannot be proven although one belives them to be true, but.is 
nevertheless a serious contribution to thought.The immortal part of the 
soul, the i n t e l l e c t , w i l l return to the great soul of the universe at 
death, f o r the aim of the Platonic philosopher., has always been, to l i v e 
on a universal plane and to lose himself more and more i n contemplation 
of the t r u t h . Hence, the soul i s individual only i n so fa r as i t i s 
imperfect. 
I f the l a t t e r i s true, then i t i s but a short step to the 
supression of a l l individualism to the interests of the c o l l e c t i v e whole. 
Plato's philosophy i n t h i s sense i s a complete reversal Of the Socratic 
doctrine, and i s based on the two principles that individualism must not 
in f e c t the state, and collectivism must permeate the i n d i v i d u a l . 
In another sense Plato owes much to his master. 
Socrates by abandoning the s c i e n t i f i c view of man and nature which had 
been developed by the thinkers of the Ionian school, substituted f o r i t 
a development of the religious school of thought, which had come down 
from Pythagoras and Parmenides. By so doing he paved the way f o r the 
f i r s t assertion of the primacy of s p i r i t to matter i . e . of philosophical 
idealism, which i n the works of Plato., represents the culmination of the 
Pythagorean/Parmeflidean attacks on m a t e r i a l i s t i c science. 
(8) 
PLATO'S POLITICAL THEORY 
(1) THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE. 
'Change i n any society starts with disagreement among the 
ru l i n g class: as long as the r u l i n g class remains united even i f i t 
i s quite small, no change i s possible'(Republic 545d). 
The function of the 'Republic' i s to reveal the deficiencies of existing 
states by comparison with the one perfectly j u s t order. Although his 
judgement of actual states takes the form of a progressive degeneration 
from the ideal, from timocracy, oligarchy, democracy to tyrannyj Plato 
does not imagine there ever actually was an ideal state i n the beginning 
and expresses grave doubts as to i t s future p r a c t i c a b i l i t y . Moreover, i f 
the ideal state never existed, then the change to timocracy etc i s purely 
theo r e t i c a l , and i f i t did exist how could such a perfect body contain 
the seeds of i t s own destruction ? Racial degeneration thus appears as 
a 'deus ex machina1 and the idea of history as a process of social decay 
a mere dramatic device, as for example i n his frequent references to the 
statesman being a physician to the swtebody of society . I t may well be 
that Plato's theory of h i s t o r i c a l change was simply that i t i s inevitable 
i f the state pursues any end other than that of the 'Idea of the Good'. 
Plato's ideal state, based upon the examples of the most 
stable i n s t i t u t i o n s of his time, i.e. the ancient t r i b a l aristocracies 
of .Sparta and Crete may be j u s t l y compared to an organism, precisely 
because of the elimination o* any trace of p o l i t i c a l of class struggle. 
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As Popper points out , 'the c e l l s and tissues of an organism, which are 
sometimes said to correspond to the members of a state, may perhaps 
compete for food, but there i s no inherent tendency on the part of the 
legs to become the brain, or of other members of the body to become the 
bel l y ' . Thus, i f the organic theory of the state i s applied to class 
society, i t i s based on a false analogy, since the essence of an organism 
i s that each member has a natural, but unequal function to perform. 
(9) 
I f one member usurps the function of another, the result i s i n j u s t i c e , not 
suffered by the in d i v i d u a l , but only by the co l l e c t i v e whole i . e . the 
state. Although there i s no fundamental antithesis between TT<?AiS 
and T loXiTVj ' i i n G r e e k p o l i t i c a l thought (except f o r the Cynics), 
Plato's philosophy nevertheless represents a departure from the main 
stream i n regarding j u s t i c e as something transcending 'subjective morality' 
and i d e n t i f i e d with 'social morality'. Happiness and j u s t i c e l i e i n the 
attainment of ' My Station and i t s Duties'. 
An important p r i n c i p l e of method i s involved here, namely that 
the state i s given private examination as a means of examining the role of 
the individual . 'We may therefore f i n d that the amount of j u s t i c e i n the 
larger e n t i t y i s greater, and so easier to recognise. I accordingly 
propose that we s t a r t our enquiry with the community and then proceed to 
the individual and see i f we can f i n d i n a smaller e n t i t y anything 
corresponding to what we have found i n the larger'*. Although Socrates i s 
the speaker, the passage i n fact represents a complete reversal of 
everything Socrates believed i n . His interest i n the state was at a l l 
times minimal, only receiving attention i n so f a r as i t affected the 
basic question Of the freedom of the in d i v i d u a l , and more especially his 
r i g h t to perform that duty incumbent upon him qua i n d i v i d u a l , namely 
Not only i s the Aristotelian/Platonic question: 'Are the good 
man and good c i t i z e n the same ?' not yet formulated, but Socrates' b e l i e f 
i n the 'Unwritten Laws' involves the p o s s i b i l i t y of a duty over and above 
that owed to the state. But f o r Plato, the state has i t s basis i n the 
innate imperfection of the i n d i v i d u a l , not i n his self - s u f f i c i e n c y to 
decide moral questions f o r himself. Similarly, Socrates' doctrine that the 
l i f e which man leads, depends on his soul more than his body, i s accepted 
T5y~P-iato i n i t s outward form, but the two 'souls' are t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t . 
For Socrates, the soul i s that 'knowing faculty' or 'reason' which 
distinguishes man qua man. For Plato, the soul i s t r i - p a r t i t e , one part 
that defined\>y Socrates, the other two representing that corruption of 
* The fact that the state i s the 'individual w/Lt large' i s the basis of 
Plato's organic theory. 
(10) 
the soul, which i s the premise of his whole p o l i t i c a l philosophya,ihe 
state i t s e l f i s regarded as a soul, exercising oyer the whole community 
the same power as the individual's soul over his body, and the 
structure of the human soul i s analogous to that of a class-divided 
society. 
'Because of i t s s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , the ideal state appears to 
Plato, as the perfect i n d i v i d u a l , and the individual c i t i z e n , as an 
imperfect copy of the state. I t has been noted however, that Plato's 
version of the organic theory does not depend on i t s likeness to another 
organism, as for example the'commonwealth' of John of Salisbury, but 
rather to the human soul. Plato i s here dealing with the perennial 
question of 'unity i n d i v e r s i t y ' * . The soul i s a unity, when i t s three 
parts each perform t h e i r a l l o t e d function, corresponding to the three 
parts of the state, the guardians (reason), the warriors (energy), the 
economic class (animal i n s t i n c t s ) , but Plato goes as far as to oppose 
these parts to one another as i f they were d i s t i n c t and c o n f l i c t i n g 
persons **. Only the stable whole, the permanent c o l l e c t i v e , has r e a l i t y 
not passing individuals, who are altogether i n f e r i o r . ' I l e g i s l a t e with a 
view to what i s best f o r the whole state f o r I j u s t l y place the interests 
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of the individual on an i n f e r i o r level of value ' .. Plato thereby reverses 
the Socratic doctrine of the<>^T^j0K€»a<'of the in d i v i d u a l , with a theory 
of the interdependence of the l a t t e r and society. 
As we have seen, change can only occur as a result of dissension 
among the r u l i n g class, simply because however disgruntled the economic 
classes become, they have no p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y power. 
* i.e. A cosmological problem 'brought down to earth'. 
** Whether the average member of the economic class i s a complete person 
i s discussed i n the conclusion to the discussion of the Guardian 
class. 
(11) 
The f i r s t form i n t o which the perfect state degenerates *, 
timocracy the rule of ambitious nobleman, (i.e.Sparta) w i l l , by errors 
i n breeding, and by the clash of the old values with the new 'Mammon' 
of wealth, decay s t i l l further i n t o oligarchy. Oligarchy not only 
recognises wealth as the standard by which fitness to rule i s estimated** 
but brings with i t the dreaded d i v i s i o n i n t o r i c h and poor,, which the 
'Republic' f o r a l l i t s f a u l t s , t r i e s to i r r a d i c a t e . The embittered, 
pauperised majority, eventually overthrow the ' c a p i t a l i s t ' class, although 
i f anything, they have even fewer pretensions to knowledge. Plato finds 
especially repugnant the idea that specialisation i s undemocratic, for 
the p r i n c i p l e of the d i v i s i o n of function i s the cardinal feature of the 
ideal state. Other offences committed by democracy include the claim of 
equal rights f o r a l l , freedom of speech and action, and especially the 
freedom of private l i f e from o f f i c i a l control. 'Nor should the mind of 
anybody be habituated to l e t t i n g him do anything at a l l on his own 
i n i t i a t i v e : . He should teach his soul, never to dream of acting 
, (8) 
independently, and to become u t t e r l y incapable of i t 
But extreme l i b e r t y leads to extreme sujection. In the 
('9) 
'Statesman' wher.er an- analysis of the d i f f e r e n t states i s made on the 
basis of consent and violence, Plato uses the same word I^ j^jyoKpo('T«tX'i f o r 
what we c a l l democracy and i t s opposite tyranny, which shows that Plato 
i s not seriously interested i n the principles of consent and violence, fo r 
each distinguishes a thoroughly i n f e r i o r Tl oA^'ff.iof . The t r a n s i t i o n 
between democracy and tyranny i s most easily effected by a popular leader, 
who while championing the cause of the poor, succeeds i n building up a 
private army of his own. Consequently, his absolute power corrupts him 
absolutely 'A precise d e f i n i t i o n of a tyrannical man i s one who, 
either by b i r t h or habit or both, combines the characteristics of 
drunkenness, l u s t and madness*. Plato's description i s no doubt coloured 
se vie* , x 
* This i s not, i n my opinion, to be regarded as h i s t o r i c a l aonoc (q.v.) 
** Only oligarchy of the four types contains the seeds of i t s own 
destruction. 
(12) 
by his experience, with Oionysius tyrant of Syracuse, as i s that of 
democracy, by his hatred of Athenian society, but whereas we may agree, 
with Sinclair that 'whatever one may think of Plato's ideal state, 
his picture of i t s opposite i s convincing enough, 'to wit a benevolent 
(12) 
tyranny' , which by d e f i n i t i o n must also suppress the freedom of 
the i n d i v i d u a l , receives unqualified praise. 'Give me a state governed 
by a young tyrant, who has the good fortune to be the contemporary of a 
great l e g i s l a t o r (Plato, for example ?). What more could a god do f o r a 
c i t y which he wants to make happy .?' 
To sum up, Plato's whole philosophy i s a search f o r unity amid 
d i v e r s i t y , for permanence i n a world of f l u x , the fundamental impulse of 
which must have arisen as a result of the period of wars and p o l i t i c a l 
s t r i f e through which he had l i v e d . The famous seventh l e t t e r corroborates 
t h i s : 'the result was that I , who had at f i r s t been f u l l of eagerness for 
a public career, as I gazed upon the whirlpool of public l i f e and saw the 
incessant movement of s h i f t i n g currents, at l a s t f e l t dizzy and 
f i n a l l y saw clearly i n regard-to a l l states now existing that without 
exception t h e i r system of government i s bad'. Although Plato decided 
that what was needed was a re-examination of f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s , t h i s did 
not e n t a i l the removal of the accepted antitheses of the Rulers and the 
Ruled, or the Few and the Many, and t h e i r replacement by a theory of the 
r e l a t i v e claims of the state and i n d i v i d u a l . On the contrary, the f a u l t 
of a l l the existing constitutions, was precisely that they had f a i l e d to 
provide that unity made necessary by the indissoluble interdependence of 
the two. 
(13) 
(2) UNITY IN DIVERSITY. 
'Our purpose i n founding our state was not to promote the 
happiness of a single class, but so far as possible, of the whole 
community' (Republic 420b). 
Plato's analysis of the imperfect societies: led him to 
postulate as the fundamental cause of t h e i r f a i l u r e to secure unity 
and harmony between the d i f f e r e n t classes, the neglect of the natural 
p r i n c i p l e of inequality upon which society i t s e l f was founded. 
Disintegration i s the di r e c t result of a breakdown i n the d i v i s i o n of 
function i.e. of specialisation when every member performs the function 
he i s naturally most suited f o r . 'Interference by the three classes with 
each others jobs, and interchange of jobs between them, does the greatest 
harm to our state, and we are e n t i r e l y j u s t i f i e d i n c a l l i n g i t the worst 
(13) 
of e v i l s ' . Obviously i n th i s society of experts, some w i l l hold f a r 
more important positions than others, so to avoid a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of 
disunity, j u s t i c e i s equated with inequality and vice-versa. To impress 
t h i s p r i n c i p l e on a largely antipathetic Athenian audience, Plato 
concocts a myth for the consumption of both the i n f e r i o r and superior 
parties i n the state*. 
The purpose of t h i s 'noble l i e ' i s twofold; to increase the 
lo y a l t y of the members to the state and to one another. 'You are a l l of 
you i n t h i s land, brothers. But when God fashioned you, He added gold 
i n the composition of those of you who are q u a l i f i e d to be Rulers; 
He put s i l v e r i n the A u x i l i a r i e s , and iron and bronze i n the farmers and 
(14) 
the rest' . This 'rich man i n his castle, the poor man at his gate' 
a t t i t u d e , which a l l the classes are expected to accept as natural af t e r a 
few generations, i s Plato's solution to the problem of p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t a b i l i t y . Rigid class d i v i s i o n , reinforced by an educational programme 
* See footnote to Cross and Woojley: 'Plato's Republic p.19617. 
(14) 
devoted e n t i r e l y to the r u l i n g class, w i l l secure the future p u r i t y of 
the metals, i . e . w i l l confirm the superiority of the rulers and the 
u t t e r prostration of the ruled. Proposals f o r promotion from the lower 
orders are not I think to be taken seriously, especially i n view of 
(15) 
t h e i r l a t e r rejection by Plato himself . That philosopher-kings 
(16) 
defined as 'lovers of t r u t h are not only to administer a great 
many l i e s and deceptions: for the 'benefit of the ruled* but also to 
believe them,* shows to what extremities Plato was driven i n his 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the state by function. The v i r t u e of keeping to one's 
appointed place i s also that of the whole i.e. of being properly 
harmonised. 'And so we are quite j u s t i f i e d i n regarding d i s c i p l i n e as 
t h i s sort of natural harmony and agreement between higher and lower 
(17) 
about which of them i s to rule i n state and i n d i v i d u a l ' . Justice 
therefore equals the interest of the state, which i n turn means, a 
s t r i c t maintainance of the 'status quo 1. 
Justice, therefore the l a s t of the four cardinal virtues on 
which the state must be founded, i s found to be a property of the whole, 
and 'consists i n minding your own business and not i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h 
(18) 
other people' . Discipline, i . e . an unquestioning b e l i e f i n the 
i n e x o r a b i l i t y of the established order i s the only redeemable feature 
of the t h i r d class. The A u x i l i a r i e s embodying Courage, and the Guardians 
'Wisdom', work hand i n hand i n benevolent despotism. * The passages referred to are 389b and 414c. 
This apparent contradiction receives attention from Cross and Woo^Ley 
i n t h e i r book 'Plato's Republic' p.196/7 where they point out that 
Plato verges on 'double-talk'. For example, when he declares that the 
philosopher w i l l never tolerate falsehood, but w i l l hate i t and love 
the t r u t h ' (485c) falsehood here refers to 'ignorance i n the soul' 
(382b). Adam comments as follows: 'the d i s t i n c t i o n between veritable 
and spoken l i e s enables Plato to c a l l his i d e a l l y rulers i d e a l l y 
t r u t h f u l , even when p r a c t i c a l l y they t e l l l i e s ' . The medicinal l i e 
(459c) as an instrument of government 'for the good of the c i t y ' shows 
that l i e s are tolerated i n as f a r as they are transcended by a higher 
stage of t r u t h and j u s t i c e . 
(15) 
'So the state founded on natural principles ( k<x*TfiC ^ O&W ) i s wise as 
a whole i n v i r t u e of the knowledge inherent i n i t s smallest constituent 
(19) 
class, which exercises authority over the rest' . This leads to the 
c r i t i c i s m that Plato's organic theory i s not organic enough i n that a l l 
the virtues other than wisdom are modes of obedience, i.e that the 
t h i r d class consists of members who are less than f u l l human beings. For 
the moment however we must be content to note that such a d i v i s i o n i n 
the state i s 'according to nature', the argument being endorsed by 
Plato's introduction of the analogy between the structure of the state 
and that of the human soul. Justice exists when a l l three elements of 
mind, l i k e the three classes i n the state, perform t h e i r proper function. 
The constituents of the human mind are the f a c i l i t i e s of reason, desire 
or appetite and the lower i n s t i n c t s , and the character of the individual 
as of the state, w i l l depend on which of the three predominates. The 
second element, often translated ' s p i r i t e d ' , a l l i e s i t s e l f w i t h the 
ra t i o n a l against the i r r a t i o n a l part, and i n the nature of things 
i s subordinate to the former, which must be the guiding and c o n t r o l l i n g 
p r i n c i p l e . Complete v i r t u e consists i n the proper ordering and control of 
the various emotional tendencies by knowledge. 'So the reason ought to 
ru l e , having the a b i l i t y and foresight to act for the whole, and the 
s p i r i t ought to obey and support i t * ' . Thus, Plato's social and 
individual psychology are so linked that order and disorder al i k e i n 
states are the outward and v i s i b l e sign of order and disorder i n the 
souls of men. Popper, I am sure i s r i g h t when he deduces from t h i s 
analogy some hint of the scale of the mental c o n f l i c t i n Plato's own mind 
* Republic 442. Similar doctrines can be found i n the 'Phaedrus' where 
the soul i s compared to a charioteer with two horses one good, one 
bad. 
(16) 
' I t must be some kind of int e r n a l quarrel between these same three 
elements, when they i n t e r f e r e with each other and trespass on each 
others functions, because i t s natural role was one of subordination 
to: the control of the superior, which produces i n j u s t i c e , (indiscipline, 
i (21) 
cowardice, ignorance and vice of a l l kinds' . Justice i s a r i g h t 
order, a healthy condition w i t h i n the soul of man or state, attained 
only when each member performs his destined function. 
(4) We can detect here the influence of the medical w r i t e r s who: talked 
about the r i g h t condition of the human body ( I &(A,\o\J 
I t i s but a short step to describe human conduct i n the same, 
terms. 
(17) 
(3). THE UNITY OF THE ELITE 
'Our citizens are devoted to a common in t e r e s t , which they 
c a l l t h e i r own; and i n consequence e n t i r e l y share each others feelings 
of joy and sorrow. And the element i n pur constitution to which t h i s i s 
due i s the community of women and children i n the Guardian class' 
(Republic 464A). 
Although Plato follows the Pre-Socratic method of looking for 
unity amid d i v e r s i t y , his extreme dualism between the sensible and 
i n t e l l i g i b l e world the One and the Many, body and soul, universal and 
par t i c u l a r , rulers and ruled etc, prevents him from deriving t h i s unity 
from a l l the elements of the whole. On the contrary, j u s t as the wisdom 
of the state i s that of the part, (q.v.), so does i t s unity come from 
the same source. For example, although Plato at one point (462c) regards 
the ideal state as an organism i n which an i n j u r y suffered by a member i s 
shared by the whole;'a community w i l l regard the individual who 
experiences gain or loss as a part of i t s e l f , and be glad or sorry as a 
whole accordingly', he i s l a t e r g u i l t y of the most extreme callousness 
i n advancing the p r i n c i p l e that sick members i.e . those unable to 
perform t h e i r function should be l e f t to die since they burden the 
(22) 
resources of the state . Plato himself must have been aware of thi s 
contradiction, and the answer must be that the state and i t s unity i s 
i d e n t i f i e d with the Guardian class alone, a not unreasonable conclusion 
i n view of the poverty of information offered about the second and t h i r d 
classes. However i f the state i s organically one then one would expect 
the stronger to carry the weaker members. 
(23) 
ECONOMICS: Most writers refer to Plato s abhorrence of class 
c o n f l i c t , especially the r e s u l t i n g d i v i s i o n between r i c h and poor, as the 
reason for his passionate insistence on unity i n his ideal state. 
The class struggle as such is.abolished by the s t r i c t e s t 
d i v i s i o n of function between the m i l i t a r y power of the r u l i n g e l i t e , and 
the economic class who are guaranteed f u l l b e l l i e s i n exchange for empty 
heads, by having a l l p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s withdrawn. An important point i s 
(18) 
that, to: use Marxist terminology the economic classes do control the' 
'means of production i f not d i s t r i b u t i o n and exchange'. To that extent 
they have attained t h e i r gcgrf* The complete separation of private property 
from p o l i t i c a l power wins the approval of Crossman among others, but one 
must be wary as Baker points out*. Just as important i s that the state 
(24) 
must be economically s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t otherwise the philosopher-kings 
w i l l remain at the mercy of the traders and secondly importation of goods 
involves the danger of innovation i n the f i e l d of ideas which must be 
avoided at a l l costs once the perfect system has been l a i d down. Plato 
the sociologist, was only too well aware of the role played by trade i n 
the breakdown of the old myths, and the effect of imperialism on 
domestic p o l i t i c s . 
After private property, family affe c t i o n presents the greatest 
danger to the unity of the state **. Wives and children w i l l therefore 
be held i n common, the ideal being that no c h i l d should know his parent 
and vice-versa. The sexual i n s t i n c t w i l l be catered for; at regular 
f e s t i v a l s devoted to the breeding of the master-race. I n t h i s way the 
r u l i n g class w i l l f e e l l i k e one big family never doubting its'.'superiority 
to the ' t o i l i n g masses' with whom contact i s s t r i c t l y forbidden, i.e. no 
mixture of the metals. However, i n both classes the claims of individuals 
y ^ j l d before the interest of the c o l l e c t i v e whole, to which end a l l that 
i s personal must be eradicated. The above measures ' w i l l prevent that 
dissension that s t a r t s when d i f f e r e n t people c a l l d i f f e r e n t things, t h e i r 
own, and when each has his own wife and children, his own private joys 
and sorrows] for our c i t i z e n s , whose interests are i d e n t i c a l and whose 
* Greek P o l i t i c ^ a l theory: Plato and his Predecessors p.147. ' I t i s 
d i f f i c u l t to agree with the view that the reform of t h i s state proposed 
by Plato i s meant as an economic reform of an economic e v i l . Plato may 
touch upon economic questions; but he always regards them as moral 
questions aff e c t i n g the l i f e of man as a member of a moral society. He 
may speak for instance, i n praise of d i v i s i o n of labour; but we soon 
learn that d i v i s i o n of labour concerns him, not as a method of economic 
production, but as a means to the moral well being of the community'. 
** This p r i m i t i v e communism i s manifestly that of the Spartan m i l i t a r y 
aristocracy. 
(19) 
E f f o r t s are a l l directed to the same end, feel almost a l l t h e i r joys and 
(25) » 
sorrows together. However, Adeimantus lodges the obvious objection that, 
i f the rulers are to have none of the perks usually associated w i t h a 
(26) 
bureauaracy, how w i l l they be happy ? . Plato's reply i s of course, 
that the purpose i n founding the state i s to secure the happiness of the 
whole, not that of a single class. But there i s something more; the idea 
of vocation which plays such an important part i n Plato's p o l i t i c a l 
philosophy, and the equation of happiness with duty. -The Guardians must 
be persuaded*, as indeed must everyone else, that i t i s t h e i r business 
to perfect themselves i n t h e i r own p a r t i c u l a r job. Their reward i s that 
they and t h e i r children are maintained and have a l l t h e i r needs supplied 
at public cost, that they are held i n universal honour while they l i v e , 
(27) 
and given a worthy b u r i a l when they die' . Only those whose personality 
i s completely i d e n t i f i e d with t h e i r role i n the state, could tolerate the 
conditions l a i d down for the Guardians. However, Plato does use ah 
organic analogy to defend his apparent severity. I f we were painting a 
statue, we would meet the c r i t i c i s m that we had hot coloured the eyes 
(28), 
red i n t h i s way; I t i s absurd to expect us to represent the beauty 
of the eye i n a way which does not make i t look l i k e an eye at a l l , and 
the same i s true of the other parts of the body; you should look rather 
to see whether we have made the whole beautiful by giving the part i t s due. 
So i n the present case don't make us give our Guardians the kind of 
happiness that w i l l make them anything but Guardians.' Whereupon, the 
reply usually given i s that, although the state may be more important than 
the individual the l a t t e r must s t i l l have a root i.e. a personality to the 
f u l l , which entails the existence of the family and private property **. 
* Or to put i t another way, having once seen the 'Idea of the Good' the 
philosopher-king i s most reluctant to serve humanity by entering the 
cave again.'The purpose of our l e g i s l a t i o n i s not to enable everyone to 
please himself but to make each man a l i n k i n the unity of the whole'. 
(520) 
** This i s especially the view of the 'Idealists' notably Bosanquet (q.y.) 
I t i s strange that supporters of the organic theory should d i f f e r on 
t h i s basic point. 
(20) 
EDUCATION 
As one would expect i n an organic state, education i s not 
valued as an end i n i t s e l f . , but as a powerful instrument of class r u l e , 
i . e . a p o l i t i c a l weapon. In contrast to Socrates who saw the problem of 
reforming the c i t y - s t a t e as one of educating a l l the citizens to s e l f -
c r i t i c i s m , i.e. to a position where they recognised t h e i r own ignorance, 
Plato considers the common man u t t e r l y unreasonable and incapable of 
self-government, regards the solution as one of the s t r i c t education 
of an i n t e l l e c t u a l e l i t e . p r e c i s e l y that kind of professional learning so 
often decried by Socrates i n his attacks on the Sophists. Thus Plato 
rejects Socrates 1 fundamental p r i n c i p l e that knowledge of t r u t h and 
r e a l i t y i s present at a l l times i n a l l souls, but i t i s the: latent 
unconscious knowledge of Meno's slave. I n t e l l e c t u a l freedom i n rulers 
and ruled al i k e must be suppressed i n the interests, of s t a b i l i t y . 'Those 
i n charge of our state must s t i c k to the system of education and see 
that no deterioration creeps i n ; xhey must maintain i t as a f i r s t 
p r i o r i t y and avoid at a l l costs any innovation i n the established 
(29) 
l i t e r a r y or physical curriculum . '. The humble universal s p i r i t of 
enquiry i s d istorted by Plato i n t o the omniscience of a t o t a l i t a r i a n 
(30) 
bureaucracy. Popper c r i t i c i s e s Crossman, because the l a t t e r agrees 
wit h Plato precisely on t h i s point that education should be a major 
res p o n s i b i l i t y of the state. The attack i s however based on the false 
premise that the i d e n t i c a l solutions are offered to i d e n t i c a l problems 
which i s certainly not the case. Whereas Plato looks on state control of 
education as the prime instrument i n securing the irrevocable d i v i s i o n 
of classes, Crossman sees i t as the only solution to the problem of 
'equality of opportunity' so long associated with mere possession of 
wealth- Moreover underlying t h i s argument i s Crossman's modern 
conception of the state as 'neutral', and not a means for the oppression 
of one class by another. 
(21) 
That education i s a monopoly of the r u l i n g class follows 
l o g i c a l l y from the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the unity and by the same token, 
the fate of the state with the quali t y of i t s leaders. Plato's p r i n c i p l e 
i s the simple one of reform from above, namely of putting the r i g h t people 
i n charge of the ideal blueprint, together with the. suppression of a l l 
innovation. What i s surprising however, i s the complete negation of any 
freedom of thought i n the t r a i n i n g of so called 'philosophers'. Although 
the danger of disintegration may have been a very real one, one cannot 
c • 
but regard the replacement of common sentiment, (oUo\JO\°? ) by a 
*- r r ' 
common set of b e l i e f s (0jjL)cJ bo b 1 ° 0 both i n the ruling, class and the 
state as a whole, as a t o t a l i t a r i a n step. Drastic censorship of l i t e r a t u r e , 
especially of the poets i s the inevitable repercussion. The philosophers 
must be taught that God i s the source of good only, and t h e i r performance 
on earth w i l l affect t h e i r chances i n heaven. They therefore act not from 
any benevolence inherent i n t h e i r superior q u a l i t i e s qua Guardians but 
from fear ! In the theocratic state of the 'Laws' the 'Nocturnal Council' 
w i l l deal with a l l those souls whose opinion about the Gods deviates from 
the ' o f f i c i a l l i n e ' . Plato may here be remembering the words; of his uncle 
C r i t i a s , a thorough-going atheist: 'Since the laws only prevented the 
commission of deeds of open violence,men continued to commit secret 
crimes. At t h i s point i t i s my b e l i e f that some far-seeing and resolute 
man saw the need f o r a deterent which would have effec t when secret deeds 
were done or contemplated. So he introduced the. idea of d i v i n i t y , of a 
god always active and vigorous, hearing and seeing w i t h his mind a l l that 
men say and do'. Thus r e l i g i o n joins forces with the state i n 
suppressing a l l individualism, and without doubt Socrates would have 
been an early victim. 
Plato's' problem i n the f i e l d of education was to i r r a d i c a t e 
the dualism between i t s l i t e r a r y and physical aspects, and especially 
to emphasise the beneficial e f f e c t of the l a t t e r on the soul, the 
improvement of which i s the chief purpose of a l l education. The lack of 
( 2 2 ) 
harmony between the two was the chief cause of degeneration i n the two 
most important states of his time.. 'Have you noticed, how a l i f e l o n g 
devotion to physical exercise to the exclusion of anything else, produces 
a certain type of mind ? Just as the neglect of i t produces another 
type ? One tends to be tough and u n c i v i l i s e d , (Sparta) the other soft 
(31) 
and over-sensitive' (Athens) . This explains why the only characters 
allowed i n the l i t e r a t u r e read by the Guardians are men of 'courage, 
s e l f - c o n t r o l , independence and religious p r i n c i p l e ' . However, although 
'effeminacy' must be avoided at a l l costs, the element of fierceness 
must be s t r i c t l y contained i f the r u l i n g class are not to oppress t h e i r 
subjects, by v i r t u e of t h e i r unchallengeable power'. Indeed i t would be 
simply monstrous i f the shepherds should keep dogs, ( a u x i l i a r i e s ) who 
(32) 
would worry the sheep, behaving l i k e wolves rather than dogs . Thus, 
self - c o n t r o l i n the Guardian class i s essential to the s t a b i l i t y of the 
state, which fo r Plato i s always the supreme consideration. 'And so we 
may venture to assert that anyone who can produce the best blend of the 
physical and i n t e l l e c t u a l sides of education and apply them to the 
t r a i n i n g of character, i s producing harmony i n a far more important sense 
. (33) 
than any mere musician 
I t i s important to note that t h i s early physical and l i t e r a r y 
education which occupies the potential Guardian u n t i l the age of twenty, 
i s the prerogative not of the whole citizen, body, but only of the o f f -
spring of the e x i s t i n g aristocracy, i n whom, as Plato would believe, the 
q u a l i t i e s of a Philosopher-King are most l i k e l y to be found *. For the 
next t h i r t y years the future Guardian w i l l devote himself to a study of 
the world of forms culminating i n the v i s i o n of the 'Idea of the Good', 
which Plato confesses himself unable to define. The whole purpose of t h i s 
higher education i n mathematical and d i a l e c t i c a l studies i s to enhance 
the f e e l i n g of u n i t y and e l i t i s m and especially the desire to u t i l i s e t h i s 
knowledge i n the interests of the almost i l l i t e r a t e demos **. 'So we must 
* I n our own time supposed innate q u a l i t i e s of leadership i n the ranks of 
the Tory party have only recently been dispelled. 
** I t i s almost certain that Plato did not intend that the t h i r d class 
should learn anything beyond t h e i r profession. 
(23) 
choose from among our guardians those who appear to us, when we scrutinise 
t h e i r whole career, to be most completely devoted to the interests of the 
(34) 
community, and never prepared to act against them'' . As the allegory 
of the Cave reveals those engaged i n i n t e l l e c t u a l pursuits look upon 
pr a c t i c a l a f f a i r s as altogether i n f e r i o r . They would l i k e to remain i n the 
to 
upper world, and refuse return t o the prisoners, below and share t h e i r 
(35) 
labours and rewards . But reluctance on the part of the rulers to rule 
i s precisely a condition of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . 'The state whose rulers 
come to t h e i r duties w i t h least enthusiasm i s bound to have the best and 
most t r a n q u i l government, and the state whose rulers are eager to rule the 
worst'. Plato i s obviously thinking of the ambitious p o l i t i c i a n who uses 
public o f f i c e f o r private gain. Thus the early t r a i n i n g from the age of 
twenty to t h i r t y f i v e i s interspersed w i t h periods of pr a c t i c a l work i n 
subordinate positions of re s p o n s i b i l i t y . Then, those who have survived a l l 
the processes of selection, take up the important administrative posts i n 
the c i t y , and only when they have reached the age of f i f t y , are they 
released from t h e i r day to day duties, and allowed to s a t i s f y t h e i r 
personal desire to contemplate the eternal tr u t h s , although they are 
s t i l l required to exercise a general supervision over the running of the 
state of which they remain the supreme authority. 
That Plato i s merely following the organic analogy to i t s 
l o g i c a l conclusion i s beyond dispute. No member, not even philosophers, 
are allowed to engage i n any a c t i v i t y that does not have direct relevance 
to the interest of the state. 'The object of our leg i s l a t i o n , . I reminded 
him again' i s not the welfare of any pa r t i c u l a r class, but of the whole 
community. I t was persuasion or force to unite a l l citizens and make them 
share together the benefits which each i n d i v i d u a l l y can confer on the 
community: and i t s purpose i n ftostelTing t h i s a t t i t u d e i s not to enable 
everyone to please himself, but to make each man a l i n k i n the unity of (36) (37) the whole . Thus, the e a r l i e r claim that the object of 
education i s to teach us to love beauty i s f u l f i l l e d only i f we share 
Plato's view that a benevolent dictatorship i s aesthetic. 
(24) 
Moreover, there i s some j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the conclusion that 
the 'Republic' i s a very peculiar state i n that the personal happiness of 
i t s members counts fo r so l i t t l e . I t i s true that Plato ingeniously 
pronounces the tyrant 729 times more unhappy than the Philosopher King, 
but the t o t a l unconcern even for the l a t t e r ' s f u l f i l l m e n t beyond his 
social function, leads one to postulate that Plato:' s members are not 
human by his own d e f i n i t i o n . I refer here to Plato's t r i p a r t i t e d i v i s i o n 
of the soul as constituents of the soul of each member. I n r e a l i t y the 
Guardians seem to have a soul which consists e n t i r e l y of the element of 
reason, the warriors the element of courage and the economic classes that 
of the animal i n s t i n c t . Unity i n the state and unity i n the individual we 
may have, but at the cost of both, state and individual becoming a 
meaningless abstraction. Diversity, namely genuine l i f e and personality i s 
t o t a l l y lacking. 
THE AUXILIARIES. 
We have so f a r been at pains to point out that Plato sees the 
unity of the state as that of the r u l i n g class only. This suggests that 
his ultimate ideal as far as the state i s concerned, i s not unity, but 
j u s t i c e , i . e . when each member discharges that function he i s most 
naturall y suited f o r , unity i s the automatic r e s u l t . However, while 
a t t r i b u t i n g unity to the 'mystic whole', Plato neglects the more 
fundamental problem of explaining the relationship between the three 
classes. This i s doubtless, because Plato himself i s f u l l y aware that i n 
r e a l i t y the second class i s but the 'armed wing' of those philosophic souls 
who occasionally turn from contemplating the 'Idea of the Good' to 
issuing an edict which involves the suppression of the economic classes. 
We are thus presented with two watertight compartments: the armed and 
educated r u l e r s , and the unarmed and uneducated ruled. The Guardians are 
merely those A u x i l i a r i e s who have acquitted themselves with, d i s t i n c t i o n 
i n t h e i r administrative posts, which i n turn e n t i t l e s them to a f u l l 
period of d i a l e c t i c a l studies necessary fo r t h e i r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
as ' philosopher - kings . I therefore suggest that the A u x i l i a r i e s 
as a whole receive the early mathematical education,, but only a few 
pass to that concentrated study of philosophy leading to the idea of Good. 
(25) 
A l l t h i s however, i s mere conjecture because Plato does not carefully 
distinguish the t r a i n i n g of the two groups. He certainly gives the impression 
that both the Guardians and Au x i l i a r i e s areprecluded from the twin e v i l s of 
(38) 
private property and family l i f e by t h e i r status as rulers . Happiness f o r 
both classes i s of course equated with performance of duty, on the grounds 
that the welfare of the whole i s a l l that matters. But as the s t a b i l i t y of 
the state depends above a l l on the unity of i t s ru l e r s , the A u x i l i a r i e s (a) 
are not expected to do any thinking f o r themselves but swallow ' i n t o t o ' the 
opinion of the Guardians; (b) are required to moderate t h e i r unlimited power 
i n the interests of the t h i r d class. This i s supposedly guarranteed by t h e i r 
'philosophic' disposition. Thus, the confusion and sparsity of information 
as to the exact role of the A u x i l i a r i e s can only be explained by the fact 
that the d i v i s i o n was not a real one i n Plato's own mind. To use his frequent 
(39) 
analogy between the shepherd, sheep-dog and sheep , the gulf i s between 
the f i r s t two and the t h i r d , and i t i s precisely the function of Plato's 
educational programme to widen t h i s irrevocably. 
THE RULED 
The v i r t u e of temperance, of knowing one's p^ace and keeping 
to i t , i s common to a l l three classes. However, while the Guardians possess 
i n addition courage and wisdom, and the A u x i l i a r i e s courage, the passive 
acceptance of the 'status quo' i s the only v i r t u e proper t o the Workers. Their 
sole function i s to provide f o r the material needs of the r u l i n g class from 
whom as we saw above, they are separated not only physically but i n t h e i r 
scale of values. Pleasure not knowledge i s t h e i r ultimate aim, so they alone 
are permitted to enjoy family l i f e and private property, provided that 
extremes of wealth and poverty are avoided. However any signs of revolt among 
these unarmed and uneducated people can be quickly and ruthlessly suppressed 
so they do not present any danger to the unity of the state. Hence Plato's 
silence of contempt on the subject, broken only by veiled attacks on the 
workers?' 'arts. At f i r s t sight, t h i s seems hardly consistent with his e a r l i e r 
(26) 
doctrine of the expert which was used to deduce natural functions and places 
f o r everybody. We may also remind ourselves of the high esteemf i n which 
Socrates the stone-masons son held the various professions of his day. Plato's 
motive i s as always to establish the unchallengeable sovereignty of the 
r u l i n g e l i t e . Thus, the :s assertion- that the carpenter does not produce the 
(40) 
essential form of Bed, the ultimate r e a l i t y , but a p a r t i c u l a r bed. 
Although t h i s statement seems harmless enough, i t i n fact means that the power 
of invention i s taken from man who depends on i t s discovery by God. Furthermore 
(41) 
Plato distinguishes three techniques - use, manufacture, and representation 
By an ingenious piece of argument, he claims that only the user has true 
knowledge ( € H i(fT >J jJ if) ). while the manufacturer has mere r i g h t opinion 
(O^fflj &0^°C w n * l e t n e a r t i s t ' s representation i s a t h i r d remove from 
r e a l i t y 4 T h e passage runs as follows: 'The player knows about the merits and 
defects of his instruments, and the manufacturer w i l l r e l y on the player's 
judgement. The user of an implement i s therefore the man who knows about i t ; 
the manufacturer i s compelled to take instructions from him and rely on his 
knowledge, and i s so able to form a correct opinion. 
We witness here Plato's attempt to reduce a l l manual labour to 
the status of.slave labour. Although slavery i s not e x p l i c i t l y mentioned i n 
the 'Republic', there can be no doubt that the position of the t h i r d class 
(42) 
corresponds to that of well-treated slaves. Popper claims that Plato 
omits the word 'slave' f o r propagandist reasons, c i t i n g , the description of 
(43) 
the timarchic character as evidence . 'He w i l l be harsh with his slaves, 
because his imperfect education has l e f t him uncertain of his superiority to 
them'. The t a c i t conclusion must therefore be that the perfectly educated 
philosopher-kings w i l l treat t h e i r slaves with gentlemanly contempt. But 
Plato always claims that he i s looking to the welfare of the whole not that of 
the part and therefore remains true i n word at least to the principles of 
an organic theory. In r e a l i t y however, as we have seen there exists not unity 
* In accordance with the divided l i n e (Book 7.509). 
(27) 
i n differencej .but- the absolute and undifferentiated unity of the part, the 
Guardians, who.merged with A u x i l i a r i e s , seem to. become i d e n t i f i e d with the 
state, the t h i r d class disappearing altogether. The head received a 
disproportionate amount of attention, whereas the role of the feet i s unjustly 
minimised; John of Salisbury redresses t h i s balance (q.v.), as indeed does 
Bosanquet (q.v.) whose conception of social charity integrates r i c h and poor 
more f u l l y than does Plato's t o t a l i t a r i a n bureaucracy. 
THE STATESMAN 
The f i r s t book of the 'Republic' had shown that discussion£like 
what i s j u s t i c e , (Ti ^ ivo rc Tc S i K o r i o v / ' ) admit of no satisfactory 
conclusion. Hence the necessity of describing the elaborate programme of the 
'Republic', which Plato himself acknowledged to be an ideal one and never 
expected to see realised. The 'PqMtlcus' on the other hand, although being a 
theoretical study of p o l i t i c s , not only makes considerable concessions to the 
real world, but returns to the question of "Kc^AiT^Kvj T'L^V"'! , which 
Socrates himself believed i n but never defined beyond an aspect of herdsmanship. 
This i s now rejected altogether on thergrounds that i t was v a l i d only when the 
rulers were gods as i n the .age of Cronos. However Plato no longer believes 
i n investing, rulers with absolute authority over t h e i r fellows as p r a c t i c a l 
policy. The pre-requisite of the statesman remains a d i a l e c t i c a l knowledge 
of the forms, i n p a r t i c u l a r of that ' TT<3 ^  V"T£ icx" ' i n comparison with which 
(44) 
those found on earth can only be a second best . But Plato cannot r e s i s t 
the temptation of describing a preliminary ideal state, which as i n the 
'Republic' j u s t i f i e s any measure taken by those i n possession of the royal 
a r t of. r u l i n g as i n the interests of the state as a whole, though they put 
some to death and banish others i n order to purge the c i t y f o r i t s own good 
(s i c J), or reduce i t s size by detaching colonies as bees do, (the population 
problem again), or increase i t s size by admitting foreign immigrants to 
citizenship, so long as they by t h e i r knowledge and j u s t i c e maintain i t and 
improve i t by every means i n t h e i r power, then we are bound to say that thus-
described t h i s i s the only r i g h t constitution. I f we mention others, we must 
(45) 
speak of them not as real or genuine, but only as imitations of t h i s one . 
(28) 
When the government i s i n the hands of those who r e a l l y know^the t r u t h , the 
consent of the governed i s of no importance. 
Since i t i s but natural for the head to act at a l l times i n 
the interests of the body, laws are not only superfluous but actually impede 
the royal a r t of the statesman. Consequently, Plato places the ideal r u l e r 
above the law, but i n doing so i s he at the same time denying the rights 
and l i b e r t y of individuals ? The answer i s i n the negative, because Plato 
never regarded law as the guarantee of personal freedom as did the Athenian 
democracy fo r example, but only as part of the equipment of r u l i n g . In 
p a r t i c u l a r , law provides the necessary unity and s o l i d a r i t y i n the state so 
that i n dispensing with i t , Plato was convinced of the a b i l i t y of his r u l i n g 
class to maintain t h i s unity i . e . he discards the law from a position of 
strength. To j u s t i f y t h i s measure , Plato f a l l s back on the f a m i l i a r 
comparison between the r u l i n g and healing a r t , i n which the statesman's role 
i s that of a doctor, the patient being the sick body of society. Neither a r t 
depends on the observance of laws but essentially on the empirical method. This 
i s i n complete accord with the theory of the 'Republic' and the statesman l i k e 
the philosopher-king i s by v i r t u e of his knowledge, regarded 'as i t were a 
, (46) god among men . 
Unfortunately however, i n practice i t remains extremely 
doubtful whether any such statesmen ex i s t . 'As. things are, there i s no l i v i n g 
person i n our c i t i e s who i s as naturally a monarch as a queen-bee i n a hive, 
supreme i n body and mind, as you can see at a glance; and so i t seems we are 
obliged to come together and make w r i t t e n terms and then keep running along 
the track of the truest ' TTOc\ i T*£{OC ^ 4 7 \ Although law consists of general 
rules which must give a kind of 'rough-edged' j u s t i c e , t h i s i s now preferable 
to a caste of benevolent dictators with perfect s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of r i g h t 
and wrong. 
(29) 
Plato has l o s t his f a i t h i n human nature since the days 
when he f i r s t described the philosopher-kings. The second-best state i s 
characterised as one i n which 'none of the inhabitants dare to do anything 
contrary to the laws and he who does i s punished by death or another severe 
(48) 
penalty . As far as the individual i s concerned, his role i s as always 
to perform his function e f f i c i e n t l y , whether i n a Utopian republic or a 
police-state. However, since the r u l i n g class has now no claim to the royal 
a r t , they are reduced to the status of obeyers of the law, not makers of i t . 
B i t t e r experience had taught Plato that such virtuous rulers who combine the 
two functions exist only i n the imagination. But the constitution of t h i s 
second-best state must s t i l l be formed by those with supreme knowledge, i . e . ; 
body of philosophers. The problem of social change receives a drastic solutioi 
' A l l actual c o n s t i t u t i o n s , i f they are to copy, e f f e c t i v e l y that one true 
policy ruled by one man having knowledge, must never, once t h e i r laws have 
been established, do anything contrary to that which has been w r i t t e n down or 
to the customs of t h e i r fathers'. This i s not only a s t a t i c organism", but a 
dead one. 
After a discussion of the d i f f e r e n t types of ' "RcA vx i " ^ ' 
distinguished by t h e i r adherence or non-adherence to law, the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
thereby d i f f e r i n g s l i g h t l y from that of the 'Republic', Plato turns again to 
the perfect Statesman. I t i s no accident that the best ' Tt©ii i T ^ t 0 ' ' i s 
considered to be a law-abiding monarchy, which thus leads naturally to a 
discussion of the royal a r t . The f i r s t thing i s to distinguish the art of the 
statesman from other kinds of technical knowledge e.g. the art of generalship 
which w i l l t e l l you how to win a war, but not whether i t ought to be started 
i n the f i r s t place. This rather goes back to Plato's answer i n the 'Protagora 
where the view was put forward that more than ordinary ' T C ^ V v\ ' i s 
required from a p o l i t i c i a n , but anybody with ' T^.^^^ ' deserves respect. 
In fact the 'royal a r t ' must be supplemented by specialised assistance i j f l 
the various f i e l d s of m i l i t a r y leadership, j u d i c i a l work, fhe"ioViC 
etc. This represents a s i g n i f i c a n t departure from the 'Republic' where 
the philosopher-kings were also the j u d i c i a r y and were expected to be 
thoroughly trained i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s etc. But i n the 'Politicus' i t i s 
(30) 
precisely the supervisory control of specialists i n executive capacities that 
i s defined as the a r t of the statesman. His task.is to u t i l i s e the various 
forms of specialised s k i l l s , which he cannot have himself, although he can 
understand them, f o r the benefit of the state as a whole. 
Thus, the p a r a l l e l between the a r t of r u l i n g and that of 
(49) 
herdsmanship and healing i s f i n a l l y rejected i n favour of that of weaving 
Both the weaver and the statesman are a r t i s i t j employing diverse materials, 
i.e . men of d i f f e r e n t a b i l i t i e s , i n t o the finished products of the perfect 
state. Unity, as always remains of paramount importance, which i s achieved 
by harmonising the unequal roles of the various members. However, j u s t as 
the authority of the weaver over his material i s absolute, so top i s that of 
the statesman. I n the case of certain forms i f there i s to be an analogy 
between one that describes an everyday occurrence and one less tangible, once 
you have realised ( OjL^loTVJ $ )^exists, you can use the one to work out the 
de t a i l s of the other. The processes of the two arts run along p a r a l l e l lines 
i . e . you are discovering something there i n nature. City and c i t i z e n are by 
t h i s analysis, linked indissolubly f o r j u s t as a part of a work of a r t cannot 
stand by i t s e l f , but only has meaning and existence as part of the whole, so 
too the l i f e and work of the individual i s only meaningful when directed by 
the Statesman to the needs of the c o l l e c t i v e whole, who w i l l always have the 
ideal community before him i n his mind's eye. 
THE LAWS 
By the time Plato came to w r i t e the 'Laws' not only was he an 
old man, but the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n .in the Hellenic world i t s e l f must have 
impressed upon him that those problems to which the 'Republic' had been 
offered as an ideal, demanded a p r a c t i c a l blueprint. As a result of the f i r s t , 
Plato realised that he had now to concede a l l hopes that he himself might be 
entrusted with p o l i t i c a l power. That t h i s had been his secret dream i s beyond 
doubt. The 'Republic' ^ 5°^had shown that the natural ruler 'who has tasted the 
(31) 
happiness of philosophy and seen the madness of the many' w i l l retreat from 
public l i f e and await.the i n v i t a t i o n to power from the despairing demos. How 
unlike the ever-inquiring Socrates i s the following: ' I t i s not i n 
accordance with nature that the s k i l l e d navigator should beg the unskilled to 
accept his command likewise should those who need to be ruled besiege 
the house of him who can rule; and never should a r u l e r beg them to accept 
his r u l e , i f he i s any good at a l l .' Alas, the Athenians saw f i t to leave 
t h e i r only q u a l i f i e d philosopher king to pursue his vision of the Good. Not 
withstanding t h i s rebuff, Plato again put forward his claim to power i n the 
'Statesman'. 'The man who possesses the Royal Science, whether he rules or 
(51) 
does not rul e , must be proclaimed royal . Since he only imagined himself 
as the diyine r u l e r of perfect wisdom, when t h i s further h i n t too f e l l on 
deaf ears. Plato was forced back to describe 'the best possible state i n the 
circumstances', the p r i n c i p l e of which w i l l be that the laws are divine. Only 
God i s now above the law, a position formerly held by the perfect divine 
statesman. 
Plato's f i n a l answer to the economic and p o l i t i c a l crises that 
were racking the Greek city-states i n the middle of the fourth century B.C. 
was a return to, the s t a b i l i t y of the days of the land- owning aristocracy 
who saw i n any form of change, a challenge to t h e i r power and accordingly 
resisted i t to the best of t h e i r a b i l i t y i . e . the Spartan type of 
cons t i t u t i o n remained f o r Plato the ideal. As a p r a c t i c a l solution to the 
problems facing the Greek world, i t was as relevant as a c a l l f o r a return to 
the principles of feudalism would be nowadays. But behind t h i s manifestly 
impractical proposal lay Plato's earnest desire to show that the interests of 
the individual and the state are the same. Unfortunately i n spite of Plato's 
claim that he i s at a l l times acting i n the interest of the whole, not the (52) , part , i n t r u t h only the 5,040 citizens could enter i n t o a voluntary 
(2) 
subjection to the laws' , and at the same time i d e n t i f y t h e i r interests 
with the state. For the vast majority of the population, foreigners and slaves, 
(32) 
engaged i n manual, professional and a g r i c u l t u r a l work, thereby supporting 
the non-productive c i t i z e n body,, the maze of laws covering every aspect 
of human behaviour w i l l naturally be seen as the instrument of class 
oppression. However, f o r Plato the laws embody the moral standards as 
* 
defined by the Gods . Hence an offence against the state i s an offence 
against the Gods; while atheism presents such a spectre of revolution 
that i t i s denounced as a capital crime. The theocratic state thus has 
the overriding advantage of guaranteeing unity, conformity and by the 
same token unparalled s t a b i l i t y . 
Plato i s at a l l times concerned to emphasise that i n the 'taws' 
we are not dealing with the'ideal'state, which always remained that of 
the 'Republic'. However, i f communism of property and family relationships 
are no longer regarded as practicable, s t r i c t censorship of a r t and 
l i t e r a t u r e * * the i n d e t l f i c a t i o n of wisdom and v i r t u e w i t h p o l i t i c a l 
conformity and preoccupation with the r u l i n g class, on the p r i n c i p l e that 
change i s always the result of i n t e r n a l dissension, again loom large. The 
imaginary s i t u a t i o n of the dialogue, i s an opportunity to give p r a c t i c a l 
advice to a lawgiver whose task is- to found a colony somewhere i n Crete. 
The most important consideration i s to shun a l l foreign contacts. To t h i s 
end, production must be large enough to maintain the needs of the population 
but any surplus which might be exported, must be avoided. Similarly, the 
most suitable s i t e f o r the colony i s f a r from the sea, where there would 
(53) 
be no temptation to b u i l d a f l e e t . Later, we learn that no man under 
f o r t y shall obtain permission to go abroad, which i s also only granted to 
* i . e . God i s the measure of a l l things not man. Gf Protagoras : 
'Man i s the measure of a l l things I ' 
••Field, The Philosophy of Plato'/ argues 'that only at the end of his l i f e 
when w r i t i n g the 'laws' does Plato come to advocate a very l i m i t e d degree 
of suppression' (p.206), but i n my opinion, such a view i s not 
substantiated by the facts. 
(33) 
those engaged i n public duties not i n private capacities. 'And these men 
afte r t h e i r return, w i l l teach the young that the p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
of other countries are i n f e r i o r to t h e i r own'. Xenophobia i s thus the 
l o g i c a l consequence of the c u l t u r a l censorship on the home-front. Complete 
Orthodoxy of b e l i e f i n matters s p i r i t u a l and temporal so that the state 
might act and think as one, i s the i d e a l . 'Intercommunication between 
states results i n a mixing of characters and i n importing novel customs; 
and t h i s must cause the greatest harm to people who enjoy the r i g h t 
laws' ( 5 4 ) 
In order that the lawgiver may work w i t h a 'tabula »"a&OL', he 
w i l l need the services of a dic t a t o r , a young man wi t h a good memory,-
i n t e l l i g e n t , brave and high-principled' (709e), to get r i d of undesirable 
elements. The q u a l i t y of 'cruxj? po<TUA/«|' i n a r u l e r i s essential, as i s 
a deep and div i n e l y inspired longing ( <ij£>il?6 ) f o r a l l orderly and 
righteous conduct. However, the dict a t o r w i l l make way for the rule of 
law which (a) i s i d e n t i f i e d with the common good (2) embodies the w i l l of 
the Gods (3) demands a p o l i t i c a l l y conscious c i t i z e n body capable of 
understanding the motives behind the laws. Plato refuses to acknowledge 
any constitution which does not abide by the p r i n c i p l e that the part i s 
created f o r the whole, and not vice-versa, c i t i n g again .the examples of 
(55) 
the doctor and craftsmen . Thus., although a man may only outshine his 
fellow-citizens by more rigorous obedience to the established laws, t h i s 
i s not$ mere, b l i n d obsequiousness, but indicates that he i s f u l f i l l i n g 
himself simultaneously as a moral and p o l i t i c a l being by conforming to 
the demands of the state and by the same token the Gods themselves. 
The State therefore controls the moral l i f e of the c i t i z e n i n the f u l l e s t 
meaning of the term, and the harmony guaranteed by s t r i c t r e l i g i o u s 
orthodoxy, i s further f o r t i f i e d by the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of atheism both 
with treason and sacrilege. The t a c t i c s of dealing w i t h atheism are the 
usual ones of persuasion and i f unsuccessful, force. Stubborn offenders 
(34) 
are sent to a 'reconditioning,' 'mind-bending' centre ((7U>(j^ |Qovi6TtfJ |5» oV ), 
which may be j u s t l y compared with the Russian i n s t i t u t i o n Ward 7, where 
they are regularly v i s i t e d by members of the Nocturnal Council, who 
perform the ro l e of secret police *. 
Society i t s e l f i s organised on the basis of slavery, closely 
i m i t a t i n g the Spartan model. Each of the 5,040 citizens has an inalienable 
p l o t of land, receives the same education, shares common meals,' i s not 
allowed to. engage i n any commercial a c t i v i t y and spends his l i f e i n one 
long round of public duties. 'We have now made arrangements to secure 
ourselves a modest provision of the necessities of l i f e : the business of 
the arts and c r a f t s has been passed on to others: agriculture has been 
handed over to slaves on condition of t h e i r granting- us a s u f f i c i e n t 
( " i f i ^ 
return to l i v e i n a f i t and seemly fashion . However/, there i s 
no longer any b e l i e f i n any theory of 'benevolent despotism' as i n the 
'Republic 1. Here we witness the rule of law not personal absolutism 
tempered only by (ToU^pcJCrt/N/VJ . Moreover, Plato introduces elements 
of a 'mixed' constitution since his psuedo-historical survey has 
convinced him that i t i s the most conducive to permanence and s t a b i l i t y . 
Hence, elections of o f f i c i a l s are permitted i n which the whole c i t i z e n 
body takes part; there i s a body of Guardians of the Law (yojUe)^u ^of » 
t h i r t y seven i n number, a Council of 360 members, twelve scrutineers, and 
of course the Nocturnal Council whose function i t i s to act as 
intermediaries between divine law and human, and i n pa r t i c u l a r to stamp 
out any h o s t i l e elements as soon as they appear. Their role may be 
compared to that of the soul of the state. However, a l l those bodies are 
drawn only from the i n i t i a l 5,040. The rest of the population have no 
ri g h t s and are not expected to visualise the state as the 'sine qua non' 
of t h e i r existence qua humans. Throughout his l i f e , Plato never looked on 
the producing classes as moral beings, but rather as animals, which as 
* Even 'honest and honourable' ran the r i s k of death f o r impiety (905b). 
(35) 
slaves they clearly approximated. * 
Although i t i s natural that the state should be concerned with 
the moral welfare of cit i z e n s , the r e s t r i c t i o n s on the basic l i b e r t i e s of 
(57) 
thought and action which follow the seemingly harmless remark: 'there 
are many things now unrestricted which would be the better of some legal 
control', indicate that Plato has neglected his own p r i n c i p l e of unity 
amid d i v e r s i t y , the One and the Many, and l a i d himself open to 
c r i t i c i s m that 'dead uniformity' i s not a true unity. This f i n a l attack on 
the claims of individualism against the c o l l e c t i v e whole represents Plato's 
solution to the increasing class war that eventually proved theaMB of the 
c i t y state. I n the interests of s t a b i l i t y ' a l l children should play the 
same games on the same occasions and i n the same way, and be fond of the 
(58) 
same toys' . The ideal state i s one i n which the 'people have the 
> 
divine good fortune to l i v e generation a f t e r generation under the same 
(59) 
laws so that none sh a l l remember or even have heard of any other 
Although we are dealing with a theocratic state, i n which the claims of 
the soul override those of the body, the possession of a soul does not 
guarantee by the same token i n t e l l e c t u a l freedom as i t did f o r Socrates. 
Thus, 'even those things which nature herself has made private and 
individual ( i . e . the soul) have somehow become the common property of a l l . 
Our very eyes, ears and hands seem to see, hear, and act as i f they 
belonged not to individuals but to the community. A l l men are moulded 
to be unanimous i n the utmost degree i n bestowing praise and blame, and 
they even rejoice and grieve about the same things as the same time. And 
. (60) 
a l l the laws are perfected for unifying the c i t y to the utmost . 
However, Plato s t i l l claims that the unity achieved by the 
laws i s i n f e r i o r to that of the godlike r u l e r of supreme wisdom 
This 'leadership mentality' has grave repercussions'. The greatest 
p r i n c i p l e of a l l i s that nobody should be without a leader...for example * c.f. Heraclitus : 'the mob f i l l s t h e i r b e l l i e s l i k e beasts'. 
(36) 
he should get up, or move, or wash, or take his meals, only i f he has 
been t o l d to do so. I n a word, he should teach his soul by long habit, 
never to dream of acting independently and to become u t t e r l y incapable 
(62) 
of i t . Those who do not devote themselves to the interests of the 
(63) 
state w i l l be punished by the Gods . How far there i s genuine 
religious f e e l ing i n the 'laws' and how far r e l i g i o n i s treated as a 
p o l i t i c a l weapon i s d i f f i c u l t to judge. But certainly subservience to 
the gods and leaders presupposes a d i v i s i o n i n the r u l i n g class and 
therefore a special education from which Plato quite naturally shrinks. 
On the other hand, i f the body only obeys natural laws then on the 
organic analogy the state should also be bound by t h i s p r i n c i p l e of 
Antip hoi. 'Only those laws are v a l i d f o r our eyes, ears, hands and feet, 
which the natural capacity of these organs makes i t necessary for us to 
observe unless we* want to b l i n d , k i l l or maim ourselves'. Plato's, f i n a l 
state however^which confirm&the absolute authority of the state over the 
in d i v i d u a l , strangles i t s members i n a complex web of a r t i f i c i a l laws, 
so that whether i n the secular c i t y i n heaven (the Republic) or i n the 
religious c i t y on earth (the laws), the p r i n c i p l e i s relentlessly 
pursued that the individual i s created for the sake of the state, not the 
state f o r the i n d i v i d u a l . 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout his long l i f e , Plato was preoccupied with the twin 
problems of p o l i t i c s and dia l e c t i c s p i d i n his works we witness the 
successful struggle of each i n turn f o r ascendancyThe early dialogues up 
to and including the 'Republic', which marks the f i r s t serious 
introduction of d i a l e c t i c s , are concerned with discussing and for the 
most part r e f u t i n g the position of the Sophists }which was one of 
championing individualism. However, t h i s did not involve a re j e c t i o n of 
the state as such. For example, Protagoras regarded the state as the 
source of morality, but by his 'man i s the measure of a l l things' 
argument, he showed that his a t t i t u d e to that i n s t i t u t i o n was above a l l 
empirical i . e . i t must be- geared at a l l times to the interests of the 
(37) 
in d i v i d u a l . Plato's answer i s hot only that the individual cannot i d e n t i f y 
himself with any order lower than the state, but that he i s a mere 
isolated s e l f *, because only the state i s a whole. 
The middle dialogues, Parmenides, Thedetetus, Sophist etc, 
reveal the fundamental dualism i n Plato's thought. Here we are concerned 
with the One as opposed to the Many, the universal not the p a r t i c u l a r , 
r a t i o n a l knowledge not b e l i e f or opinion and the world of being not of 
becoming. But Plato i s forced to leave t h i s i d y l l i c world of the 
philosopher for the rough and tumble of everyday;-politics, because of his 
be l i e f that the individual's sOul i s affected by his environment, and 
that to reform philosophy one has to reform the state f i r s t , an idea 
repugnant to a l l l i b e r a l thinkers. Hence/the 'Statesman' and the 'Laws' 
although i n the l a t t e r and the 'Timaeus' we see Plato i n his old age 
reverting not unnaturally to metaphysical problems. In the 'Timaeus' soul 
i s p r i o r to body and more important. I n the 'Laws' as we have seen God 
(64) 
i s the measure of a l l things , not individuals. 
By giving a metaphysical basis to law, Plato aims at order 
and measure ' Ao\joC, y vo^J o<i Tc/^i£ 1 problems which he himself 
inherited from Pre-Socratic philosophy - the search f o r permanence i n the 
world of f l u x . From the same source, Plato borrowed the analogy of 
microcosm and macrocosm, but transferred the organic theory of the 
universe to state, making ' \^o&"\poh ' depend not on physical forces, but 
on the true p o l i t i c a l 'Tt^x/vj ', which i s f i n a l l y agreed to be embodied 
i n the a r t of weaving a unity out of discordant parts. 
The problem i s the following :- has Plato: u n i f i e d the state 
to excess ? i.e . neglected his own p r i n c i p l e of unity i n d i v e r s i t y . As 
A r i s t o t l e was l a t e r to point out there can be no interaction between 
reciprocal parts i f they are a l l a l i k e . The body has a truer unity than 
a p i l e of bricks. Has Plato i n fact proposed some members as a means to 
* A perfect description of Socrates. 
(38) 
the l i f e of the rest that they do not share i.e. they are denied a f u l l 
i n dividual existence i n accordance with his claim that he i s at a l l times 
l e g i s l a t i n g with a view to the whole and not i n the interests of any part? 
This answer to a l l t h i s i s a resounding 'yes'. Plato's organic theory of 
the state suffers throughout by denying to i t s members those capacities 
which make possible a conscious independent contribution for the good of 
the whole. I f any member was suddenly severed from the body p o l i t i c i t 
would f e e l no pain or loss because i t never participated i n the state 
above the l e v e l of an automation. To be sure, such a member could not 
function outside the state, but only because i t shows a l l the 
characteristics of a sub-human. In the f i n a l analysis, Plato equated 
unity with s t a b i l i t y , d i v e r s i t y with i t s opposite. Inevitably, dead 
uniformity was the r e s u l t . 
A more serious confusion arises as a result of a f a i l u r e to 
define terms. Such a charge i f upheld, w i l l considerably damage Plato's 
theory of the state as a moral organism. F i r s t l y , by the t r a d i t i o n a l 
body/soul analogy, the state at f i r s t sight appears as a body. But with 
whom must the state be i d e n t i f i e d ? The answer must be that only the 
r u l i n g classes, the Guardians and A u x i l i a r i e s i n the 'Republic', i n the 
'Laws' the 5,040 ci t i z e n s , can possibly i d e n t i f y t h e i r interests with 
those of the state. The 'ruled' i n each case do not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the 
l i f e of the c i t y , and Plato i s c e r t a i n l y not thinking of them when he; 
says ' i f anyone of the citizens experiences any good or e v i l , the whole 
state w i l l make his case t h e i r own'. What we are r e a l l y presented w i t h 
therefore, i s the administrative machinery i d e n t i f i e d with the state, a 
very modern conception t h i s , and society, incorporating the producing 
Classes*. But of course, the Greeks did not think of the state as a mere 
col l e c t i o n of statutes and r u l i n g apparatus, but essentially as a l i v i n g 
* The unity of the 'Republic' i s thus the unity of the 'state' i . e . a 
part not society as a whole. 
(39) 
community, t r a i n i n g the minds and characters of i t s citizens. Thus, 
Isocrates talks about the constitution as the 'soul of the state'. Plato 
too regards, as we have seen, the state as a soul exercising over 'the 
whole community' the same power as the individual's soul over his body. 
But 'the whole community', the 'state', i s i t s e l f . The Guardians are 
therefore both soul and body, an absurd conclusion, but the l o g i c a l 
conclusion of Plato's dishonesty i & not admitting that the interests of 
society, the ruled might often be diametrically opposed to those of t h e i r 
r u l e rs. 
I contend therefore that a true common purpose i s lacking i n 
Plato's 'organic theory of the state'. Plato himself considered the 
economic classes incapable of p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the l i f e of the community, 
but that as long as they are performing the function proper to them 
i.e. producing f o r others, the harmony and welfare of the whole i s 
secured. This i s obviously why Plato f a i l s completely to explain the 
relationship between the three classes i n the 'Republic', because he 
never thought of the t h i r d class as true members of the whole. The 
economic class remains an alienated and p o t e n t i a l l y h o s t i l e force, 
precisely because no e f f o r t i s made at integration through education. 
I t i s hard to r e s i s t the conclusion that Plato's organism i s r e a l l y a 
corpse, due to his paranoic antipathy to change. Antiphon by contrast 
regarded the organism whether plant or human, as f l o u r i s h i n g only when 
l e f t to i t s e l f . I f you deny i t , i t s natural condition, i t w i l l inevitably 
become distorted or stunted.. Not surprisingly, he rejected the state and 
i t s conventions as an impediment to the pleasurable l i f e . He i n contrast 
to Plato made personal happiness his main concern. 
But what Plato i s r e a l l y t r y i n g to convey by his analogy 
between the soul of the individual and that of the state i s the idea 
that unity depends upon each member performing his proper function, 
conscious at a l l times of the heeds and aims of the whole. Such a 
di v i s i o n of function existed even among the Greek gods, each with t h e i r 
(40) 
defined duties. The p o l i t i c i a n ' s 'royal a r t ' i s a creative one as we have 
seen to compose a coherent whole of dissident elements, l i k e the a r t i s t 
or musician. But i f Plato's organic analogy i s unsatisfactory because 
three-quarters of the population do not acquit themselves as human not to 
say, p o l i t i c a l beings, there was a form of society which Plato obviously 
(65) 
admired, namely that of the bees . The bee community does bear very 
close resemblance to an organic u n i t e.g. Plutarch's description of 
Spartan l i f e : 'Lycurglil accustomed his citizens so that they neither 
would nor could l i v e alone, but were as men incorporated one with -another 
and were always i n company together, as the bees about the master bee'. 
So too Kruschev speaking to the twenty-second Congress: 'We may w e l l 
imagine Soviet society as a big Communist beehive. Society has become 
more united and monolithic than ever before'. Later from the same 
speech j_ 'Spontaneity i s the deadliest enemy of a l l ' . How Plato would 
have agreed w i t h him I While no one w i l l deny that unity has been 
achieved both i n Plato's p o l i t i c a l theory and i n the U.S.S.R, we have 
seen that the equation of j u s t i c e w i t h the interests of the state does 
not secure the f u l l existence of the individual w i t h i n a harmonious 
whole, but his ultimate enslavement to an impersonal e n t i t y which 
symbolises only his alienation from his fellows. The lesson i s clear; an 
individual must have rig h t s as well as duties. 
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P A R T TWO 
JOHN OF SALISBURY 
(1) 
JOHN OF SALISBURY AND THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE AS AN ORGANISM. 
I t has become an axiom i n the study of philosophy that the student; 
should beware of imposing the exactness of modern conceptions upon an age 
when the unconscious and unwritten element of thought was barely 
differentiated from e x p l i c i t theory. In considering medieval p o l i t i c a l 
thought and that of John of Salisbury i n p a r t i c u l a r such caution i s more 
than j u s t i f i e d . To quote John's own maxim: "Words should be gently handled 
not tortured l i k e captive slaves to make them give up what they never 
had". One example requiring very gentle treatment i s the word 'organic' 
i t s e l f . Indeed, much of the energy of modern scholars has been focussed.in 
t h i s one direction, namely, i s medieval theory when tr u l y medieval, organic 
or i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ? I t w i l l be necessary therefore, af t e r studying John 
of Salisbury's own theory to consider the merits of the respective cases 
put forward by Dr. Otto Gierke and more recently by the American scholar 
Ewart Lewis. 
I t i s generally admitted that the chief contribution of John of 
Salisbury to p o l i t i c a l thought l i e s i n h i s use of the organic analogy in 
which for the f i r s t time a systematic attempt i s made to compare the 
various parts and t h e i r functions i n the 'commonwealth' to those i n the 
natural organism.John himself claimed that he borrowed th i s scheme from a 
work of Plutarch e n t i t l e d ' I n s t i t u t i o T r a j a n i ' . The d i f f i c u l t y i s that no 
such work at present e x i s t s or i s elsewhere referred to. A further 
problem a r i s e s because scholars are divided as to whether John knew Greek. 
The origin of John's elaborate organic analogy therefore l i e s i n one of 
four possible sources : (a) a L a t i n t r a n s l a t i o n of a compilation of 
passages from Plutarch's writings, (b) a L a t i n o r i g i n a l masquerading under 
the name of Plutarch, (c) John knew Greek and had access to a work which 
has since been l o s t , (d) there never was any such document and John i s 
merely claiming c l a s s i c a l authority for h i s own idea. 
(2) 
However the idea came to John, i t s influence on the remainder of the 
Middle Ages was enormous. Modern scholars have c a l l e d the 'P o l i c r a t i c u s ' 
'the e a r l i e s t elaborate medieval t r e a t i s e on p o l i t i e s ' (DICKINSON),'the 
f i r s t attempt to produce a coherent system which should aspire to the 
character of a philosophy of p o l i t i c s ' (POOLE),'the f i r s t representative 
known to us from the Middle Ages of the organic theory of the state as a 
theory of i t s law' (REMM). What, however, were the unwritten and 
unconscious assumptions, too obvious and too universally accepted to 
warrant e x p l i c i t formulation, but which lay at the heart of John's 
p o l i t i c a l thought ? 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION. 
Between the composition of Plato's 'Republic' and John of Salisbury's 
' P o l i c r a t i c u s ' there e x i s t s a gap of f i f t e e n hundred years, yet i n many 
ways Plato i s the key to medieval p o l i t i c a l theory i n the idea that the 
f i r s t and p r i n c i p l e task of the State i s to maintain j u s t i c e . Under the 
influence of the Stoics, Cicero and St.Augustine, law became the 
embodiment of j u s t i c e and the positive law of states drew i t s authority*-
from the universal and eternal law, the natural law of the Stoic t r a d i t i o n , 
the revealed law of God by Christian interpretation. However, the 
c l a s s i c a l notion of the state as a supplier of s p i r i t u a l as well as 
material needs demanded serious r e v i s i o n as St. Augustine observed : 'the 
State, even the most perfect state cannot s a t i s f y our desires. God and 
soul, that i s what I desire to know — nothing else I The problem was to 
reconcile the freedom, equality and communism of natural law with the 
actual conditions of society, and i t s solution by the Christian Fathers 
underlines the debt owed by C h r i s t i a n i t y to Stoic philosophy. Stoicism as: 
developed by Cicero i n p a r t i c u l a r i s a v i t a l l i n k between the c l a s s i c a l 
and medieval world. 
(3) 
(1) The contribution of the Stoics to p o l i t i c a l thought. 
Stoicism and likewise Epicureanism originated i n the f a i l u r e of -Hi£ 
c l v t y y state to provide a su f f i c i e n t l y , s t r o n g s o c i a l code. Plato's 
'Republic' had t r i e d to f i l l the gap with a new, positive knowledge and 
morality, but i t had been far too abstruse to counter the current mood of 
scepticism which had i t s origins i n Ionian rationalism and more recently 
i n the 'Sophist' movement. The most urgent question was s t i l l an e t h i c a l 
one, what was good for man ? The answers the Stoics gave and the problems 
which arose from them form an intimate l i n k with C h r i s t i a n thinking on the 
same subject. F i r s t l y , they followed the Sophists i n affirming the 
fundamental equality of men. Secondly, they argued that man alone has the 
a b i l i t y to aspire to a higher destiny because of h i s higher nature. Man's 
higher nature consisted of the unique quality of reason which was 
homogeneous to the Supreme Reason i n the universe. Salvation lay 
e s s e n t i a l l y i n acquiescence to. the divine plan, and i n the f i n a l analysis 
only one pr i n c i p l e guided a l i f e according to nature, namely to keep one's 
reason i n perfect a c t i v i t y . Universalism, the note of a l l medieval 
thought f i r s t found expression i n the early Stoic idea of an e t h i c a l and 
r e l i g i o u s , but not p o l i t i c a l world state of which reason was the 
constitution. This concept of universal brotherhood paved the way for the 
idea of s o c i a l service as an integral part of man's ra t i o n a l and moral 
nature, and when suitably modified was to find' ready acceptance i n the 
Roman world, to which the idea of duty was p a r t i c u l a r l y appealing. 
However, for the early Stoic, man was a part of a world governed by 
universal meaning and purpose, and as such was subordinate and must conform 
to the whole. His duty consisted i n performing well h is part. Such organic 
tendencies were re i t e r a t e d i n the sphere of physics, where i n t h e i r 
'biological' approach to the cosmos, the Stoics projected the functions of 
the active elements i n the l i v i n g body into: inorganic substances. Thus, 
the world was conceived as a JJAJOV/ a l i v i n g creature permeated by the 
dynamic p r i n c i p l e .( TtV£y#v/cy , 4ew.SiolA ) which causes, the entire 
(4) 
cosmos to: be a single, orderly and harmonious unit, i n exactly the same 
way as the soul i n man i s the TTv/^ujUof which gives the natural organism 
i t s unity. The cosmos becomes ' a physical f i e l d of a c t i v i t i e s and 
influences passing from place to place and from substance to substance and 
transforming the whole mass of e n t i t i e s into a structure which acts and i s 
, (2) 
acted upon through the harmonious interpenetration of i t s parts The 
s i m i l a r i t y between the Stoic conception of the cosmos and the organic view 
of the interdependence of individuals i n society, and the harmony that 
must e x i s t between the various members i s one more i l l u s t r a t i o n of the 
f e r t i l i t y of Stoic thought.* 
(2) The adaptation and development of Stoicism under the Romans. 
Although the charge of 'barren i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m ' may be too harsh a 
judgement on e a r l i e r Stoic thought, nevertheless i t was e s s e n t i a l that 
philosophy should have a p r a c t i c a l content for minds more r e a l i s t i c than 
contemplative. A philosophy which taught that hitherto only s i x wise men 
have existed and that even Chrysippus himself was only 'advancing' towards 
wisdom, was not l i k e l y to command wide support where 'common sense' and 
'p r a c t i c a l v i r t u e ' were ideal q u a l i t i e s , f o r the e a r l i e r Stoics, the world 
st a t e of wise men remained the only state, whereas existing states are not 
states at a l l , being composed of fools. Compared with the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the wise man and the fool, that between a freeman and a slave 
was unimportant. To counter these d i f f i c u l t i e s l a t e r Stoic thought, 
es p e c i a l l y that of Panaetius who introduced Stoicism to Rome, developed 
a second conception of r e l a t i v e achievement which the man i n the s t r e e t 
could l i v e up to. This idea of absolute and r e l a t i v e standards was to 
provide the Ch r i s t i a n Fathers with the key to explaining p o l i t i c a l 
authority as we s h a l l see i n the next section. Concretely, i t led to the 
doctrine of 'duty', (officium), an action performed 
*We may also c i t e the argument of Carneades, the so c a l l e d 'heap' 
argument. How many jgraiTis make a heap i . e . a whole, and i f you s t a r t 
why stop ? 
(5) 
by a man not wise, but the kind of action a wise man could perform. The 
problem of Stoic 'apathy' was dealt with i n a similar way. Desire for 
health, property, honour and reputation, i f limited, was sanctioned, 
because t h i s represented progress towards r e a l i s i n g the ideal of a wise 
man. Natural law too was rescued from the wise man's Utopia and made the 
basis for the positive law of states. In the case of Rome the presence of 
many foreigners with different l o c a l laws had resulted i n the necessity 
of transacting business on the basis of common ideas, and the ' Q$s 
gentium' thus became united with reason^equity and Justice*, the precepts of 
natural law. 
The Stoic ideal of s o c i a l service and universal brotherhood 
finds i t s greatest expression i n the work of Cicero, whose aim was to 
represent p o l i t i c a l l i f e as the acme of human achievement and a p o l i t i c a l 
career, as the most honourable of professions. J u s t i c e i s the necessary 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Cicero's commonwealth, and law i s what unites men i n a 
state to the extent that without law a state cannot e x i s t . John of 
Salisbury i s in entire agreement with Cicero on t h i s point. The law of 
states i s an imitation of eternal and divine law which for Cicero i s the 
universal law (vera lex) and for John the law of God. e.g. 'There i s in 
fact a true law namely right reason which i s in accordance with nature, 
applies to a l l men and i s unchangeable and eternal. By i t s commands..'this 
law summons men to the performance of t h e i r duties, by i t s prohibitions 
(3) 
i t r e s t r a i n s them from wrong-doing . Law and j u s t i c e thus a r i s e from 
universal reason and reason i s the e s s e n t i a l attribute of man.'We are born 
(4) 
for j u s t i c e and men naturally seek to l i v e j u s t l y ' . The commonwealth i s 
therefore an. a f f a i r of the people ( re& put^dctf-&o{ re«j ^cpu-li )> which 
by very d e f i n i t i o n presupposes j u s t i c e as i t s p r i n c i p l e thereby rendering 
the concept of p o l i t i c a l authority as absolute an impossibility, an 
unbroken l i n k from Cicero, through St. Augustine to John of Salisbury. 
From Cicero too the universalism of medieval thought can be traced. The 
existence of universal law implies that the world i s the true state of 
which the Gods and man are fellow c i t i z e n s . 'Universus hie mundus una 
quitas communis deofium atque hominum existimanda est'. That the s o c i a l u i 
(6) 
order i s a sacred, i n s t i t u t i o n and that the foundation of government rests 
on divine sanction, are ideas shared by John and Cicero a l i k e . 
Two further points need emphasis as i l l u s t r a t i n g how the 
c l a s s i c a l idea of law permeated medieval thought. The f i r s t i s that the 
state i s an association of people united by consent to law and community 
of i n t e r e s t s . Thus, l i b e r t y i s the end for which the law i s established 
and obedience i s not based on fear but mutual advantage, for without law 
one would be subject to ar b i t r a r y control. In medieval society t h i s idea 
had reached i t s . l o g i c a l conclusion. 'High and Low a l i k e sought l i b e r t y by 
i n s i s t i n g on enlarging the number of rules under which they l i v e d . The 
most highly privileged communities were those with most laws. At the 
bottom of society was the s e r f , who could l e a s t appeal to law against the 
a r b i t r a r i n e s s of h i s s u p e r i o r s ^ ^ i ' The idea of function which becomes 
basic i n the organic view of the state was also developed by Cicero, who 
i n s i s t s l i k e Plato that the inner strength of government depends on the 
assignment of appropriate functions 'there i s no cause for change when each 
individual i s firmly set i n h i s proper place and there i s no i n f e r i o r 
• (6) 
position into which he may rapidly decline . F i n a l l y , both for Cicero 
and John of Salisbury the d i s t i n c t i o n between a king and a tyrant depends 
on h i s r e l a t i o n to law and j u s t i c e . John was the f i r s t to develop the idea 
of tyrannicide as a legitimate act, but without doubt Cicero provides the 
premise for h i s conclusion. 'For once a king has adopted a form of rule 
which i s unjust and arbitrary he becomes forthwith a tyrant, than whom no 
creature more foul or loathsome or detestable to gods or men can be (7) 
imagined* . 
(3) The Christian Tradition. 
St. Augustine represents the t r a n s i t i o n from the c l a s s i c a l 
world about to pass away to the world of Christendom-., a universal society 
i n which Church and State formed an organic unity. However, the state 
could never be a thing of beauty as i t had been for Plato. Both the 
(7) 
C h r i s t i a n Fathers and the Stoics agreed that coercive authority was not 
natural but necessary to control the unreasonable passions, of human nature. 
An additional case against the state l a y i n the revolutionary aspect of 
both Stoicism and C h r i s t i a n i t y namely that the soul of man has an 
individual relationship with God which cannot come under the control of 
the state. To explain the origin of the state, St. Augustine, under the 
influence of the Stoics distinguished between the absolute and r e l a t i v e 
law of nature between the ideal order of things and th e i r actual condition 
as the r e s u l t of the f a l l . 'Whatever was the h i s t o r i c a l origin of a 
ru l e r ' s authority, i t s fundamental condition was s i n , i t s fundamental 
.(8) 
cause the w i l l of God, and i t s fundamental purpose order and j u s t i c e . 
John of Salisbury follows t h i s t r a dition without reservation but 
emphasises the divine origin of p o l i t i c a l authority and develops the idea 
that every o f f i c e under the sacred laws i s r e a l l y a re l i g i o u s o f f i c e , 
thereby claiming that secular authority r e a l l y belongs to the s p i r i t u a l 
power. St. Gregory the Great adopting a more extreme position argued that 
the state was a r e l a t i v e e v i l i n that i t saved the people from anarchy, 
so that i t was i r r e l i g i o u s to r e s i s t i t or even to c r i t i c i s e i t . 
The p r i n c i p l e that order required d i v e r s i t y was basic to a l l 
medieval thinking and undoubtedly favoured the development of. an organic 
view of the sta t e . St. Paul had l a i d emphasis on the d i v e r s i t y of g i f t s 
within the church, and the corresponding d i v e r s i t y of o f f i c e s 'there are 
. (9) 
many members but one body . The h i e r a r c h i c a l structure of the church 
led to the Christian community being seen as a mutually interdependent 
fellowship of members with unequal functions and ranks, each rank performing 
a s p e c i a l function for the common good. Neo-Platonist cosmology seemed to 
add new j u s t i f i c a t i o n to t h i s .attiitude . The whole universe appeared as 
planned by God i n a wonderful hierarchy of ranks and orders i n which each 
member had h i s appropriate niche. Thus, Augustine's conception of j u s t i c e 
lay i n a world at peace with i t s e l f and with God, i n the tranquil 
(10) 
maintenance of the divinely-established order of d i v e r s i t y . 
(8) 
This was e s s e n t i a l l y the role of the prince i n John of Salisbury's 
commonwealth, which w i l l now be discussed i n greater d e t a i l . 
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF JOHN OF SALISBURY. 
The value of the preceding discussion l i e s i n the fact that 
John's o r i g i n a l i t y consists of the comprehensiveness and systematization 
of h i s thought. He i s considered to be the greatest c l a s s i c i s t of h i s 
time and l i k e h i s model Cicero can be j u s t l y charged with being an 
e c l e c t i c . The C l a s s i c s were not an end i n themselves, but were studied for 
the purpose of understanding and guiding the present, to transmit that 
'informationem v i r t u t i s quae f a c i t virum bonum'. As Helen Waddell has 
pointed out: 'those who come to John for information on contemporary 
matters do so warily: he may so e a s i l y be thinking of the court of 
Augustus not of Henry I I ' . 
The 'Poli c r a t i c u s ' was completed i n 1159 which makes i t a 
land mark i n p o l i t i c a l theory for three reasons. F i r s t l y , i t represents 
the renewed i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c a l questions resulting from the c o n f l i c t 
between Papacy and Empire s e t t l e d at Worms i n 1122 leaving p r a c t i c a l 
supremacy with the Popes. Secondly, i t represents the purely medieval 
tr a d i t i o n before western thought had once more, become f a m i l i a r with the 
' P o l i t i e s ' of A r i s t o t l e . This w i l l become important i n considering the 
organic tendencies i n the 'Policraticus'. Thirdly, i t comes j u s t before 
the important turning point i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l development at the end of 
the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth century when le g a l precision 
began to be stamped on previously i n d e f i n i t e relationships and when feudal 
independence tended to become consolidated into definite organs of 
p o l i t i c a l control. Together with the renewal of interest i n p o l i t i c a l 
questions, there arose the conception of the innate dignity of the 
secular, order largely at the hands, of scholars who knew what Cicero, and 
Serjeca had said about the o f f i c e of a r u l e r e.g. Hildebert, Archbishop of 
Tours wrote to the. "Covint of Anjett who had l a i d himself under a vow of 
pilgrimage as follows : ' I f the f r u i t of government i s much greater and 
more desirable than the pilgrimage - which no one w i l l dare to deny, stay 
i n your palace, help the a f f l i c t e d , l i v e for a l l , that a l l may l i v e for 
(9) 
you: l i v e for the s t a t e ( r e i publicae); work for i t day and night. Let 
equity not acceptance of persons be the rule of your court. Rule yourself 
(12) 
by law and your subjects by love' . (John of Salisbury likewise begins 
his book with the theme of the dignity of j u s t authority). 
The cardinal feature of John of Salisbury's thought i s the 
apparent r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the Christian conscience within an 
authoritarian s t a t e . An organic theory assBrts not only that the part 
derives i t s value and character from embodiment i n the whole, but l i k e 
the hand separated from the body i t cannot r e a l i s e i t s e l f to the f u l l , i f 
indeed at a l l , when detached from the unity of the whole. The state 
therefore, has the highest claim on man's loyalty and obedience, being that 
organisation, i n which man completely f u l f i l l s himself as a rational and 
s o c i a l being. I f man r e a l i s e s h i s end purely i n h i s s o c i a l function, 
i . e . qua prince or qua peasant, then h i s hope of salvation i n the next 
world w i l l depend on the degree to which he f a i t h f u l l y performs that 
function. But i s John saying that the state and not the Church has prior 
claim to the loyalty of men ? This would indeed be a very dangerous 
position to hold i n medieval Catholic Europe, but the very ambiguity of 
John's treatment of the r e l a t i o n of the Church to the temporal power and 
of the connection between individual and s o c i a l l i f e and the t r a n s i t i o n 
from one to the other, may suggest that t h i s was hi s secret doctrine. 
However, there remains the problem, whether i t i s man merely i n h i s 
s o c i a l function or man as a whole i . e . as a Christian, that John i s 
r e f erring to i n his description of the prince, p r i e s t , peasant etc. 
I s i t conceivable that John ever regarded the prince i n any other l i g h t 
than primarily a Christian holding a secular o f f i c e and responsible 
ultimately to God for a l l his actions ? Surely loyalty to God must take 
precedence over loyalty to earthly authority ? I f t h i s i s so, i t would 
be hard to avoid l a b e l l i n g John's organic theory of the state a pure 
abstraction. 
THE PRINCE - THE HEAD OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
The s u r v i v a l and use of the term 'republica' i n the most 
confident and creative period of feudalism i s indicative of the strength 
of the ecclesiastical-Roman t r a d i t i o n . I t i s one of the s t r i k i n g features 
(10) 
of the 'Polic r a t i c u s ' that there i s hardly a trace of contractual feudal 
theory, but instead of a mere network of private relations,, the concept 
of a true p o l i t i c a l relationship between the members of a state becomes the 
sine qua nbn of the true commonwealth. This consists of a society'of ranks 
and orders, ordained by God, the unity of which i s secured by the 
interdependence of the parts. The guardian of t h i s unity i s the prince who 
works continually to keep the pattern from dissolving by maintaining 
j u s t i c e and peace, the greatest emphasis being l a i d upon the coercive 
aspect of the royal o f f i c e . John closely follows the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l 
t r a d i t i o n at th i s point. The king i s God's minister and es p e c i a l l y God's 
minister for wrath, e.g. 'The ru l e r i s a minister of God to thee for good. 
But t f thou do that which i s e v i l be af r a i d : for he beareth not the sword 
i n vain.: for he i s a minister of God, an avenger for wrath to him that 
(13) 
doeth e v i l 1 . 
The prince has power over a l l h i s subjects 'to the end that 
the state of the human commonwealth may be ordered i n the best possible 
(14) 
manner, seeing that each and a l l are members of one another' . Nature 
has subjected a l l the members i n obedience to i t so that they w i l l a l l 
function properly so long as they follow the guidance of the head and the 
(15) 
head remains sane* . The prince i s on the one hand the supreme 
p o l i t i c a l authority, but he i s also a 'kind of likeness on earth of divine 
majesty', for h i s power comes from God. These two ideas can be traced 
from (1) the re v i v a l of Roman law i n the twelfth century, e s p e c i a l l y the 
idea of the 'lex regia' whereby the people had voluntarily handed oyer 
th e i r sovereignty to a ru l e r ; (2) that the beginning of kingship marks a 
f a l l i n g away from the purity of obedience to the law, and was a token of 
God's anger. A cruel r u l e r could thus be j u s t i f i e d as representing God's 
w i l l , but an unjust one i s guilty of neglecting the law of God, and i s 
consequently a tyrant, the authority of the prince depending upon the 
authority of j u s t i c e and law. The prince i s therefore not absolved from 
the obligations of law, but i t i s h i s e s s e n t i a l character to practice 
equity not out of fear of the law but through his love of j u s t i c e . Indeed 
the prince has no actual w i l l of h i s own apart from that which law or 
(16) 
equity enjoins or the calculation of the common in t e r e s t requires. 
(11) 
Although i n t h i s sense he 'bears, the public person', he i s responsible for 
the commonwealth but not to i t , for ultimately the prince i s responsible 
only to God, the le g a l authority to which he owes his appointment, which 
i n practice means the Church e.g. 'The prince i s then as i t were a minister 
of p r i e s t l y power and one who exercises that side of the sacred o f f i c e s 
(17) 
which seems unworthy of the hands of the priesthood' . Kingship thus 
being a sacred o f f i c e , the prince must set an example to his flock by 
being chaste and avoiding avarice, and l i s t e n i n g to the advice of the 
priests;, e.g. 'the prince i s the Lord's servant, and performs h i s service 
by serving f a i t h f u l l y his fellow servants, namely h i s subjects'(18). 
The p r i n c i p l e that 'what thou wouldst should be done unto thee do that unto 
others', John claims to be one of the precepts of law'which have a perpetual 
necessity, haying the force of law among a l l nations and which absolutely 
cannot be broken with impunity.' There i s no conception of 'oderint durri 
mediant' but the favour and love of one's subjects i s held up as an i d e a l . 
A second c l a s s of f l e x i b l e rules can only be altered i f a concession i s 
made to the common in t e r e s t . However, i f the viow of the prince s subjects 
are unable to be cured by mild measures sharper punishments must be 
i n f l i c t e d . 'But who was ever strong enough to amputate the members of his 
(19) 
own body without g r i e f and pain ?' asks John. The prince i s therefore 
responsible for a l l the members and has t h i s incentive to practice j u s t i c e , 
namely that h i s son w i l l suceed him, as John does not accept the absolute 
hereditary right of kings. 
At t h i s point, l e t us summarise the organic tendencies i n 
(20) it 
r e l a t i o n to the role of the prince using John s own words. The prince 
being the public power draws from the strength of a l l , and i n order that 
his own strength may not f a i l , he should accordingly take care to preserve 
the sandness of a l l the members. For as many o f f i c e s and stations of duty 
as there are i n the administration of a prince's government, so many are 
the members as i t were of the prince's body therefore, i n preserving each 
+ John's d i v i s i o n of law into two kinds represents the view that the state 
i s above positive but below natural law, universally accepted i n 
medieval thought. 
(12) 
o f f i c e i n unimpaired i n t e g r i t y of strength and purity of reputation, he i s 
preserving as i t were the health and reputation of hi s own members. But 
when through the negligence or concealment of the prince as regards the 
members there i s l o s s of strength or good reputation, then diseases and 
blemishes come down upon h i s own members. Nor does, the well-being of the 
(21) 
head long continue when sickness attacks the members '! Again, ' i t i s 
common knowledge that the commonwealth enjoys the rights and legal position 
of a ward, and i t advances along the path of good fortune only when i t s 
head recognises that he i s unprofitable unless he f a i t h f u l l y coheres to 
the members.. Without doubt, John had very firmly grasped the interdependence 
of individuals i n society. The importance of the head l i e s i n uniting the 
sp e c i a l i s e d functions of each part i n the whole organism, e.g. the function 
of duty i s to bring different acts into harmony by a l l o t i n g them to the 
(22) 
different individuals to whom they are appropriate. What i s more he 
grasped the need for that basis of psychological unity, the bond of 
common feeling, ' i t seems to me that there can be no f a i t h f u l and firm 
cohesion where there i s not an. enduring union of w i l l s and. as i t were a 
. (23) 
cementing together of souls . However the r e l a t i o n between the parts 
of the organism i s a fixed and s t a t i c one to f i t i n with the pre-established 
design which John took to be eternal and immutable. At t h i s point, l e t us 
return to John's analogy. THE CHURCH - THE SOUL OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
John introduces Plutarch's l e t t e r for the 'Instruction of 
Trojan' by quoting h i s d e f i n i t i o n of a commonwealth. 'A commonwealth 
according to Plutarch is. a certain body which i s endowed with l i f e by the 
benefit of divine favour, which acts at the prompting of the highest equity,. 
(24) 
and i s ruled by what may be cal l e d the moderating power of reason' 
'Those things which e s t a b l i s h and implant i n us the practice of re l i g i o n , 
and transmit to us the worship of God f i l l the place of the soul i n the 
body of the commonwealth'. However, the e a r l i e r conception of the p r i e s t s 
(25) 
as advisers to the prince i n the interpretation of law now gives way 
(13) 
to the doctrine of s p i r i t u a l supervision of secular a f f a i r s . 'Furthermore 
since the soul is- the prince of the body, and has rulerShip over the whole, 
so those whom our author c a l l s the perfects of r e l i g i o n preside over the 
( Oft) 
entire body'. The prince i s therefore subject to God, and "to those 
who exercise His o f f i c e and represent Him on earth, even as i n the human 
body the head i s quickened and governed by the soul. Thus the organic 
unity of Church and State i s c l e a r l y maintained i n the notion that (the 
organisation of temporal government), l i k e (Church organisation )bis ;but an 
instrument for applying the 'higher law', the law of God. Following 
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l t r a d i t i o n , the wielder of temporal power i s conceived by 
John as a minister of the p r i e s t l y power for the purpose of enforcing the 
divine law by physical sanctions and receives h i s sword from the Church. 
John seems to imply that the prince was merely the agent, of the Pope, and 
on the basis of t h i s , some scholars consider that John i s the f i r s t to 
make an e x p l i c i t claim of dire c t power in. temporal things existing i n the 
Pope. There i s however a great difference between supervisory and direct 
control of temporal a f f a i r s by the Church and there i s no evidence that 
John i s here, suggesting the complete absorption of the State within the 
Church. John c e r t a i n l y i s not so extreme as Gregory VII i n saying that 
'human arrogance invented the one, and divine piety invented the other'. 
This i s one of those cases where the definiteness of modern constitutional 
(27) 
ideas must not be read, into John s thought. As Schubert observes : 
'the theories of the P o l i c r a t i c u s are not exclusively of the high 
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l variety but are combined with others which attribute to the 
state a high and independent significance*. Indeed i t i s my contention 
that John considered the state necessary for man's moral development (see 
below), but whether i t i s an intermediate, or f i n a l stage w i l l be the test 
as to whether John s theory i s erriby- organic. 
To summarise, i t may be sa i d that the Church has a moral 
supremacy rather than a s t r i c t l y l e g a l one. e.g. 'those who minister to 
Him i n the sphere of human law are as much i n f e r i o r to those who minister 
. (28) 
i n divine law as things human are below things divine . I t i s my 
(14) 
b e l i e f that John grasped the necessity of solving the problem of 
sovereignty and hi s solution i s e s s e n t i a l l y of a compromising nature. The 
soui has i t s part to play and likewise the head. 'Where there i s no r u l e r , 
(29) 
the people w i l l f a l l * . Indeed, genuine pluralism i s a feature of 
organic thought recognising the necessity of the intermediary forms of 
s o c i a l l i f e , and th e i r freedom and right to perform t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r 
functions. There i s no idea of an inherent struggle between Church and 
State i n John's thought, r e s u l t i n g i n a necessary absorption of one i n the 
other but the emphasis, i s rather upon the closest coordination between the 
two to r e a l i s e the common good, each part having a pa r t i c u l a r function to 
perform. Two i l l u s t r a t i o n s w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t . John observes that as the 
priesthood has the power of conferring royalty, they also have the power 
of d e p o s i t i o n ^ ^ . However, he notBS that God does not always work through 
t h e i r power, but frequently employs other agencies to elevate .his chosen, 
candidate to o f f i c e . The prince i s i n fact chosen by divine, popular and 
(31) 
c l e r i c a l elements, the model being Moses . Secondly, i t would appear 
from the d e f i n i t i o n of the prince as the minister of the priesthood, 
that the prince must submit to the supreme adjudication of the priesthood 
i n a l l questions requiring an interpretation of the divine law. However, 
the ultimate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for bringing human law into* accord with equity 
r e s t s with the Prince himself* The Prince thus seems to be the servant of 
the Church only i n an ideal sense, that i s when the p r i e s t s are r e a l l y 
such as they ought to be, and John's a n t i - c l e r i c a l s a t i r e shows h i s 
contemporaries were f a r from being paragons of virtue. F i n a l l y , there i s 
l i t t l e doubt that John has i n i t i a l l y magnified the sovereign, to show how 
much greater i s the Church from whom hi s power largely derives. 
THE SENATE : THE HEART OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
'The place of the heart i s f i l l e d by the Senate, from 
(32) 
which proceeds the i n i t i a t i o n of good works and i l l ' . The wisdom of 
old age consists in. properly apportioning a l l duties and i n p r a c t i s i n g the whole a r t of l i f e . 'For the a r t of right l i v i n g as. the Stoics thought, 
(33) 
i s the a r t of a r t s , but for John the necessary basis of t h i s a r t i s 
the p r i n c i p l e that the fear of the Lord i s the beginning of wisdom®^! t 
(15) 
i s certain that he who fears God omits nothing and does good works. A man: 
who searches d i l i g e n t l y into a l l things, and knows the things which ought 
to be done, and does them i s v e r i l y a wise man and such as i@i i s most f i t 
to be a counsellor of princes . One thing however remains impossible, 
namely, to seek j u s t i c e and money at the same time, so l i k e a l l the inner 
parts of the body of the commonwealth, the f i n a n c i a l o f f i c e r s , b a i l i f f s etc. 
the counsellors are to be provided for from the public store l e s t they 
become needy and covet the goods of others. This i s i l l u s t r a t e d by a s t r i k i n j 
use of the organic analogy. 'And perchance i t i s for t h i s reason that 
mother nature has prudently protected the inner parts of the body with the 
eoating of the chest, and the s o l i d structure of the ri b s ... to the end 
that they may be more safe against violence from without, and then proceeds 
(35) 
to supply them with th e i r several n e c e s s i t i e s . 'So i n the commonwealth 
i t behoves us to follow the pattern of nature's craftmanship and from the 
public store supply these o f f i c i a l s with a sufficiency for t h e i r needs"'. 
There i s a passage i n a t r e a t i s e e n t i t l e d 'Old Men i n Public A f f a i r s i n 
(36) 
Plutarch's Moralia' which likewise emphasises the contribution of the 
senate to the common good which may be one of the sources of John's view. 
'There are many kinds of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y by which old men may readily 
benefit the commonwealth by giving reason, judgement frankness etc. For 
not only do our hands and feet or the strength of our body constitute a 
possession of the s t a t e , but f i r s t of a l l our soul, and the beauties of 
the soul, j u s t i c e , moderation, wisdom'. 
THE SIDES OF THE COMMONWEALTH : THOSE WHO ATTEND UPON THE PRINCE 
The i d l e parasites of the court are the victims of John's most 
savage s a t i r e . The scandalous venality of the bureaucracy depended upon the 
lack of ef f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l organisation which i n turn was the outcome of 
the concept of 'higher law*. This bound individuals d i r e c t l y and was at 
once international, constitutional and private law. I t led to p o l i t i c a l 
'quietism' i n the idea that i f a government acted i l l e g a l l y God would 
(16) 
punish such violations of h i s own law. The court o f f i c i a l s negate the 
basic prin c i p l e of the state, namely j u s t i c e . Their very s i l e n c e i s a 
commodity to be bought. I t i s the prince who i s d i r e c t l y responsible for 
such a state of a f f a i r s , being the head of the commonwealth. 'For the 
negligence of ru l e r s i s most often the source of the wickedness of the 
(37) 
subjects'. Therefore, to curb the malice of his o f f i c i a l s the prince 
must provide for them out of the public funds to remove a l l occasion for 
extortion. John, perhaps remembering with bitterness h i s own years of 
court l i f e declares that the only way to preserve virtue i s to leave the 
court, because the l a t t e r casts put philosophy u t t e r l y and the true 
philosopher w i l l i n no way participate i n i t s f o l l i e s . The re l a t i o n of the 
true philosopher to the problem of p o l i t i c a l obligation w i l l be discussed 
l a t e r . 
THE EYES, EARS AND TONGUE OF THE COMMONWEALTH. THE JUDGES AND THE GOVERNORS 
OF PROVINCES. 
The duties of eyes, ears and tongue are claimed by the judges 
and the governors of provinces, and the idea that every o f f i c e existing 
(38) 
under and concerned with the sacred laws i s r e a l l y a re l i g i o u s o f f i c e , 
has p a r t i c u l a r force i n the case of judges who should be slaves to 
j u s t i c e , knowing that ultimately they themselves w i l l be judged by God. 
Furthermore, John conceives the rule of judges as an idea l i n contrast to 
monarchy, thereby emphasising h i s idea of the supremacy of law, kingship 
marking the punishment of the people by God for f a i l i n g to obey t h i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y non-coercive form of law. Judges should therefore be eminently 
r e l i g i o u s men with the means and w i l l to enforce j u s t i c e , t h i s being t h e i r 
s p e c i a l i s e d function i n the organic whole. But, i f a governor or judge 
knows and wishes to do equity, but has not adequate power, the fa u l t i s 
(39) 
not so much h i s own as i t i s the f a u l t of the prince . This follows 
from the es s e n t i a l function of the head to maintain the cohesion of the 
members. Judges should be bound to the laws by an oath, and neither rank, 
wealth nor friendship should influence them i n the administration of 
j u s t i c e . John quotes Cicero: 'he puts off the character of a judge who puts 
(17) 
on that of a friend'^°^, and attacks the venality of the judges 
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l as well as temporal, of h i s own day. Offices should be 
performed gratuitously, and those who s e l l j u s t i c e , s e l l their own soul. 
Governors, likewise, have the primary duty of ensuring j u s t i c e 
(41) 
i n t h e i r province which should be 'peaceful and quiet'. To t h i s end, 
a governor should be 'easy of access', but should not admit provincials to 
too great f a m i l i a r i t y . I d e a l l y , there should be unceasing- s a c r i f i c e to 
(42) 
the Lord i n the house of a judge, but i n practice, John sees 
'extortioners rather than judges'. Such i s the materialism of h i s age that 
from disgust at these 'publicans of j u s t i c e ' , John contrasts the r e a l 
riches of philosophy, closely following the Stoic doctrine. Indeed i t i s 
the f i n e s t f r u i t of philosophy to know how to bear both poverty and 
abundance, so that a man w i l l meet every fate with a happy and even mind, 
(43) 
and presenting a front of s o l i d virtue, wholly disarm fortune. 
'Does not the judgement of God i t s e l f make riches contemptible because the 
unjust abound i n them while the good are often i n poverty ? ' 
Once again 'the l i f e of the philosopher' seems to be an ideal achieved over 
and above participation i n the s t a t e . THE HANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH - THE SOLDIERS. 
'The hand of the commonwealth i s either armed or unarmed. The 
armed hand i s that which performs the soldiering of camps and blood; the 
unarmed i s that which administers j u s t i c e , and keeping holiday from arms, 
(44) 
i s e n l i s t e d i n the service of the law . The hand of each m i l i t i a , to 
wit both the armed and unarmed, i s the hand of the prince himself; and 
unless he res t r a i n s both, he i s not continent'. Here then i s yet another 
example of the cohesion and mutual dependence of the head and members of 
the commonwealth. There i s no doubt that John paints a very lo f t y picture 
of the s o l d i e r ' s o f f i c e , thereby implying that he accepted the necessity 
of war, but the control exercised over i t i s the p r i n c i p a l test of the 
(45) 
wisdom and j u s t i c e of the prince . The prince must therefore add to h i s 
knowledge of law that of m i l i t a r y *uiM.te , a profession i n s t i t u t e d by 
God . The secular soldi e r has t h i s i n common with his s p i r i t u a l brother 
(18) 
namely, selection and oath, and he serves God l o y a l l y when he loves him 
who reigns by the authority of God i . e . the prince. The soldier's o f f i c e 
i s e s s e n t i a l l y a rel i g i o u s one, bound to the sacred service and worship 
of God: 'To defend the Church, to a s s a i l i n f i d e l i t y , to venerate the 
(47) 
priesthood, to protect the poor from i n j u r i e s ' i n a word, to 
apply the necessary defence of the commonwealth. However, i n certain cases 
the sol d i e r can disobey the prince i£ the l a t t e r ' s actions are contrary to 
the higher law of God, because h i s f i r s t l oyalty i s to God not man. To 
guard against reb e l l i o n the soldiers are given certain p r i v i l e g e s , the most 
important being that i n common with other o f f i c i a l s , they are not 
permitted to be i n want. Di s c i p l i n e and training are e s s e n t i a l i f the 
sold i e r i s to carry out h i s duty, and likewise the avoidance of luxury, 
which John I l l u s t r a t e s by countless examples, praising the virtues of the 
Romans i n t h i s f i e l d , and deploring the decadence of h i s own age. 
THE FEET OF THE COMMONWEALTH :* the drawers of water and hewers 
of stone*. 
The feet are the l a s t , but as John himself emphasises, not the l e a s t of the 
members of the commonwealth. Before them John places the stomach, the 
fi n a n c i a l o f f i c e r s , and keepers of the privy chest, which becomes congested 
through excessive greed, and throws the whole body into- disorder. I t i s i n 
the r e l a t i o n of the feet to the r e s t of the body, that we find the best 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of the relationships of feudal society, so sparsely mentioned 
i n the "Policraticus' e.g. 'For i n f e r i o r s owe i t to th e i r superiors to 
provide them with service, j u s t as superiors in t h e i r turn owe i t to th e i r 
i n f e r i o r s to provide them with a l l things needful for t h e i r protection and 
»(48) 
succour . The feet have t h e i r s p e c i a l i s e d function to perform, without 
which the l i v i n g unity of the whole could not be r e a l i s e d . ' I t i s they who 
ra i s e , sustain and move forward the weight of the entire body. Take away 
the support of the feet from the strongest body, and i t cannot move 
(49) 
forward by i t s own power* . The feet are the r u r a l and urban p r o l e t a r i a t 
'performing duties which are i n the highest degree useful and profitable 
to the corporate whole of the commonwealth*, but they must be shod 'to 
the end that they may not be wounded by stumbling against a stone or other 
(19) 
(50) obstacles which so many chances put i n the i r way . This protection i s 
i l l u s t r a t e d by the i n s t i t u t i o n of magistrates to prevent wrongs being 
committed against them. Following the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l t r a d i t i o n of caring 
for the widow and the orphan, John concludes that"an a f f l i c t e d people i s 
i - +(51) a sign and proof of the c^e<x\^<t>boi the prince. The body as a whole 
cannot be healthy, i f any of i t s parts, including the humblest i s s i c k . 
e.g. 1 1 then and only then w i l l the health of the commonwealth be sound and 
flourishing when the higher members sh i e l d the lower, and the lower respond 
f a i t h f u l l y to the j u s t demands of t h e i r superiors, so that each and a l l are 
as i t were members of one another by a sort of reciprocityand each regards 
h i s own i n t e r e s t as best served by that which he knows to be most 
advantageous for the others. 
CONCLUSION. 
The 'Policraticus', i n dealing with the moral issues a r i s i n g 
from man's position as a r u l e r or subject, i s an outstanding example of 
that type of writing known as the 'mirror of princes'. I n the medieval 
Teutonic world C h r i s t i a n i t y was imposed upon h i s subjects by the monarch 
so that instruction in. the claims of r e l i g i o n was e s s e n t i a l for a r u l e r 
conceived i n terms of a pastor and church administrator. John himself was 
acquainted with the 'De Regia Eotestate 1 of Hugh of Pieury (died 1117), 
who: advocated the same coordination between the temporal and s p i r i t u a l 
powers. 'What the p r i e s t cannot accomplish by verbal teaching, the royal 
(52) 
power does or commands by the terror of i t s d i s c i p l i n e * . Although as 
we have seen, John takes great pains to emphasise the importance of the 
s p e c i a l i s e d functions of the members, 'the happiness of no body p o l i t i c 
w i l l be l a s t i n g unless the head i s preserved i n safety and vigor, and looks 
(53) 
out for the whole body. John finds the character and harmonised 
a c t i v i t i e s of the state i n the bees., with t h e i r ideal d i v i s i o n of function, 
t h e i r common effort and s p i r i t of s e l f - s a c r i f i c e . J u s t i c e e x i s t s when 'the duties of each individual are performed with an eye to the welfare of the (54) 
whole' , but t h i s i s only possible under a r u l e r , who although forgiver 
for human vices, must keep r e l i g i o n i n v i o l a t e . The organic unity of the 
(20) 
head and members i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the fact that an injury to the hand i s 
brought home to a l l members and likewise a wound unjustly i n f l i c t e d on any 
(55) 
member tends to the injury of the head . 'May the excellence of the head 
,(56) 
ever f l o u r i s h because therein consists safety of the whole body . But 
are we to conclude that John i s r e a l l y putting forward an organic theory of 
the state ? I s man qua man f u l f i l l i n g himself merely i n terms of h i s s o c i a l 
function or i s the l i f e of man the philosopher hinted at above^a higher 
end achieved outside the t o t a l i t a r i a n organisation of both state and church 
. Moreover, has John r e a l l y solved the problem to whom one's loyalty i s owed, 
*^,L.40 and what i s the r e l a t i o n between the two ? 
e^* f" J (57) 
In her book 'Medieval P o l i t i c a l Ideas' Lewis r i g h t l y urges caution 
in dealing with the term 'organic' : 'the term 'organic' i s an ambiguous 
one : the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l theoriescis ' i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ' or 
'organic' leaves the vast majority of systems wandering i n the debatable 
ground between the two categories'. I n a previous a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d 'Organic 
(58) 
Tendencies i n Medieval Thought' , Lewis had attempted to refute the main 
contention of Gierke's ' P o l i t i c a l theories of the Middle Age', that 
' p o l i t i c a l thought when i t i s genuinely medieval s t a r t s from-the whole, but 
ascribes an i n t r i n s i c value to every p a r t i a l whole down to and including .(59) ' . the individual . Thus medieval thought i s for her a f a i r l y stable .(60) 
compound of i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and organic elements , the former comprising 
the purely medieval element^ j%\ i U c ^ ^)\Tf*.ti If \M&Li \J\.C/AA.KJ\AA. 
the l a t t e r being the ecclesiastical-Roman t r a d i t i o n . The a r t i c l e referred 
to above i s admitted by the author to be an oversimplification of the 
problem, but i s remarkable to the extent that no mention i s made of John of 
Salisbury i n dealing with the question of organic tendencies i n medieval 
thought. Lewis' argument that 'there i s no need to assume that any 
medieval writer meant to imply more than a limited resemblence between 
the body natural and the body p o l i t i c , i s put forward once again i n 
'Medieval P o l i t i c a l Ideas' (p.204) : 'In spite of a frequent use of 
analogies between the organised community and the human body, no medieval 
writer seriously defined the community as an organism or maintained that 
i t s unity was of the same kind as the unity of the human individual 
* I agree with t h i s view as I try to show i n the section : 'Does John's view s a t i s f y an organic theory of the state ?' 
(21) 
However, Lewis does agree that medieval theory can be c a l l e d 'organic' 
i n the following instances: 'because i t emphasises the harmony between 
the individual and organised society; because i t sees p o l i t i c a l 
organisation not as merely r e s t r i c t i v e , but as po s i t i v e l y necessary to 
the f u l f i l l m e n t of human nature; which v i s u a l i s e s s o c i a l bonds as deeply 
rooted i n human need, and not i n a mere revocable and deliberate contract, 
which derives a l l p o l i t i c a l rights not from individual rights, but from 
common purposes, which i s led to approve an inequality of p o l i t i c a l r ights, 
(61) 
and the existence of spheres of absolute authority*. Such ideas form 
the back bone of the 'Policr a t i c u s ' as we have seen above. 
After t h i s concession, Lewis tables those conditions of an 
organic theory, which i n her opinion, medieval thought f a i l e d to sustain 
namely: 'that the whole has a purpose d i s t i n c t from and superior to the 
ends of individuals; which construes the whole as a hierachy of p a r t i a l 
groups each with i t s s p e c i a l end and with a right as a group to r e a l i s e 
that end; which posits the unity of each group l i k e the unity of the 
human individual}which views the o f f i c e r s of the group as organs through 
which the unity of the whole expresses i t s e l f ' . Contrast Gierke: ' i f 
medieval theory holds out one hand to Antique thought when i t sets the 
whole before the parts, and the other hand to the modern theories of 
natural law when i t proclaims the i n t r i n s i c and aboriginal rights of the 
individuals, i t s peculiar c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s that i t sees the universe as 
one a r t i c u l a t e d whole and every being - whether a j o i n t being (community) 
or a single being - as both a part and a whole : a part determined by the 
f i n a l cause of the universe, and a whole with a f i n a l cause of i t s own*. 
So f a r from the whole having a purpose d i s t i n c t from the ends of individuals 
as Lewis asse r t s , i t i s the es s e n t i a l feature of the organic theory that 
there i s no r e a l c o n f l i c t between the int e r e s t of the whole and the true 
i n t e r e s t s of i t s constituent members. John cannot be faulted on these, 
grounds. The common good, the end of the state, consisting of law, peace, 
security, etc i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y different from the mere sum of the part i c u l a r 
goods of individuals, but the raisfin d'etre of the state i s i t s service to 
individuals. 
(22) 
Lewis' argument that John did not pass beyond the p a t r i s t i c 
(62) 
idea to a complete organic conception , i s true to the extent that 
Ch r i s t i a n thought whilst desiring that unity expressed in organic terms 
could never accept i t s f u l l implication of the supremacy of the s t a t e . .In 
other words, the perfection of one's immortal soul could never be 
synonymous with mere fu l f i l l m e n t of p o l i t i c a l obligation. To be sure, John 
i s vague as to what 'commonwealth' he had i n mind in h i s comparison to an 
organic body, whether a c i t y , a province, a kingdom, the Roman Empire or 
the Universal Church. However, i f John can be faulted for h i s lack of 
precise d e f i n i t i o n his philosophic insight i s indeed s t r i k i n g as can be 
seen from a l e t t e r written to Peter abbot of Celle at the time of sending 
.(63) 
him the P o l i c r a t i c u s . A l l things derive their strength from 
mutual aid. I t i s for t h i s reason alone that a l l things go on t h e i r way 
because the same indwelling s p i r i t of unanimity nurtures the concord of 
things dissident, and the dissidence of things concordant, and arranges 
the diverse parts of the body of the universe as though they were i t s own 
members, i n order that they may be attuned together for mutual and 
reciprocal s e r v i c e . Thus, i t i s i n the human body the members serve each 
other and the o f f i c e s of each are elected for the benefit of a l l . There 
are l e s s of some and more of others, but a l l of them are united to serve 
the body's health. They d i f f e r in their e f f e c t s , but i f you consider the 
health of the body they are a l l working for the same end'. Jacobs concludes 
as follows t^^^'John gave the state a soul - he made i t human. To him i t 
was a person f a l l i b l e but with i n f i n i t e p o t e n t i a l i t y for goodness - a 
creature that breathed, thought, w i l l e d , dependent upon a l l the delicate 
adjustments of the human body*. 
DOES JOHN'S VIEW SATISFY AN ORGANIC THEORY OF THE STATE ? 
Many commentators have argued that i n John of Salisbury we 
find one of the e a r l i e s t d e f i n i t e statements that a l l authority, 
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l or secular, belongs to the s p i r i t u a l power. However, on 
several very c r i t i c a l points, for example, the choice of the prince by the 
p r i e s t s , the right of the Church to depose the r u l e r , the way i n which the 
(23) 
Church communicates i t s commands to the prince and imposes them upon him, 
he simply evades the issue. Indeed, are we to take his words l i t e r a l l y , 
that the Church i s . the soul of the stat e , i . e . that i t i s merely an organ 
of the l a t t e r , for there i s no objection to temporal power such as 'so 
long as i t i s exercised i n subjection to God and follows His ordinances 1 
i . e . so long as the Church can use the prince as a mouth-piece for i t s 
own teaching. I s t h i s John's solution to the problem of the Church and the 
sta t e , but because of the uproar which would r e s u l t from the idea that the 
Church should be absorbed i n the stat e , he has veiled h i s true intention 
by emphasising the moral supremacy of the Church. Why should John have 
proposed such a r a d i c a l solution to the problem of sovereignty ? The 
reformers of the eleventh century had seen no other way of purifying the 
Church than to set i t wholly free from temporal control. I t remained for 
the i r succesors i n the twelfth century to witness that the f a u l t s of 
church organisation were not wholly due to secular causes. John devotes 
much of the 'Po l i c r a t i c u s ' to exposing the corruption and ambition within 
the Church, and ends the book with the observation that the position of 
the Pope himself i s an .impossible one i n the face of the r i v a l r i e s between 
the members. Absorption within the sta t e i s indeed a r a d i c a l reform, but 
the Church s t i l l has as i t were, the controlling i n t e r e s t . The Church's 
loss of sovereignty i s rewarded with the acquisition of the prince as i t s 
puppet, and the hitherto ..J^-aj of in t e r e s t s i s resolved into a single 
community able to command the loyalty of a l l c i t i z e n s . 
The question i s now to be asked, does John consider that man 
r e a l i s e s himself as a s o c i a l and ra t i o n a l being only i n so far as he 
participates i n this single harmonious society ? Throughout the 'Policratici; 
John i n s i s t s that where men are free from s i n they can l i v e by law alone 
and need no government. His be l i e f that a king should reign not rule finds 
i t s ideal i n Gideon : 'I w i l l not rule over you, neither s h a l l my son rule 
over you, but the Lord s h a l l rule over you'. In other words John i s saying 
that i n so far as men are virtuous, they make government seen as an 
o 
IAX- ^ IMMAA.- instrument of coercion (redundant), and the state loses i t s absolute 
authority over the c i t i z e n s because of the existence of a complete code 
(24) 
of i n t e l l i g i b l e laws of divine authority, which every virtuous man can 
know d i r e c t l y , i . e . without participation i n the s t a t e . This has very 
important implications i n regard to the question of p o l i t i c a l obligation. 
So far from the individual f u l f i l l i n g himself within an all-embracing 
state, the state i s f u l f i l l e d i . e . i t s coercive aspect withers away, as. a 
r e s u l t of the moral perfection of individuals. 'For i f every man were to 
labour i n the c u l t i v a t i o n of himself, and were to regard things external 
to himself as no proper concern of h i s , straightway the condition of each 
and a l l would become the best possible, virtue would f l o u r i s h and reason 
pre v a i l and mutual charity would reign everywhere, so that the f l e s h 
would be subdued to the s p i r i t and the s p i r i t would serve God with f u l l 
d e v o t i o n ' . i t would seem therefore that man's f i n a l perfection i s an 
inner process and not achieved purely i n his s o c i a l function. S i m i l a r l y i n 
h i s discussion of the best l i f e , there i s no mention of the impossibility 
of achieving t h i s without participation i n the s t a t e . John i s here quoting 
Apuleius (Bk.6 Ch.28): 'I marvel at nothing so much as that while a l l 
desire to lead the best l i f e , and while they know that l i f e i s not l i v e d 
otherwise than with the mind, and that i t i s impossible to l i v e the best 
l i f e except i n c u l t i v a t i o n of the mind, s t i l l the fact i s that men do not 
c u l t i v a t e their minds'. So far from the c u l t i v a t i o n of the mind i n the 
service of God being the complete r e a l i s a t i o n of man's p o t e n t i a l i t i e s only 
achieving perfection within the state, John considers t h i s f i n a l 
development to be possible only outside the realm of p o l i t i c a l obligation. 
'No l i f e i s more f a i t h f u l , none more simple, none more blessed than the l i f e 
of the men who spend t h e i r days humbly i n the c l o i s t e r s ' (Bk.7 - 21). 
But j u s t how far i s the state necessary for the f u l f i l l m e n t of 
human nature and to what degree does the performance of one's s o c i a l 
function determine one's rewards i n the a f t e r l i f e ? Perhaps John comes 
closest to defining the value of the i n s t i t u t i o n s of Church and State in 
the following passage (Book 7 Ch.20) i n a quotation from J «d i cti/i 
'Greatest among a l l the g i f t s bestowed by the supreme mercy of God are the 
p r i e s t l y power and the power of the Emperor; both proceed from one and the 
same source to improve the l i f e of men.1 In other words neither Church nor 
state are absolute or ends-in-themselves, but means to a further development 
which must be the work of man himself. Sometimes the wickedness of the 
(25) 
people causes the coercive aspect of government to take an extreme form, 
to wit a tyrant. 'For tyrants are demanded, introduced, and raised to 
power by s i n , and are excluded, blotted out, and destroyed by repetance' 
(Book 8 Ch.20). How can man r e a l i s e h i s end i n a state ruled over by a 
tyrant ? John's answer i s that a tyrant can have no claim whatsoever on 
the loyalty of men 'being an enemy of the human race'. One's only 
obligation i n this case i s to k i l l him, but here the greatest caution i s 
needed. A tyrant i n the f i r s t place may be God's agent for punishing a 
wicked people, but i f they are penitent and the tyrant stands i n the way 
of t h e i r further progress, than and only then i s tyrannicide permissible. 
However, the best method of destroying tyrants i s through prayer, so that 
i n t h i s case the people f u l f i l l themselves i n spite of the sta t e . 
There i s very l i t t l e evidence that John re l a t e s the performance 
of man's s o c i a l function with his rewards i n the a f t e r - l i f e . Two examples 
* 
however stand out. On the negative side i n connection with tyrannicide 
'No blame i s attached to any of those by whose valour a penitent and 
humbled people w i l l set free but th e i r memory i s preserved i n affection 
by posterity as servants of the Lord 1. Secondly, i n the case of princes 
'in the l i f e to come they w i l l surpass the i r subjects i n glory-, i n 
proportion as they have surpassed them i n virtue because of thei r greater 
opportunity which they have to s i n ' . But apart from these isolated 
examples, John considers salvation t o l M e e s s e n t i a l l y i n keeping one's, soul 
in t a c t by avoiding the material things of l i f e and following nature }the 
best guide to right l i v i n g , a l l t h i s i n the pursuit of wisdom. I n fact 
there i s s t r a i n of anarchism running, throughout John's thought (Bk 7 Ch.l) 
e.g. ' I am not here speaking of men whose hearts are wholly cleansed and 
who r e j o i c e i n continual subjection, declining to be set over any i n t h i s 
l i f e : my task i s rather to analyse the l i f e of men i n the p o l i t i c a l s t a t e . 
And whom w i l l you name me among them who does not i n point of power desire 
to be set ahead at l e a s t of one other'. I n describing qualities, of j u s t i c e , 
kindness, prudence etc necessary for the various ruling elements of the 
s t a t e j John conceives, the abuse of public power i n terms of a breach of 
* How i n fact the head of a body can be removed without detriment to the 
l a t t e r never occurred to John. 
(26) 
personal morality, but t h i s morality i s not something man derives from 
participation i n the' state but i s e s s e n t i a l l y the outcome of man's 
ratio n a l a c t i v i t y carried on i n communion with God and as i t were from 
outside provides the ethics of government. 
F i n a l l y , there i s no suggestion that the Church, the soul of 
the state i s the soul of individual man as i s the case i n Plato's Republic. 
Indeed, i t i s the very possession of a personal immortal soul which 
characterises the Ch r i s t i a n f i r s t and foremost as a complete entity i n 
himself. The unity of the state therefore i s made up of s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t 
individual units, as a wall consists of a number of independently e x i s t i n g 
b ricks. I f we take away a brick i t does not cease to possess the properties 
of a brick; likewise the Christian retains h i s q u a l i t i e s qua. Christian 
outside any p o l i t i c a l structure. The organic analogy with i t s images of 
severed heads and heads i s quite inapplicable, and as we have seen breaks 
down as soon as any attempt i s made to remove i t from i t s proper place i n 
the realm of ideas to the everyday world of p o l i t i c s ^ T h e r e were two 
problems which faced John i n working out a theory of p o l i t i c a l obligation. 
2 
F i r s t l y , where i s sovereignty to l i e i n Church or State. In my opinion, 
having decided that the power of the Church would have to be compromised 
within the state, John could then ask himself whether man f u l f i l l e d the 
needs of h i s immortal soul e n t i r e l y within that structure. His answer i s 
that the state i s a r e l a t i v e not an absolute end. In so far as man i s 
imperfect and needs laws for the protection of property, l i f e j u s t i c e etc, 
then the state performs a useful and necessary function. 
The problem of tracing an organic theory of the 'state' £p any 
writer i n the period before the thirteenth century i s pr e c i s e l y because 
' p o l i t i c s ' was not separated from morals, or r e l i g i o n . The 'Republica 
Christiana' was indeed one body, an organic unit, but ruled by laws which 
embodied the purely Ch r i s t i a n conception of j u s t i c e . Theoretically, the 
'regnum' and 'sacerdot^m' worked together for the same ends within the 
all-embracing 'res. publica'. Before Aquinas, the concept of the state as 
(27) 
an independent s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t and autonomous body was unthinkable, although 
John himself soaked in C l a s s i c a l studies, prepares us for the explosion 
accompanying the rediscovery of A r i s t o t l e i f we are prepared to read 
between the l i n e s . What we are r e a l l y x presented with i s the following: 
an organic theory of the 'res publica' i . e . of that body composed of both 
secular and s p i r i t u a l authority. Within t h i s , the priesthood seems to have 
control of the prince, but i f i n fact the l a t t e r i s prepared to uphold 
Ch r i s t i a n b e l i e f s then lo y a l t y to i t , i n terms, of f u l f i l l i n g one's alloted 
* 
function i s as. indispensable as l o y a l t y to the Church . The 'state' i s 
therefore i s s t i l l a r e l i g i o u s body, i . e . Christian, otherwise the position 
of any Chr i s t i a n writer advocating an organic theory i s obviously 
completely contradictory. However, I am also convinced that John reaches . 
back to the Socratic/early Christian idea of man's soul or conscience. 
This l i e s behind h i s hatred of the bureaucratic officialdom he found at 
Rome, and h i s insistence that voluntary subjection to the laws was the 
i d e a l , which i n turn, kept the coercive aspect of sovereignty to the 
minimum. But in John of Salisbury, there i s a glimmer of suggestion that 
i n s p i t e of the h i e r a r c h i c structure of power designated 'from above', 
f i r s t from the hands of God, through h i s vicecj^-e/W^ on. earth, the kings 
etc, the idea of the right of resistance to a tyrant implies that a r u l e r 
must carry out certain obligations i . e . i n some way however vague, he i s 
responsible to the people. Although, John i n no way advocated a theory of 
government 'from below', the theory of tyrannicide does r a i s e the question 
of the rights of an individual. I t must be added however, that such a 
question never occurred either to John or any other writer of the medieval 
period. What i s clear however i s that to attribute an organic theory of 
the state i n the secular sense i n which the term 'state' i s usually applied, 
to John of Salisbury's 'res publica' ignores the claim of the C h r i s t i a n 
conscience which must reduce the 'organic s t a t e 1 to the l e v e l of an 
abstraction. 
* John's dictum that 'every o f f i c e under the sacred laws i s r e a l l y a 
r e l i g i o u s o f f i c e ' must always be borne i n mind. 
(28) 
THE ORIGIN OF JOHN'S THEORY. 
John i s considered to be the best read man of h i s time, a fact 
which no doubt accounts for the d i f f i c u l t y scholars have found i n 
distinguishing the o r i g i n a l i t y as opposed to the influence of others on 
hi s thought. His t h i r s t for knowledge was indeed remarkable. Born C. 1115 
he travelled to Paris i n 1136 and for the next twelve years studied under 
the leading teachers both there and at Cha rtres, the centre of humanistic 
studies. The l i s t i s formidable : Abelard.Alberic, Robert of Melun, 
William of Canches, Peter Helias, Richard l'Eveque, Adam du P e t i t Pont, 
and Gilbert de l a Porree. However, John's e s s e n t i a l detachment prevented 
him from taking sides i n the great dispute between nominalism and realism 
at that time raging through the different schools, but he could not 
(67 
remain aloof from the secondary struggle between d i a l e c t i c s and c l a s s i c s 
D i a l e c t i c s became the fashion of the day and consequently attracted those 
who saw considerable f i n a n c i a l rewards i n th i s new 'art*. When twelve 
years l a t e r , John r e v i s i t e d these 'dialections * he found that they had not 
progressed at a l l , and concluded that d i a l e c t i c s furthers other studies, 
but by i t s e l f i s bloodless and barren. 'To waste a li f e - t i m e i n these 
pursuits i s an occupation for a man who has nothing to do or for one who 
does not mind labouring i n v a i n 1 . His superb sense of realism, combined 
with his love of learning, especially his love of the c l a s s i c s , i s 
evident throughout the 'Policraticus*, which l i k e the 'Metalogican' was 
written e n t i r e l y i n h i s spare time, a l i v i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n of his. b e l i e f 
that OIIVVIA d f f j i v M b wiotfs atf\, 
In 1146, John l e f t Paris and spent the next twelve years i n 
church administration, eight at the court of Pope Eugenius I I I . By 1159, 
he t e l l s us that he had crossed the Alps ten times, engaged i n 
diplomatic missions. Later, he was to become confidential secretary to 
Theobald and Becket. John was above a l l a churchman, and there i s no 
doubt that the h i e r a r c h i c a l structure of the church had great influence 
on his p o l i t i c a l views. However, the role of the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l 
p o l i t i c i a n was far from being straightforward, and John the scholar too 
(29) 
was finding i t necessary to reconcile the study of pagan authors with 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , grammar and rhetoric being two subjects which had l a t e l y 
been attacked. In addition, i t was during these twelve years that John's 
love of learning increased i n contrast to the vanities of the court, so 
savagely attacked i n the ' P o l i c r a t i c u s ' . I n the 'Metalogican', he talks 
(68) 
of himself 'being fettered to the t r i f l i n g concerns of court' 
Therefore, because of h i s delicate position and indeed the r a d i c a l nature 
of his doctrine some scholars have argued that John i s using a c l a s s i c a l 
authority as a vehicle for expressing his own views on contemporary 
problems. Such i s the case argued by Hans Liebeschutz i n a paper 
,(69) 
e n t i t l e d John of Salisbury, and the Pseudo-Plutarch . 
Liebeschutz. begins by saying that there i s no new feeling 
for the character and organic unity of the state i n John's writings, but 
that he i s merely expressing the common medieval conception of society as 
an organism with the two authorities of Church and State working i n 
harmony. The organic view attributed to Plutarch i s a pseudo<-classical 
invention of his own which i n i t s combination of c l e r i c a l and c l a s s i c a l 
features, i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the author. I f t h i s i s the case, and 
c e r t a i n l y we do not know of the existence of a work e n t i t l e d ' I n s t i t u t i o 
T r a j a n i ' , then i t i s . reasonable to conjecture, as Liebeschut-2. does, that 
Jbhn had a p a r t i c u l a r purpose i n bringing the name of Trajan before his 
readers. An. analysis of John's authorities reveals that he made extensive 
use of two l a t e r Roman his t o r i a n s , Florus and Eutropius, who stressed the 
harmony of m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l and moral strength exemplified by Trajan. 
Additionally fascinating for medieval writers was the myth that Pope 
Gregory had wept for the Emperor and so released him from, h e l l , on 
hearing how he had delayed going to war to bring j u s t i c e to a widow whose 
son had been murdered. Thus, John as an e c c l e s i a s t i c and a lover of 
antiquity was naturally attracted to Trajan, and h i s ,^admir,atdonio-: could 
be j u s t i f i e d on the authority of Gregory himself, as John himself 
emphasises i n the ' P O l i c r a . t i c u s ' ^ 7 ^ . 'But-I do not hesitate to prefer 
Trajan before a l l the pagan r u l e r s because he founded the greatness of 
his. reign s o l e l y on the practice of v i r t u e * . However there i s no evidence 
(30) 
that Plutarch was Trajan's t u t o r , although he did v i s i t Rome on at least 
two occasions. Certainly, Trajan and Plutarch were connected i n the l a t e r 
Roman period, and t h i s might have come down t o the middle ages through 
the Byzantine t r a d i t i o n . 
However, the main objection to the existence of such a work 
by Plutarch, according to Liebschutz's analysis, f a l l s on the words of 
(71) 
John himself . 'There i s extant a l e t t e r of Plutarch w r i t t e n for the 
instruction, of Trajan, which expounds the meaning of one sort of p o l i t i c a l 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . I t i s said t o run i n t h i s way. 'Liebschutz argues that t h i s 
n u l l i f i e s the evidence of the l e t t e r although we must bear i n mind John's 
own statement that he intends 'to insert the ' I n s t i t u t i o Trajahi' i n part 
i n the present work, but i n such a way as to follow rather the general 
(72) 
trend of ideas than the actual sequence of words'. 
Liebeschutz then argues, that when we examine the number of 
times John actually quotes Plutarch's ' I n s t i t u t i o Trajani' by name,, we are 
forced to. conclude that t h i s was 'only one among many authorities employed 
and not his p r i n c i p a l textbook'. I n dealing with the soul and the heart, 
Plutarch i s cite d as the authority, but not i n the case of the head, sides, 
(73) 
eyes, ears or tongue, although at the end of that chapter John writes 
'Now l e t my pen pass on to those who are likened to the hands i n the 
(74) 
simile of Plutarch'. The same formula i s employed i n regard to the feet 
'For these are the l a s t words which Plutarch uses i n the 'Instruction of 
Trajan.' when he descends from the hands to consider the feet. Let us, 
therefore, follow him, and as he himself says, make as i t were shoes for 
the feet, to the end that they may not be wounded by stumbling against a 
stone or other obstacle which so many chances put i n t h e i r way'. In a 
(75) 
l a t e r chapter dealing with the mutual dependence of the head and 
members John writes: 'Read d i l i g e n t l y again; the 'Instruction of Trajan' of 
which mention has been made above, and you w i l l f i n d these things 
discussed there at large'. However, i t must be borne i n mind that John 
had at the very beginning of his introduction to Plutarch's work ca r e f u l l y 
(76) 
enumerated the various offices metioned by him , so that i t would 
seem superfluous to quote his name every time when he came to discuss each o f f i c e i n greater d e t a i l . One further example of great interest 
(31) 
remains. I n i l l u s t r a t i n g the difference between a tyrant and a true prince 
(77) 
, John draws the same organic analogy with regard to 'the commonwealth 
of the ungodly which stri v e s to correspond as i t were to the c i v i l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of a legitimate commonwealth'. The tyrant who i s i t s head i s 
the likeness of the d e v i l : i t s soul consists of the h e r e t i c a l , schismatic, 
and s a c r i l i g i o u s p r i e s t s , and to use the language of Plutarch, prefects of 
r e l i g i o n who wage war on the law of God; i t s heart of unrighteous 
counsellors i s l i k e a senate of i n i q u i t y : i t s eyes, ears and tongue, and 
unarmed hand are unjust Judges, laws and o f f i c i a l s : i t s armed hand consists 
of soldiers of violence whom Cicero c a l l s brigands: i t s feet are those 
who i n the humbler walks of l i f e go against the precepts of the Lord and 
His lawful i n s t i t u t i o n s . The ambiguous phrase, 'to use the language of 
Plutarch' inserted almost as an afterthought, convinces me that t h i s i s one 
case where the Christian mind i s a t t r i b u t i n g to a pagan authority 
c r i t i c i s m s of which i t was unaware. 
But what of Plutarch himself, i s i t true as Liebschutz contends, 
that 'the bulk of Plutarch's writings were certainly as l i t t l e known to 
John as they were to the Middle Ages generally'. The great d i f f i c u l t y 
consists i n the volume of Plutarch's work, and the corresponding loss i n 
the course of time. I n addition to the o r i g i n a l catalogue of Lamprias 
there are 152 quotations from Plutarch which cannot be allocated w i t h 
(78) 
certainty under any known t i t l e of works by him . Moreover another 
twenty pieces are preserved, the majority of undoubted authenticity, which 
are not mentioned i n the o r i g i n a l catalogue. The greatest loss probably 
occurred i n the centuries immediately following the closing of the schools 
of philosophy by Justinian i n 529 AD. However, abstracts of some of 
Plutarch's works were made probably i n the tenth century, and these 
usually supplanted the o r i g i n a l s . I n the case of the 'Moralia' there are 
over one hundred manuscripts, and there are undoubtedly i n existence others 
which have not yet been discovered. I t i s quite l i k e l y that s t i l l others, 
known to have been i n existence may be rediscovered. I t i s possible that 
John's evidence f a l l s i n t o one of these categories. I n addition to 
numerous quotations from Plutarch made by early medieval w r i t e r s , there are 
seven manuscripts of the 'Moralia' dating back to the eleventh and 
(32) 
t w e l f t h centuries, and i n the case of the 'Lives', there i s a tenth 
century parchment containing f i f t e e n l i v e s and an eleventh century 
parchment consisting of sixteen l i v e s . One ought not therefore, to consider 
Plutarch as being a w r i t e r unknown to the middle ages, and i t i s possible 
that John who tra v e l l e d widely and attended some of the most important 
schools of the day, did have a knowledge of Plutarch which most scholars 
dismiss on the grounds on his being an undiscovered w r i t e r . 
Moreover, there are examples of genuine Plutarch i n the 
'Policraticus'. These are (1) : the disapproval of the public worship of 
(79 ) (80) Fortuna (2) : young Alexander's envy of his father's deeds : the 
fact that palm was chosen as the symbol of victo r y because of i t s 
(81) 
resistance to pressure : the story of man despising the married state. 
The l a s t two examples are paralleled by Gellius and Hieronymus, but the 
f i r s t i s of great value, as John should have i l l u s t r a t e d the sovereign's 
fear of God, leading up to the place of the pr i e s t i n the state, but John 
i s obviously fascinated by Plutarch's view on fortune and digresses 
accordingly. Contrary evidence however, i s revealed i n John's discussion 
(82) 
of the q u a l i t i e s of leadership . He cites as his authorities the 
'Instruction of Trajan' and Frontinus 'Book of Stratagems'. Webb has 
shown that he does use Frontinus here and has followed his words l i t e r a l l y . 
John has also made use of Eutropius, both authorities being prominent 
throughout the 'Policraticus'. However the story of Fabricius which 
follows, John a t t r i b u t e s to the s i x t h book of Julius Ignius. ' l i f e and 
deeds of i l l u s t r i o u s men, but i s a mixture of Gellius and Frontinus. 
John continues : 'What shall I say concerning s e l f - r e s t r a i n t and contempt 
for possessions, since I have also promised some of the stratagems of 
Plutarch ?' At the beginning of the next chapter (Bk.5 Ch.8) he writes : 
'To conclude these borrowings from Plutarch's 'Stratagems' with the case 
of Trajan ... ' thereby implying that what came i n between these two 
statements was genuine Plutarch. I n fact i t i s Frontinus again a l l three 
stories being cgAled from one chapter of-Frontinus w i t h the addition of 
Suet§pius as the authority for Augustus. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y damaging 
evidence and Liebeschutz concludes that i t i s proof of John's desire to 
set out a c l e r i c a l scheme of the relationship between the church and state 
i n terms of classical precepts and examples, thereby protecting himself 
(33) 
against the charge of vanity i n his delicate position as an 
ecclesiastical p o l i t i c i a n , on the grounds that he i s only handing down 
* 
another's work. 
Liebeschutz considers there are two general d i f f i c u l t i e s which 
one can only suffimount by ascribing the 'Policraticus' to the medieval 
t r a d i t i o n . The f i r s t consists i n John's claim.that the analogy of the 
priesthood as. the soul of the body p o l i t i c comes from a pagan source i n 
spite of the sub s t i t u t i o n of the one true God for the e a r l i e r pantheon. 
There i s no doubt that John, wary of offending his c l e r i c a l readers, would 
have found i t necessary to a l t e r the examples given i n the o r i g i n a l . The 
second point i s that i t i s d i f f i c u l t to accept that the b e l i e f i n a 
hierarchical structure of society as expressed i n the 'Policraticus' 
could have been characteristic of classical thought. Liebeschutz solves 
the problem by saying that John took the basis of his idea from the work 
of Robertus Pullus, who we know instructed John i n theology. He i s 
mentioned favourably on two occasions i n the -Metalogican 1 as a man 'whom 
(837 
a l l good men hold i n happy memory , and commendable al i k e f o r his 
v i r t u e and knowledge^*^ 1. Pullen was archdeacon of Rochester from 1138 
to 1143 and was called to Rome i n 1144 where he became a cardinal so that 
the v i r t u e of t h i s theory i s that a theologian i s asserted as the authority 
fo r the idea that the prince should be the servant of the priesthood, the 
central theme of the 'Policraticus'. I n Pullen's 'Book.of Sentences' the 
harmony between the s p i r i t u a l and temporal powers i s expressed i n the 
symbol of the soul and body, but the c l e r i c a l authority remains pre-
eminent. The prince wards o f f e v i l from without, the church caring f o r 
man's inner welfare. Robert also discusses the features that distinguish 
a prince from a tyrant, and how a subject should behave under a 
tyrannical government, and then considers the functions of the various 
offi c e s appointed by the king and the various classes of society, the 
judges dispensing j u s t i c e , the knights defending the country, the peasants 
and merchants maintaining the whole machinery by t h e i r payments. I t i s 
Liebeschutz 1s contention that John's discussion i n books f i v e and six of 
the 'Policraticus' follows the sequence of Robert, but extends i t to 
cover the relationship-between a l l classes of society. 
•This seems to me the most plausible solution to the problem. 
(34) 
There are however, objections to what on the surface seems 
a very plausible theory. The d i s t i n c t i o n between a prince and a tyrant 
has i t s roots i n the classical t r a d i t i o n , i n p a r t i c u l a r i n the works of 
Cicero, w i t h which John was very f a m i l i a r , and although John was the 
f i r s t to state e x p l i c i t l y that to k i l l a tyrant i s a j u s t act, t h i s was 
already i m p l i c i t i n the works of Isidore of Seville i n the seventh century, 
so that John need not have r e l i e d on the work of Pullen alone. Secondly, 
the organic analogy, although i n a considerably less elaborate form, had 
i t s origins i n the b i b l i c a l and classical t r a d i t i o n , and i n an introduction. 
to the I n s t i t u t e s of Justinian, a t t r i b u t e d to date between 850 and 1100, 
and probably representing the e a r l i e r Byzantine ed i t i o n , the d i f f e r e n t 
ranks i n the imperial hierarchy are compared to the d i f f e r e n t parts of 
(85) 
the human body - the prince to the head, the ' i l l u s t r e s ' to the eyes, 
the 'spectabiles' to the hands, the ' c l a r i s s i m i ' to the thorax etc. So 
that i n t h i s instance as w e l l , there were other sources besides that of 
Pullen. Thirdly, although John i s apt to use material without assigning i t 
to i t s source i n the case of classical authors I f e e l sure that Pullen 
as his teacher, f r i e n d , contemporary and above a l l a respected theologian, 
would have been cite d as his authority i f t h i s r e a l l y was the source of 
his idea^especially i n view of his delicate position as an ecclesiastical 
p o l i t i c i a n , the basis of Liebeschutz's own argument. 
CONCLUSION 
~ " ~ ( 8 6 ) 
I t has been said that the three p r i n c i p l e contributions to 
p o l i t i c a l thought i n the 'Policraticus' are ( 1 ) : that the prince i s the 
servant of the priesthood (2) the detailed examination of the difference 
between the legitimate r u l e r and the tyrant (3) the a l l o c a t i o n of 
d i f f e r e n t functions to the various members. As we have seen, none of these 
ideas are o r i g i n a l i n themselves, but John i s the f i r s t to formulate them 
e x p l i c i t l y . I t must be.remembered, that John considered that Henry I I had 
challenged the authority of the Church, but while every medieval w r i t e r 
agreed that monarchy was the best form of government i n order to provide 
the necessary unity i n the social organism, i t was universally accepted 
(35) 
that the state was above positive but below natural law. However John 
follows the ecclesiastical t r a d i t i o n i n keeping a l i v e the classical 
notion of the state as an i n s t i t u t i o n with special claims on the l o y a l t y 
and obedience of men, and may be t r y i n g to centralise the a c t i v i t i e s of 
the state, his model being the highly organised Church. Thus, j u s t as i n 
the case of the r e l a t i o n between the prince and the priesthood, and 
between the prince and the tyrant, John has merely formulated e x p l i c i t l y 
what was i m p l i c i t i n medieval thought, so i t seems to me but a short 
step from the organic analogies of classical and ecclesiastical w r i t e r s 
to the detailed theory expounded i n the 'Policraticus', £his being the 
case, I do not think that one can safely say 7with Liebeschutz that John 
took the basis of his theory from Robertus Pullus. He no doubt influenced 
John but the same t r a d i t i o n of organic analogy played i t s part i n 
formulating the ideas of both w r i t e r s , and I have no doubt that John was 
the more o r i g i n a l thinker of the two. My conclusion i s then that John 
has merely followed the organic analogy of b i b l i c a l and classical writers 
to- i t s l o g i c a l end, and i t s clear formulation f o r the f i r s t time i n the 
'Policraticus' i s the culmination of medieval thought on the subject, 
before the rediscovery of A r i s t o t l e ' s ' P o l i t i e s ' , when, the state was to 
recover an innate d i g n i t y unknown to John of Salisbury. 
There remains the problem of Plutarch. I agree with 
Liebeschutz that the discrepancy between the b e l i e f i n a hierarchical 
structure of society and classical thought poses great problems, and the 
l i n k i n g of Plutarch's name with that of T r a j a n ^ h i s t o r i c a l l y very doubtful, 
nevertheless i s from a l i t e r a r y point of view very convenient. What of 
the other p o s s i b i l i t i e s ? Wyttenbach argued that John employed a 
t r a n s l a t i o n , perhaps contemporary^of a Byzantine o r i g i n a l which was a 
compilation of genuine works by Plutarch. Apart from the d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
content mentioned above, we s t i l l face the problem that only those writers 
who had been influenced by the 'Policraticus' refer to the ' I n s t i t u t i o 
Trajani'. M i r t z e l and Schaarschmidt claim that John mistook a Latin 
forgery for a genuine work of Plutarch^a complete reversal of Wyttenbach's 
view; but i n t h i s case too the d i f f i c u l t y remains of explaining the 
sudden loss of the work i n question. A more remote p o s s i b i l i t y i s that 
(36) 
John knew Greek and had access to the o r i g i n a l work of Plutarch. Most 
scholars f i n d i n the t i t l e s 'Policraticus and Metalogican' the pathetic 
desire of a man who knew no Greek, to f i n d Greek sounding names fo r his 
works,which became a fjjjd i n the t w e l f t h century. McGarry however, i n his 
(87) 
introduction to the 'Metalogican' writes , 'Although John knew some 
Greek, he apparently used his Greek sources i n Latin translations'. I n 
(88 ) 
that book , John himself refers to what* a Greek interpreter who also 
knew the Latin language very w e l l , t o l d me when I was staying i n Apulia .' 
Certainly i n both the 'Policraticus' and 'Metalogican', John quotes the 
derivations of words from, the Greek. Whether John knew enough Greek to 
understand a work of Plutarch must remain a matter of conjecture, but we 
do know that.appreciating as he d i d ^ t h a t the course of philosophy lay 
i n Greece, he employed John the Saracen to translate the o r i g i n a l Greek 
(89) 
f o r him . Indeed i n a l e t t e r he wrote to John the Saracen, he corrects 
a translation of the pseudo-Dionysus that John has sent him, so that the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the Greek o r i g i n a l of Plutarch's work should be 
considered along w i t h theories of Latin translations whether forged or 
genuine. 
Scholars therefore, seem to have turned the f u l l c i r c l e i n 
accounting for t h i s l o s t work of Plutarch; the fact that there i s hardly 
anything else in. John's w r i t i n g which i s knownto be genuine Plutarch 
makes the survival of t h i s -one l e t t e r most unlik e l y . I t seems to me that 
while r i g h t l y c r e d i t i n g John to be the most well read man of his time, 
scholars have overlooked the fact that he had a mind capable of developing 
the ideas of others. Nurtured i n the Platonic-Ciceronian school, the home 
of philosophic doubt, John's thought i s a combination of orthodoxy and 
humanism. In the inevitable c o n f l i c t between the two, John f a l l s back on 
the old l i t e r a r y subterfuge of putting his own views through the work of 
another. I n the r e l a t i v e l y unknown Plutarch, he found the perfect agency. 
Believing that a kingdom was an ordered community in. which each social 
group had by divine appointment a necessary part ot play i n the welfare of 
the whole, John took over the t r a d i t i o n a l organic analogy, and extended i t 
to cover a l l classes of society, from the prince to the poorest peasant. 
* I suggest that 'Policraticus* may be connected wi t h 'Polycrates' of 
Samos, one of the most enlightened of the Greek 'tyrants'. 
(37) 
In his ideal state, there could be no clash of interests between the two. 
After John, the organic analogy becomes the dominant feature of medieval 
thoughtj,culminating i n the system of Nicholas of Cusa^ before f i n a l l y 
losing ground to the mechanistic theories of an increasingly i n d u s t r i a l i s e d 
society, but by then the medieval world of John of Salisbury had long 
since died. 
REFERENCES 
1. 'Metalogicon* I I I 1. 
2. Samuel Sambursky 'The Physical World of the Greeks' p.142 
3. Cicero: De Republica Book I I I . Ch. XXII. 
4. Cicero: De Legibus Book 1. Ch. X. 
5. R.W. Southern. 'The Making of the Middle Ages', p.113. 
6. Cicero. De Republica. Book 2 Ch.XXVI. 
7. Ibidem; 
8. P o l i t i c a l Ideas. E. Lewis, p.143. 
9. Romans 12 : 4-8 : 1 Corinthians 12 : 4-31. 
10. Augustine De. Civ. Dei. Book 19 Ch.3 
11. Helen Waddell. 'The Wandering Scholars'. 
12. R.W.Southern. 'The Making of the Middle Ages' p.100 
13. St. Paul. Romans 13 1-5. 
14. 'Policraticus' Book 4. Ch.l 
15. 'Policraticus' Book 4. Ch.2 
16. Ibidem.: 
17. " Book 4. Ch.3 
18. " Book 4. Ch.7 
19. " Book 4. Ch.8 
20. " Book 4. Ch.12 
21. " Book 5. Ch.7 
22. " Book 5. Ch.4 
23. " Book 5. Ch.7 
24. " Book 5. Ch.2 
25. " Book 4. Ch.6 
26. " Book 5. Ch.2 
27. In 'Die Staatslehre Johanns von Salisbury'. 
28. 'Policraticus' Book 5 Ch.4 
29. " Book 5 Ch.7 Proverbs 9 : 14. 
30. " Book 4 Ch.3 
31. " Book 5 Ch.6 
32. " Book 5 Ch.2 
33. 'Policraticus• ' Book 5 Ch.9 
34. Ibidem . 
35. Ibideim... 
36. 797e. 
37. 'Pblicraticus 1 Book 5 Ch.10 
38. " Book 4 Ch.3 
39. " Book 5 Ch.ll 
40. 'De O f f i c i i s ' Book 5 Ch.12 
41. 'Policraticus 1 Book 5 Ch.15 
42. " Book 5 Ch.16 
43. " Book 5 Ch.17 
44. " Book 6 Ch.l 
45. " Book 6 Ch.2 
46. " Book 6 Ch.5 
47. " Book 6 Ch.8 
48. " Book 6 Ch.20 
49. " Book 5 Ch.2 
50. " Book 6 Ch.19 
51. " Book 6 Ch.20 
52. De Regia Potestate Ch.4 quoting Isidore of Seville. 
Sententiae Book 3. Ch.51 
53. 'Policraticus' Book 6 Ch.22 
54. Ibidem. 
55. " Book 6 Ch.25 
56. " Book 6 Ch.26 
57. 'Medieval P o l i t i c a l Ideas' p.193 
58. 'American P o l i t i c a l Science Review' 1938 p.849-876. 
59. ' P o l i t i c a l theories of the Middle Age' p.7 
60. Medieval P o l i t i c a l Ideas p.204 
61. A.P.S.R. 1938. 
62. 'Medieval P o l i t i c a l Ideas' p.198 
63. 'Letters of John of Salisbury' N o . I l l M i l l o r and Butler. 
64. 'Policraticus' Book 6 Ch.25 
65. " Book 6 Ch.24 
66. Social and P o l i t i c a l Ideals p.47-72. 
67. See August C.Krey. 'John of Salisbury's Knowledge of the Classics' 
University of Wisconsin. 1911 
68. Metalogican Book 1 Ch.4 
69. Journal of the Wanburg I n s t i t u t e VI 1943. 
70. 'Policraticus' Book 5 Ch.8 
71. " Book 5 Ch.l 'Exstat epistola Plutarchi ... ea 
d i c i t u r ....' 
72. 'Policraticus' Book 5. Ch.2 
73. " Book 5 Ch.17 
74. " Book 6 Ch.19 
75. " Book 6 Ch.25 
76. " Book 5 Ch.2 
77. " Book 8 Ch.17 
78. F.C.Babbit. Introduction to the Loeb ed i t i o n of Plutarch's Moralia. 
79. 'Policraticus' Book 5 Ch.4 
80. " Book 5 Ch.12 
81. " Book 5 Ch.10 
82. " Book 5 Ch.7 
83. Metalogican. Book 1 Ch.5 
84. " Book 2 Ch.10 
85. Dickinson 'Statesman's book of John of Salisbury 1 P.XX 
86. Jacobs: 'Social and P o l i t i c a l Ideals', p.47-72. 
87. Metalogican P.XXIII. 
88. " Book 1 Ch.15 
89. August C. Krey 'John of Salisbury's Knowledge of the Classics'. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
The 'Policraticus 1 of John of Salisbury< 
The 'Metalogicon' of John of Salisbury. 
JOHN DICKENSON. 
New York 1927. 
DANIEL MCGARRY 
University of California 
1955. 
HISTORY OP MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY (especially VOL I I I ) R.W.CARLYLE 
Blackwood 1922. 
POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 
JOHN OF SALISBURY AND THE 'POLICRATICUS' IN 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEALS. 
MEDIEVAL HUMANISM. 
O.GIERKE (translated 
Maitland.) Cambridge 1922. 
E.F. JACOB. 1923. 
HANS LIEBESCHUTZ 1950. 
JOHN OF SALISBURY AND THE PSEUDO-PLUTARCH 
(Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld I n s t i t u t e s 1943) 
JOHN OF SALISBURY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CLASSICS. AUGUST KREY. 
(Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Science and l e t t e r s ) (1909-1910) 
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN MEDIEVAL TIMES. 
ORGANIC TENDENCIES IN MEDIEVAL. THOUGHT. 
(American P o l i t i c a l Science Review 1938), 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF MEDIEVAL THOUGHT. 
JOHN OF SALISBURY 
(Church Quarterly Review 1929) 
GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST. 
A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT : 
THE MIDDLE AGES. 
JOHN OF SALISBURY (BIOGRAPHY) 
JOHN OF'SALISBURY i n Essays, 
and studies by the Members of the 
English Association X I I I . 1928. 
THE MAKING OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 
Medieval P o l i t i c a l Ideas. 2 Vols. 
Letters OF JOHN OF SALISBURY. 
J.B.MORRALL. 
EUART LEWIS. 
Hutchinson 
1958. 
R.POOLE 1920 
REV. ROGER LLOYD. 
MCILWAIN. 
W.ULLMANN. 
Macmillan 1932. 
Penguin 1966. 
C.WEBB 1932. 
HELEN WADDELL. 
R.W.Southern. 
E. LEWIS Routledge 1954. 
MICCOX AND BUTLER 1955. 
P A R T I I I 
BERNARD BOSANQUET. 
(1) 
THE ORGANIC THEORY OF THE STATE CONSIDERED IN THE WORK OF 
BERNARD BOSANQUET. 
The development of a B r i t i s h Neo-Hegelian movement may be 
accounted f o r p a r t l y as a reaction to u t i l i t a r i a n and Marxian theories 
of society, p a r t l y as a product of that c i v i l i s a t i o n which might f a i r l y 
claim to be the bearer of the present stage of development of the 
'world - s p i r i t ' . Thus, the i d e a l i s t theory of the state i s essentially 
a philosophy of patriotism, and the state i t s e l f i s considered a 
s p i r i t u a l phenomenon, and citizenship a great s p i r i t u a l experience, 
without which human l i f e would not be complete. The purpose of the 
'Philosophical theory of the State' i s to f i n d an e t h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for the use of cbercian by the state, and a satisfactory explanation of 
the duty of obedience to the law. 'Philosophy, i n t r e a t i n g of society^ 
has to deal with the problems which arise out of the nature of a whole 
and i t s parts, the r e l a t i o n of the individual to the universal, and the 
transformation by which the p a r t i c u l a r self.,- i s l o s t , to be found again 
i n a more in d i v i d u a l , and yet more universal form' . Bosanquet admits 
that the essence of t h i s theory i s to be found not merely i n Plato and 
A r i s t o t l e , but i n many modern writers, especially^ Hegel, Green, Bradley 
(23 * and Wallace ; However, he considers that there i s no longer any need 
for the scrupulous caution which Green displayed i n estimating the value 
of the State to i t s members, but the state must be recognised as the 
'substantive purpose and foundation of our l i v e s ' . 
THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND. 
At the heart of the I d e a l i s t system l i e s the b e l i e f that everything 
whether natural or i n t e l l e c t u a l , forms part of a system apart from which 
i t cannot be understood. 'That the world of mind or the world above sense 
exists as an actual and organised whole i s a t r u t h most easily realised 
i n the study of the beau t i f u l . And to grasp t h i s p r i n c i p l e as Hegel 
applies i t i s nothing less than.to acquire a new contact with s p i r i t u a l 
(2) 
(3) l i f e ' . The suggestive force of special experiences such as beauty 
and r e l i g i o n , ' leads us to the World of the Absolute, the whole of which 
the human Individualsis a mere fragment, and the constitutive feature of 
the f i n i t e s e l f i s self-transcendance. The individual i s incomplete and 
imperfect so long as he remains i n his own f i n i t u d e , and his l i f e i s a 
constant struggle between the f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e elements of his nature 
towards perfection 'in the great world of s p i r i t u a l membership', as 
opposed to the essentially false world of claims and counter-claims. 
However, the individual transcends himself not i n a world beyond t h i s one 
but i n his d a i l y l i f e . 'The Absolute i s simply the high-water mark of 
fluctuations i n experience of which i n general.we are dai l y and normally 
(4) 
aware' . c.f, Hegel : 'the subject-matter of philosophy i s never 
anything abstruse and remote but always something concrete and i n the 
highest sense present'. I t i s because the s p i r i t u a l world i s conceived 
by Bosanquet to be simply the natural world understood i n the f u l l e s t 
l i g h t , that he sees the ideal state i n the actual state. This has led 
* 
many commentators to accuse Bosanquet of confusing the actual with the 
ideal state i.e. instead of r e a l i s i n g the i d e a l , he idealises the r e a l , 
but i t i s precisely t h i s dualism that Bosahquet i s anxious to avoid. 
(5) 
I n one of his l a s t papers Bosanquet writes : Plato i n p articular 
came as a revelation, not as confirming the dualism of ' t h i s ' world and 
the 'other', but i n opposition to the current and more or less popular 
legends of his meaning, i t was so pl a i n and obvious that his true passion 
was for the unity of things'. This unity i s i l l u s t r a t e d as follows : ' I f 
you ask what r e a l i t y i s , you can i n the end say nothing but that i t i s 
the whole which thought i s always endeavouring to a f f i r m . And i f you ask 
what thought i s , you can i n the end say nothing but that i t i s the central 
function of mind i n affirming i t s p a r t i a l world to belong to a real 
universe'. I t i s as an organic part of t h i s real universe, the concrete, 
Hobhouse p a r t i c u l a r l y . 
(3) 
objective 'world of mind 1, that the individual derives his value and 
r e a l i t y , not as distinguished from other p a r t i c u l a r s , but as a concrete, 
universal e n t i t y w i t h i n a r i c h l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d and systematic whole i.e. 
the Absolute. This f i n a l form of i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s anticipated i n f i n i t e 
experience by the human personality and the state, but the l a t t e r remains 
the highest embodiment of the social,: not absolute^mind, being one of the 
'media' by which the individual comes i n contact with the Absolute. 
I t i s precisely because p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the state i s conceived by 
the i d e a l i s t to be a s p i r i t u a l experience that the ideal can be claimed 
to be realised i n the actual. Ideal does not mean unrealised, but the 
universal or essential character of the community considered from a moral 
(6) 
point of view. Thus the state i s an ideal fact . 'The actual facts of 
t h i s world dp d i r e c t l y arise out of and are causally sustained by 
conscious i n t e l l i g e n c e ' , and these facts^rom the world above sense. The 
unity of a Christian church or congregation i s a governing fact of l i f e : 
so i s that of a family or nation. What i s t h i s unity ? Is i t v i s i b l e 
and tangible, l i k e the unity of a human body ? No, the unity i s ideal; 
that i S j i t exists i n the world of thought only. An army, qua army, i s 
not a mere fact of sense; for not only does i t need mind to perceive i t -
(7) 
a heap of sand does that - but i t also needs mind to MAKE i t . The 
i d e a l i s t therefore casts his p o l i t i c a l theory i n terms of mind, w i l l and 
purpose. Man's s p i r i t u a l l i f e i s a concrete r e a l i t y here and now, and 
there i s no divorce of the sensuous and the supersensuous, the natural 
and the supernatural. The world of sense i s seen as an organ and symbol 
of the world of s p i r i t , and the world of s p i r i t as the ' t r u t h ' and f u l l 
r e a l i t y of the world of sense. The task of philosophy i s to realise the 
' i d e a l i t y of l i f e i n i t s commonest actual phases'. 
Two principles therefore emerge from our preliminary discussion of 
Bosanquet's metaphysics. F i r s t , the ultimate r e a l i t y of the individual 
i s a f i c t i o n . The f i n i t e s elf has no being apart from membership of the 
whole i . e . self-transcendance i n the perfection of the Absolute, the 
( 4 ) 
a l l - i n c l u s i v e harmonious system of experience i n which a l l our i m p e r f e c t 
human v a l u e s and achievements are consummated and f u l f i l l e d . Bosanquet's 
p o l i t i c a l philosophy i s e s s e n t i a l l y the a p p l i c a t i o n of the theory of the 
Absolute t o the n a t i o n - s t a t e as i m p e r a t i v e on man's nature as r a t i o n a l . 
Secondly, 'the o b j e c t of p o l i t i c a l philosophy i s to understand what a 
S t a t e i s , and i t i s not n e c e s s a r y f o r t h i s purpose t h a t the s t a t e which 
(8 ) 
i s a n alysed should be ' i d e a l ' , but only t h a t i t should be a s t a t e ' 
The s t a t e i s ' i d e a l ' only i n the sense t h a t i t s w i l l i s a t every s t a g e 
d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h i t s own e x p r e s s i o n i n i t s e f f o r t to s a t i s f y the needs 
of i t s members, who i n t u r n acknowledge the common s e l f of s o c i e t y to be 
more r e a l than the apparent i n d i v i d u a l , i . e . as r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e i r 
h i gher or i d e a l s e l f as opposed to the a c t u a l s e l f a t the o r d i n a r y l e v e l 
of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 
THE PROBLEM STATED. 
The u l t i m a t e root of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n l i e s f o r Bosanquet i n 
the complete i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the w i l l of the i n d i v i d u a l w i t h the w i l l 
of the s t a t e , and i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s b e l i e f t h a t only w i t h i n that 
s t r u c t u r e can he f u l f i l l h i m s e l f as a s o c i a l being. To t h i s must be 
( 9 ) 
added t h a t 'the aim of p o l i t i c s i s to r e a l i s e and f i n d the i n d i v i d u a l ' , 
and t h a t 'nothing s h o r t of the s t a t e i s the a c t u a l i s a t i o n of f r e e d o m 1 . 
The end of the i n d i v i d u a l and the s t a t e i s the same, to w i t , the 
r e a l i s a t i o n of the best l i f e . A l l t h e o r i e s which accept as u l t i m a t e , the 
a b s o l u t e and n a t u r a l independent e x i s t e n c e of the p h y s i c a l i n d i v i d u a l , 
must regard government as a l i e n , a diminution of the s e l f by o t h e r s and 
f o r c e as oppression. Self-government i s not the government of each by 
h i m s e l f , but of each by o t h e r s . T h e r e f o r e the t h e o r i e s of M i l l , Bef)tham, 
Hobbes and Locke, do not s o l v e the problem of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n 
because they accept the n a t u r a l s e p a r a t e n e s s of the human u n i t , t h a t the 
'people' who e x e r c i s e the power a r e the same people over whomr> i t i s 
e x e r c i s e d . But the w i l l of the people p r a c t i c a l l y means the w i l l of the 
most numerous or a c t i v e p a r t of the people, and such a tyranny of the 
(3) 
m a j o r i t y i s one of the e v i l s a g a i n s t which s o c i e t y must be on i t s guard., 
Bosanquet t h e r e f o r e , i n h i s r a d i c a l treatment of the problem of p o l i t i c a l 
o b l i g a t i o n r i g h t l y r e j e c t s democracy as a paradox of two a l i e n f a c t o r s , 
s e l f and government. 
( 5 ) 
Where then l i e j j the s o l u t i o n ? 'We must take the two f a c t o r s of the 
working i d e a of self-government i n t h e i r f u l l antagonism, and e x h i b i t , 
through and because of t h i s , the fundamental u n i t y a t t h e i r root, and the 
n e c e s s i t y and c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r coherence. We must show, i n s h o r t , how 
man demands to be governed; and how government, which puts r e a l f o r c e on 
him, i s e s s e n t i a l as he i s aware, to h i s becoming what he has. i t i n him 
to b e ' ^ ^ . T h e o r i e s of self-government, designated a s ' t h e o r i e s of the 
f i r s t look', f a i l p r e c i s e l y because they assume t h a t s o c i e t y and the 
i n d i v i d u a l r e a l l y a r e as they immediately appear to be. Government by 
consent i n v o l v e s a t any time the r e t r a c t i o n of t h a t consent. L i b e r t y i s 
not merely absence of c o n s t r a i n t but the maximisation of the s e l f and 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y which f i r s t becomes p o s s i b l e and r e a l i n and through the 
s t a t e . I t i s i n the d o c t r i n e of the g e n e r a l w i l l , f i r s t put forward by 
Rousseau and developed by Hegel, t h a t Bosanquet f i n d s the b a s i s of 
s o c i e t y which w i l l make m o r a l i t y and self-government i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
Freedom l i e s i n the a s s e r t i o n of the higher s e l f , the r e a l w i l l of the 
i n d i v i d u a l as opposed to h i s a c t u a l w i l l c o n s i s t i n g of h i s t r i v i a l and -
r e b e l l i o u s moods, and t h i s r e a l w i l l i s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e ' g e n e r a l w i l l ' 
or 'common s e l f ' which i s the essence of the s t a t e . The general w i l l as 
opposed to an aggregate of w i l l s , the ' w i l l of a l l ' , i n v o l v e s the i d e a 
of o r g a n i c u n i t y , the d i f f e r e n c e being i l l u s t r a t e d by a f o r t u i t o u s crowd 
and a w e l l - d i s c i p l i n e d army. The former i s u n i t e d merely by a s s o c i a t i o n , 
the l a t t e r by a s y s t e m a t i c whole which permeates and l i v e s i n the members 
who i n t u r n a re determined by i t . Thus, the i n d i v i d u a l through the 
g e n e r a l w i l l a t t a i n s genuine i n d i v i d u a l i t y t h a t belongs to a s e l f o r g a n i c 
to the communal whole 
THE REAL WILL OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
The theory of r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y i s the b a s i s of I d e a l i s t s o c i a l 
philosophy. To the e g o i s t i c , p a r t i c u l a r s e l f , l i v i n g e n t i r e l y by n a t u r a l 
impulse, the f o r c e e x e r c i s e d by the s t a t e merely epitomises h i s 
a l i e n a t i o n . The r e a l s e l f on the other hand i s capable of r a t i o n a l and 
( 6 ) 
moral behaviour and f r e e l y a c q u i e s c e s i n s t a t e compulsion, being the 
instrument of h i s f u l f i l l m e n t as a s o c i a l being. The d o c t r i n e of the 
r e a l w i l l thereby paves the way f o r a s e r i e s of r e s t r a i n t s upon the 
i n d i v i d u a l . L i b e r t y , normally defined as the absence of c o n s t r a i n t , now 
becomes a c o n d i t i o n of the mind, but i n e i t h e r case Bosanquet argues the 
(13) 
p r i n c i p l e remains of only being determined by o n e s e l f . I n the l i t e r a l 
c a s e , what we mean by o u r s e l f i s the given s e l f , the a c t u a l w i l l , which 
being acknowledged as u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , 'we throw the c e n t r e of g r a v i t y , 
o u t s i d e i t , and p l a c e the t r u e s e l f r a t h e r i n something which we want to 
b e than i n what we a c t u a l l y a r e ; although a t the same time i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t to some extent we are t h i s something or we should not want to be 
(14) 
i t ' . I n other words as a member of a s t a t e one's l i b e r t y c o n s i s t s of 
the r e s t r a i n t l a i d upon one's worst p r o p e n s i t i e s which are a t war w i t h 
one's b e t t e r s e l f . Bosanquet admits t h a t t h i s form of l i b e r t y i s merely 
(15) 
metaphorical , and i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s conception of being f r e e 
wherever one's higher s e l f i s being a s s e r t e d , even by compulsion, t h a t 
l e d the ' l i b e r a l i s t ' p h ilosopher L.T.Hobhouse to a t t a c k the whole i d e a of 
a r e a l as opposed to an a c t u a l w i l l . The b a s i s of t h i s r e a l w i l l which 
transcends the i n d i v i d u a l whose w i l l i t i s , and the throwing of the c e n t r e 
of g r a v i t y of the s e l f o u t s i d e what i s normally considered to c o n s t i t u t e 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y , has obvious a f f i n i t i e s . ' w i t h Bosanquet's metaphysics. 
I t has been mentioned however, 'that the r e a l w i l l i s but s l i g h t l y 
(16 ) 
represented i n our e x p l i c i t consciousness a t i t s o r d i n a r y l e v e l ' 
How t h e r e f o r e , can anything be my w i l l which I am not f u l l y aware of, or 
which I am even a v e r s e to ? The answer i s i n d i c a t e d by the common 
experience t h a t 'what people demand i s seldom what would s a t i s f y them i f 
they got i t ' . I n order t h e r e f o r e , to o b t a i n a f u l l statement of the r e a l 
w i l l , 'what we want a t any moment must a t l e a s t be c o r r e c t e d and 
( 1 7 ) 
amended by what we want a t a l l other moments' . Secondly, ' t h i s 
cannot be done without a l s o c o r r e c t i n g and amending i t so as to harmonise 
i t w i t h what oth e r s want.' However, 'when any c o n s i d e r a b l e degree of 
such c o r r e c t i o n and amendment has been gone through, our own w i l l would 
r e t u r n to us i n a shape i n which we should not know i t again, although 
( 7 ) 
every d e t a i l would be a n e c e s s a r y i n f e r e n c e from the whole of wishes and 
r e s o l u t i o n s we a c t u a l l y c h e r i s h I Moreover, ' i f i t were to be supplemented 
and r e a d j u s t e d so as to stand not merely f o r the l i f e which on the whole 
we manage to l i v e , but f o r a l i f e i d e a l l y without c o n t r a d i c t i o n , i t would 
appear to us q u i t e remote from anything which we know'. Bosanquet has 
(18) 
here d i s t i n g u i s h e d three l e v e l s of r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y . The f i r s t 
c o n s i s t i n g of our day to day a c t s of w i l l , embodies r a t i o n a l i t y a t the 
l e v e l of ends and means. In. c o r r e c t i n g what we want a t one moment w i t h 
what we want a t a l l other moments, we have moved to r a t i o n a l i t y a t the 
l e v e l of p r i v a t e s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n , the t h i r d stage of amending our own 
wants w i t h those of o t h e r s , r e p r e s e n t s the l e v e l of m o r a l i t y , or i n 
other words a r a t i o n a l way of l i v i n g must be a s o c i a l way of l i v i n g . 'The 
S t a t e i s an i m p e r a t i v e n e c e s s i t y of man's nature as r a t i o n a l , w h i l e 
c o n t r a c t i s a mere agreement of c e r t a i n f r e e persons about c e r t a i n 
ex t e r n a l t h i n g s • ^ 1 ^ \ 
Thus, the c o n f l i c t between s e l f and o t h e r s which destroyed the 
conception of self-government i s removed when we r e a l i s e t h a t the average 
i n d i v i d u a l i s not the r e a l s e l f . Self-government i s only p o s s i b l e on the 
b a s i s of an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the r e a l w i l l o f the i n d i v i d u a l w i t h the 
g e n e r a l w i l l as embodied i n s o c i e t y . 'There i s no other way of e x p l a i n i n g 
how a f r e e man can put up w i t h compulsion and even welcome it'^^°\'The 
impe r a t i v e c l a i m of the w i l l t h a t w i l l s i t s e l f i s our inmost nature and 
we cannot throw i t o f f * . T h i s i s the u l t i m a t e root of p o l i t i c a l 
o b l i g a t i o n . But, as we have seen, the r e a l w i l l i s something which we 
(21) 
do not know, and cannot w i l l because we do not r e c o g n i s e i t . I s 
t h e r e f o r e , Bosanquet's v e r s i o n of the r e a l w i l l a v a l i d conception, i n 
i t s e l f , and does i t s o l v e the problem of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n ? 'Are we 
to t r e a t the average nature as a means to the t r u e r and f u l l e r s e l f - as 
something t h a t i s to say, which i s i n s t r u m e n t a l to the l a t t e r and has no 
. _ . ^ . ^  ( 2 2 ) r i g h t s a g a i n s t i t ? 
( 8 ) 
A fundamental o b j e c t i o n to the conception of the r e a l w i l l r e s t s on 
the ifalse-Jaut itshe's i s b e t w e e n conscious aims and a c t u a l d e s i r e s . 'The 
man's w i l l i s i n s h o r t j u s t what i t i s w i t h a l l i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , and not 
(23) 
what i t might be i f these l i m i t a t i o n s were removed' . Regret a t doing 
a t h i n g i s no more ground f o r r egarding r e g r e t as more e s s e n t i a l l y 
myself than r e g a r d i n g my o r i g i n a l c h o i c e as more r e a l . A l l such 
i m p e r f e c t i o n s a r e p a r t of my ' r e a l ' w i l l , but s t r i c t l y there i s no p a r t 
i n me which i s more r e a l than any other. The term ' r e a l ' must be 
« 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d between i t s a d j e c t u a l meaning, connecting a p a r t i c u l a r 
phase of myself-^'With myself as a whole, and i t s s u b s t a n t u a l meaning 
i n which ' R e a l i t y ' i s something e i t h e r to be simply a s s e r t e d or denied. 
'For the c o n t r a s t between the r e a l and the u n r e a l then should be 
s u b s t i t u t e d the c o n t r a s t between the s e l f as i t i s permanently c o n s t i t u t e d 
(24) 
and the s e l f as i t a c t s i n some t r a n s i t o r y excitement' . However, even 
t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n breaks down, because not merely s u p e r f i c i a l i n t e r e s t s 
c l a s h w i t h the be s t l i f e but the deepest p a s s i o n s . The r a t i o n a l , 
harmonious w i l l i s not r e a l i n the average man, but r a t h e r i t s r e c o g n i t i o n 
depends upon h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . Thus, the a c t u a l ' w i l l ' i s r e a l not 
r a t i o n a l , the ' r e a l ' w i l l , r a t i o n a l but not r e a l . I t would appear 
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Bosanquet's statement of the r e a l w i l l i s not s a t i s f a c t o r y , 
but i s d e f i n e d i n e f f e c t as an i d e a l w i l l , and i t i s t h i s i d e a l w i l l 
which i s the b a s i s of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . The i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e l a t i o n to 
the s t a t e , 'as the guardian of our r e a l s e l f , the instrument of our 
. (25) 
g r e a t e s t s e l f a f f i r m a t i o n , has developed i n t o a r e l a t i o n between two 
' i d e a l ' e n t i t i e s t h a t o v e r r u l e h i s e m p i r i c a l e x i s t e n c e . THE REAL WILL AS IDENTICAL WITH THE GENERAL WILL 
"The r e a l i t y of the common s e l f , i n the a c t i o n of the 
(26) 
p o l i t i c a l whole, r e c e i v e s the name of the 'general w i l l ' . I t i s we 
might say, the w i l l of the whole s o c i e t y 'as such' or the w i l l s of a l l 
i n d i v i d u a l s ' i n so f a r as they aim a t the common good'. By the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r w i l l s of i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h the s o c i a l 
good, the gen e r a l w i l l purports to provide a genuine account of 
O) 
self-government by 'on the one hand, an ab s o l u t e and determinate 
adjustment and r e c o g n i t i o n of r i g h t s ; on the other hand, embodying i n i t s 
(27) 
r e c o g n i t i o n s a l l i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m s which r e p r e s e n t a true i n d i v i d u a l i t y ' 
The general w i l l i s then the s p i r i t of the community as a w i l l f o r the 
good and i s as much imp l i e d i n the l i f e of a s o c i e t y as some s o r t of w i l l 
f o r good i n the l i f e of an i n d i v i d u a l . The two, i n f a c t , a re not merely 
(28) 
analogous, but to a great extent i d e n t i c a l . Bosanquet seems to reduce 
the general w i l l to the l e v e l of philan t h r o p y , e.g. 'The general w i l l 
i n the l a s t r e s o r t i s the i n e r a d i c a b l e impulse of an i n t e l l i g e n t being 
to a good extending beyond i t s e l f i n as f a r as th a t good takes the form 
of a common good'. However, i t s r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i s th a t i t binds the 
i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y i n t o an i n v i o l a b l e whole, an organ i c u n i t y , together 
w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l ' s conscious r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the r e a l i s a t i o n of the 
best l i f e i s p o s s i b l e only i n and through s o c i e t y . ' I t i s p l a i n t h a t the 
u n i t y of myself w i t h others i n a common good i s the same i n p r i n c i p l e as 
the u n i t y of myself w i t h myself which I aim at i n aiming a t my own 
. (29) 
good . But the general w i l l , as mentioned above, i s fundamentally 
opposed to a mere aggregate of w i l l s , the w i l l of a l l . S u r e l y however, 
the w i l l of a l l , i f d i r e c t e d to the common good, would be one w i t h the 
gene r a l w i l l ? I n f a i r n e s s t o Bosanquet i t must be mentioned t h a t he 
(30) 
h i m s e l f r a i s e s t h i s point , but h i s answer i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , namely 
t h a t the gen e r a l w i l l , as a t r u e i n t e r e s t r e q u i r e s some degree of energy 
or e f f o r t , perhaps of s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , and t h a t such a c t i o n w i l l not be 
forthcoming, without the a p p l i c a t i o n of some ki n d of f o r c e or 
' a u t h o r i t a t i v e suggestion by the s t a t e ' . T h i s not only expresses a very 
p e s s i m i s t i c view of human nature, the r a t i o n a l i t y of which i s elsewhere 
made the b a s i s of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n , but i s i n e f f e c t c o n t r a r y to 
Bosanquet's own view t h a t m o r a l i t y cannot be enforced by the s t a t e , to 
co n s i d e r a man's i d e a l s not as the spontaneous e x p r e s s i o n of h i s 
* 
innermost f e e l i n g s , but as c r e a t e d i n the f i r s t p l a c e by the s t a t e . 
* Compare Bosanquet's l a t e r remarks t h a t the s t a t e can only enforce 
o b l i g a t i o n s not d u t i e s . 
(10) 
The q u e s t i o n remains as to how the general w i l l f i n d s 
e x p r e s s i o n . Rousseau having grasped the d i s t i n c t i o n between the gen e r a l 
w i l l and the w i l l of a l l , f a i l s i n Bosanquet's judgement, to conceive 
how the g e n e r a l w i l l e x e r c i s e s i t s s o v e r e i g n t y i n the modern n a t i o n - s t a t e . 
By r e v e r t i n g to the democracy of the Greek p o l i s , 1 he i s appealing from 
the o r g a n i s e d l i f e , i n s t i t u t i o n s , and s e l e c t e d c a p a c i t y of a n a t i o n to 
(31) 
t h a t n a t i o n regarded as an aggregate of i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s . : '. I t i s 
p r e c i s e l y the community of the i n t e r e s t and the nature of the o b j e c t , 
not the number of votes which d i s t i n g u i s h e s the general w i l l . Bosanquet, 
f o l l o w i n g Hegel provides the f o l l o w i n g s o l u t i o n : 'The h a b i t s and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of any community a r e , so to speak, the standing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of a l l the p r i v a t e w i l l s which compose i t , and i t i s thus p o s s i b l e to 
a s s i g n to the general w i l l an a c t u a l and concrete meaning as something 
d i f f e r e n t a t once from every p r i v a t e w i l l and from the vote of any given 
assembly, and yet as standing, on the whole, f o r what both the one and 
(32) 
the other n e c e s s a r i l y aim at s u s t a i n i n g as the framework of t h e i r l i f e ' 
The w i l l of the i n d i v i d u a l i s a c t u a l i s e d i n p r i v a t e property, the fa m i l y , 
i n i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the Trade Unions and the Church, and f i n a l l y i n 
the s t a t e , which embodies the h i g h e s t freedom. The f u l l e s t c o n d i t i o n of 
l i b e r t y i s that i n which we are o u r s e l v e s most completely, or i n other 
words 'the f r e e w i l l i s the w i l l t h a t w i l l s i t s e l f ' . 'Any system of 
i n s t i t u t i o n s which r e p r e s e n t s to us, on the whole, the c o n d i t i o n s 
e s s e n t i a l to a f f i r m i n g such a w i l l , has an imperative c l a i m upon our 
(33) , 
l o y a l t y and obedience as the embodiment of our l i b e r t y . Thus, 
freedom l i e s i n conformity to the r e a l w i l l , which i s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the 
common s e l f , the general w i l l , and which i n t u r n i s embodied i n the 
s o c i a l f a b r i c . 
T h i s concept of a common s e l f , a s o c i a l mind, i d e n t i f i e d w i t h 
the g e n e r a l w i l l , s t r i k e s a t the root of every theory which regards human 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y as something u l t i m a t e . I t i s however, e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h Bosanquet's b e l i e f i n the Absolute as the concrete u n i v e r s a l , the 
t o t a l i t y of experience, which a s s e r t s i t s e l f to the f u l l through i d e n t i t y 
and d i f f e r e n c e i n the i n d i v i d u a l . As we have seen, Bosanquet's metaphysics 
(11) 
i s i n many ways the key to h i s p o l i t i c a l theory, and i t i s worthwhile a t 
t h i s p o i n t to r e - s t a t e the C a r d i n a l Tenet of h i s philosophy. 'Thus, f o r 
freedom as f o r t r u t h and r e a l i t y , freedom i n s o c i e t y i n morals, and i n 
a l l a c t i o n and e x p r e s s i o n , once more the c o n d i t i o n and c r i t e r i o n was the 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the whole, by union w i t h which alone the f i n i t e s p i r i t 
(34) 
could become what i t had i n i t to be 1 . Now the p r i n c i p l e behind 
Bbsanquet's conception of the common s e l f i s t h a t 'the nearer I approach 
to being myself, the nearer I approach i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the communal 
(35) 
mind' , so t h a t a l l the r e a l w i l l s of i n d i v i d u a l s , d e f i n e d as t h a t 
which they ought to be, are i n q u a l i t y and c h a r a c t e r i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e , 
and i t i s t h i s sameness which c o n s t i t u t e s the one, common s e l f of s o c i e t y . 
The crux of the problem l i e s as always i n Bosanquet's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
the term ' i n d i v i d u a l i t y ' . The t r u e i n d i v i d u a l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s does not 
l i e i n t h e i r i s o l a t i o n , but i n t h a t d i s t i n c t i v e a c t or s e r v i c e by which 
(36) 
they pass i n t o unique c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the u n i v e r s a l . I n other words, 
Bosanquet r e j e c t s as the b a s i s of i n d i v i d u a l i t y 'the pure p r i v a c y and 
incommunicability of f e e l i n g ' which f o r him ' i s superceded i n a l l p o s s i b l e 
degrees by the s e l f - t r a n s c e n d e n c e and u n i v e r s a l i t y of the contents w i t h 
(37) 
which i t i s u n i f i e d ' 
The p o i n t of view of the ' t h e o r i s t of the f i r s t look' i s 
(38) 
admirably argued by Hobhouse . Drawing a d i s t i n c t i o n between the kind 
of u n i t y i n v o l v e d i n the q u a l i t a t i v e i d e n t i t y between r e a l w i l l s , and 
that u n i t y i n v o l v e d i n the s e l f or the s t a t e , he continues, 'the s e l f i s 
a continuous i d e n t i t y u n i t e d by s t r a n d s of p r i v a t e memory and e x p e c t a t i o n , 
comprising elements of f e e l i n g , emotion and b o d i l y s e n s a t i o n which a r e i t s 
a b s o l u t e , e x c l u s i v e property. No such c o n t i n u i t y u n i t e s d i s t i n c t s e l v e s 
however a l i k e , or however u n i t e d i n t h e i r o b j e c t s ' . Bosanquet, however, 
regards the d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the s e l f as i d e n t i c a l i n t h e i r e s s e n t i a l 
n a t u re w i t h the d i f f e r e n c e s between s e l v e s , and t h e r e f o r e seems to imply 
a numerical i d e n t i t y between i n d i v i d u a l s . ' I f we co n s i d e r my u n i t y w i t h 
myself a t d i f f e r e n t times as the l i m i t i n g case, we s h a l l f i n d i t very 
hard to e s t a b l i s h a d i f f e r e n c e between the u n i t y of what we c a l l one 'mind 
(39) 
and t h a t of a l l the 'minds' which e n t e r i n t o a s i n g l e s o c i a l experience 
(12) 
I n r e p l y Hobhouse argues t h a t experience qua experience can never be 
common, because u n i t y can only belong to the o b j e c t of experience, w h i l e 
the s u b j e c t i n each case remains a d i s t i n c t c e n t r e of s e n s a t i o n . He 
acknowledges however, t h a t Bosanquet h i m s e l f r e c o g n i s e s t h a t ' i n a sense 
i t i s t r u e t h a t no one consciousness can partake of or can a c t u a l l y e n t e r 
v 
i n t o another, but as always Bosanquet is not content w i t h prima f a c i e 
d e f i n i t i o n s , but takes the problem one st a g e f u r t h e r i n t o the realm of 
metaphysics. 'Separateness i s not an u l t i m a t e c h a r a c t e r of the i n d i v i d u a l , 
but i t i s a phase of being a l i e n to e x t e r n a l i t y and tending to disappear 
i n as f a r as t r u e i n d i v i d u a l i t y p r e v a i l s ' ^ ^ . Of course i f you r e j e c t 
Bosanquet's metaphysics, as Hobhouse does., then i t i s p e r f e c t l y l e g i t i m a t e 
to r e p u d i a t e the conception of the common s e l f from the point of view of 
the uniqueness of the i n d i v i d u a l . I t must be pointed out, however, th a t 
Bosanquet's p o s i t i o n i s q u i t e l o g i c a l , provided t h a t the f u l l e r and 
metaphysical sense of i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s taken as. the r e a l , and the sense 
given t o i t by Hobhouse r e j e c t e d as a lower and incomplete v e r s i o n of i t . 
I t i s merely an e x t e n s i o n of the p r i n c i p l e i n v o l v e d i n a r e a l and a c t u a l 
w i l l . 
THE GENERAL WILL IDENTIFIED; WITH THE STATE 
The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the s t a t e w i t h the r e a l w i l l of the 
i n d i v i d u a l i n which he w i l l s h i s own nature as a r a t i o n a l being i s the 
f i n a l s tage i n Bosanquet's account of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . Our r e a l w i l l 
i s to l i v e and a c t as c i t i z e n s , and we r e a l i s e i t by conforming to the 
r u l e s and conventions of the laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s , as the embodiment of 
the s o c i a l s p i r i t . 'The s t a t e i s to the g e n e r a l l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l 
much as. we saw the f a m i l y to be w i t h regard to c e r t a i n of h i s impulses. 
The i d e a i s th a t i n i t , or by i t s help, we f i n d a t once d i s c i p l i n e and 
expansion j t h e t r a n s f i g u r a t i o n of p a r t i a l impulses and something to do 
and c a r e f o r , such as the nature of a human s e l f demands. I f you s t a r t 
w i t h a human being and t r y to d e v i s e what w i l l f u r n i s h him/an o u t l e t and 
r 
(13) 
a s t a b l e purpose capable of doing j u s t i c e t o h i s c a p a c i t i e s - a 
s a t i s f y i n g o b j e c t of l i f e - you w i l l be d r i v e n on by the n e c e s s i t y of 
(41) 
the f a c t s a t l e a s t as f a r as the s t a t e , and perhaps f u r t h e r ' 
I n s t i t u t i o n s , 'as the st a n d i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a l l the p r i v a t e w i l l s 
a r e ' e t h i c a l i d e a s ' because they provide the i n d i v i d u a l w i t h an 
opportunity f o r s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n . However, c i t i z e n s h i p as a sphere of 
r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y i s only p o s s i b l e i n a p o l i t i c a l l y organised s o c i e t y . 
The term ' s t a t e ' f o r Bosanquet, acc e n t s the p o l i t i c a l aspect of the 
whole and i s opposed to the noti o n of an a n a r c h i c a l s o c i e t y ' , but i t a l s o 
i n c l u d e s the e n t i r e h i e r a r c h y of i n s t i t u t i o n s by which l i f e i s determined, 
from the f a m i l y to the tr a d e , and from the t r a d e to the Church and the 
(42) 
U n i v e r s i t y . ' T h i s i s the source of a most s e r i o u s confusion between 
s t a t e and s o c i e t y which w i l l be considered l a t e r . Bosanquet goes on to 
d e f i n e the s t a t e as the 'operative c r i t i c i s m of i n s t i t u t i o n s ' , as t h a t 
s t r u c t u r e which g i v e s ' l i f e and meaning' to the l a t t e r . I t i s a 'working 
conception of l i f e by the guidance of which every l i v i n g member of the 
(43) 
commonwealth i s enabled to perform h i s f u n c t i o n ' . 'But a complete 
r e f l e c t i v e conception of the end of the s t a t e ... would mean a complete 
i d e a of the r e a l i s a t i o n of a l l human c a p a c i t y ' , and Bosanquet c o n s i d e r s 
t h i s an i m p o s s i b i l i t y 'because of the gradual c h a r a c t e r of the process 
by which the end of l i f e i s determined f o r man'. The r e a l w i l l , as 
repr e s e n t e d by the S t a t e i s only a p a r t i a l embodiment::, of i t . T h i s 
statement, together w i t h the phrase 'perhaps f u r t h e r ' mentioned above, 
i s the f i r s t i n t i m a t i o n t h a t there may be something higher than the 
s t a t e . 
For the moment, however, i t i s f a i r to say t h a t i t i s the 
t o t a l i t a r i a n a s p e c t of the s t a t e to which Bosanquet d i r e c t s h i s c h i e f 
a t t e n t i o n . ' I t seems important to observe t h a t f o r c e i s i n h e r e n t i n the 
(44) 
s t a t e , and no t r u e i d e a l p o i n t s i n the d i r e c t i o n of d e s t r o y i n g i t ' 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , as the s o v e r e i g n t y of the s t a t e i s the s o v e r e i g n t y of the 
gene r a l w i l l , i t i s not mere p o s s e s s i o n of f o r c e t h a t c h a r a c t e r i s e s the 
s t a t e , but i t s use i n f u r t h e r a n c e of the gen e r a l w i l l . F orce i n t h i s 
sense i s de f i n e d as ' i n s t r u c t i o n and a u t h o r a t a t i v e s u g g e s t i o n ' , reminding 
(14) 
us of d u t i e s we are too ignorant or i n d o l e n t to c a r r y out, as opposed to 
the mere r e s t r a i n t of law-breakers. 'The s t a t e i s the f l y - w h e e l of our 
l i f e . We p r o f i t at every t u r n by i n s t i t u t i o n s , r u l e s , t r a d i t i o n s , 
r e s e a r c h e s , made by minds a t t h e i r b e s t , which through s t a t e a c t i o n , a r e 
now i n a form to operate as extensions of our own m i n d s ' ^ ^ . However, 
'the r e t u r n of t h i s g r e a t e r s e l f , forming a system a d j u s t e d to u n i t y , 
upon t h e i r i s o l a t e d minds, as an expansion and s t i m u l u s to them, 
n e c e s s a r i l y takes the shape of f o r c e , i n as f a r as t h e i r minds are i n e r t ' . 
But, as the end of the s t a t e i s the end of the i n d i v i d u a l , to w i t the 
^ r e a l i s a t i o n of the b e s t l i f e , the common good, t h e r e can be no q u e s t i o n 
of such f o r c e impeding the h i g h e s t s e l f - a s s e r t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l mind. 
An abrupt t r a n s i t i o n i n the argument now takes p l a c e i n which the s t a t e 
i s promoted from i t s p o s i t i o n 'as a n e c e s s a r y f a c t o r i n c i v i l i s e d l i f e ' 
to mean ' s o c i e t y as a u n i t , r e cognised as r i g h t l y e x e r c i s i n g c o n t r o l over 
i t s members through a b s o l u t e p h y s i c a l power 1 . Without such power the 
s t a t e could not f u l f i l l t h a t f u n c t i o n f o r which by d e f i n i t i o n i t e x i s t s , 
v i z the 'ultimate and e f f e c t i v e adjustment of the c l a i m s of i n d i v i d u a l s ' . 
'The s t a t e , as the w i d e s t grouping whose members a r e e f f e c t i v e l y u n i t e d 
by a common experience i£f n e c e s s a r i l y the one community which has 
a b s o l u t e power to ensure, by f o r c e i f need be a t l e a s t s u f f i c i e n t 
(47) 
adjustment of the c l a i m s of a l l other groupings to make l i f e p o s s i b l e ' 
The n a t u r a l consequence of such a view i s t h a t each i n d i v i d u a l must 
belong to only one s t a t e , which, as w i l l be shown, de s t r o y s the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of any e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n . By i d e n t i f y i n g the g eneral 
w i l l w i t h the s t a t e , and g i v i n g a new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to the term ' f o r c e ' 
Bosanquet s o l v e d the paradox of self-government which arose out of a view 
which equated f o r c e w i t h p h y s i c a l compulsion and government w i t h f o r c e . 
'Our theory i n s i s t s on the w i l l and p e r s o n a l i t y of the s t a t e , and w i t h 
them on i t s moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' ^ ^ \ However, the q u e s t i o n now to be 
,asked i s , whether the i n d i v i d u a l i s not i n e f f e c t s a c r i f i c e d to the ends 
i 
jof an a u t h o r t a r i a n s t a t e . 
END AND LIMIT OF STATE ACTION. 
On the c r e d i t s i d e , Bosanquet's f i r s t p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t 'the 
(49) 
promotion of m o r a l i t y by f o r c e i s an a b s o l u t e s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' 
(15) 
Although the end of the s t a t e i s the r e a l i s a t i o n of the best l i f e , i t s 
d i r e c t power i s l i m i t e d to the performance of e x t e r n a l a c t i o n s , i . e . 
/backed u l t i m a t e l y by p h y s i c a l f o r c e , i t can promote the i n t e n t i o n to a c t 
|i n a c e r t a i n way, and thereby i n d i r e c t l y the a c t i o n s themselves. 
Furthermore, 'an a c t i o n performed i n t h i s sense under compulsion i s not 
(51) 
a t r u e p a r t of the w i l l 1 . I n so f a r as such p h y s i c a l compulsion i s 
used a g a i n s t r e c a l c i t r a n t i n d i v i d u a l s , they are not being f o r c e d to be 
f r e e , f o r they a r e capable only of the lower l e v e l s of freedom and not 
of the freedom of c i t i z e n s h i p . Thus, Bosanquet d e s c r i b e s the d i s t i n c t i v e 
• ( 5 2 ) 
province of the s t a t e as hindrance to hindrances of good l i f e . So 
t h a t s t a t e a c t i o n i s n e g a t i v e i n i t s immediate bearing, though p o s i t i v e 
i n i t s u l t i m a t e purpose. How c a r e f u l Bosanquet i n f a c t i s i n l i m i t i n g the 
(53) 
use of f o r c e by the s t a t e i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the f o l l o w i n g passage : 
'We ought, as a r u l e , when we propose a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g compulsion, to be 
a b l e to show a d e f i n i t e tendency to growth, or a d e f i n i t e r e s e r v e of ic a p a c i t y , which i s f r u s t r a t e d by a known impediment, the removal of which i s a s m a l l matter compared w i t h the c a p a c i t i e s to be s e t f r e e . For i t 
should be remarked that every a c t done by the p u b l i c power has one asp e c t 
of encroachment, however s l i g h t on the sphere of c h a r a c t e r and i n t e l l i g e n c e 
I t can t h e r e f o r e only be j u s t i f i e d i f i t l i b e r a t e s r e s o u r c e s of c h a r a c t e r 
and i n t e l l i g e n c e g r e a t e r beyond a l l q u e s t i o n than the encroachment which 
i t i n v o l v e s ' . The s e l f - c o n s c i o u s development of the i n d i v i d u a l i s the s i n e 
qua non of h i s membership of s o c i e t y , and Bosanquet r e s t r i c t s automatism: 
to those a c t s b e t t e r performed from any motive than not performed a t a l l , 
thereby f o l l o w i n g Green. He i s a l s o f o l l o w i n g Bradley i n the i d e a t h a t 
t h e r e must be i n t e n s e l i f e and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n the members, otherwise 
the whole s t a t e i s o s s i f i e d . The c r i t e r i o n f o r a l l s t a t e a c t i o n i s i t s 
e f f e c t on the moral c h a r a c t e r of the c i t i z e n e.g. 'thus we may say t h a t 
every law and i n s t i t u t i o n , every e x t e r n a l f a c t maintained by the p u b l i c 
power, must be judged by the degree i n which i t s e t s a t l i b e r t y a growth 
(54) 
of mind and s p i r i t ' . Bosanquet's p o s i t i o n t h e r e f o r e , i s t h a t as f a r as 
(16) 
the h i g h e r l e v e l s of r a t i o n a l i t y a r e concerned e.g. citizenship^government 
can only h i n d e r h i n d r a n c e s . The c a p a c i t y f o r r a t i o n a l achievement must 
a l r e a d y be t h e r e , and government can do no more than a s s i s t i n i t s 
l i b e r a t i o n . I t can only a c t d i r e c t l y w i t h regard to the thr e e lower l e v e l s 
of r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y , to w i t , those of means and ends, p r i v a t e s e l f -
s a t i s f a c t i o n , and moral r u l e s and customs. I n these i n s t a n c e s the general 
w i l l a c t s i n the form of f o r c e through automatism,, not as s o c i a l suggestion 
which we spontaneously r i s e to accept, but comes to us ex hypothesis as 
something which c l a i m s to be o u r s e l f , but which f o r the moment we more or 
(55) 
l e s s f a i l t o r e c o g n i s e . . However:, ' i n so f a r as by m i s d i r e c t i o n of 
the automatic process i t encroaches upon the r e g i o n of l i v i n g w i l l - the 
region where the good r e a l i s e s i t s e l f d i r e c t l y by i t s own f o r c e as a 
motive, i t i s sawing o f f the branch on which i t s i t s ' , and superseding 
( 5 6 ) 
the aim by the instrument . Our l o y a l t y to the s t a t e r e s t s on the 
f a c t t h a t i t s end i s moral purpose imperative upon i t s members. 
The s u b j e c t of r i g h t s i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the province of 
s t a t e a c t i o n . ' I f we ask i n g e n e r a l , f o r a d e f i n i t i o n arid l i m i t a t i o n of 
s t a t e a c t i o n , the answer i s i n a simple phrase that s t a t e a c t i o n i s 
(57) 
c o i n c i d e n t w i t h the maintenance of r i g h t s ' . The system of r i g h t s i s 
d e s c r i b e d as the 'organic whole of outward c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to the 
best l i f e ' and the p o s i t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l i n the organism i s 
(58) , 
summarised as f o l l o w s : The immediate point i s t h a t no r i g h t s a re 
a b s o l u t e , or detached from the whole, but a l l have t h e i r warrant i n the 
aim of the whole, which a t the same time i m p l i e s t h e i r adjustment and 
r e g u l a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to gen e r a l p r i n c i p l e s ' . The u l t i m a t e b a s i s of a 
^ r i g h t i s t r a c e d to the i n d i v i d u a l ' s f u n c t i o n i n the whole and depends upon 
that f u n c t i o n being recognised as i n s t r u m e n t a l to the common good. 'A 
(59) 
r i g h t thus regarded i s not anything primary' R i g h t s a r e claims 
recognised by the s t a t e , but duty i s the purpose w i t h a view to which the 
r i g h t i s s e c u r e d and not merely a corresponding o b l i g a t i o n e q u a l l y 
d e r i v e d from a common ground. Buty, t h e r e f o r e being considered the b a s i s 
of r i g h t s , i t f o l l o w s t h a t there can be no r i g h t S j which a r e not 
recognised by the s t a t e . However, Bosanquet adds t h a t i f r i g h t s can only 
be r e c o g n i s e d by the s t a t e , they can only be r e a l i n the i n d i v i d u a l , and 
(17) 
cannot be enforced because they i n v o l v e the r e l a t i o n of an a c t to an end 
i n a person's w i l l . An o b l i g a t i o n on the other hand i s the c o r r e l a t i v e 
of a r i g h t . I t i s what must be done by other s i n order to sec u r e the 
r i g h t . I n t h i s case 'the s t a t e can enforce an a c t which favours the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a c t i n g towards a moral end' . However, 'no person and 
,(61) tc^iiJ no s o c i e t y i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s e l f , so t h a t l o y a l and customary 
r i g h t s must be co n t i n u o u s l y overhauled to see whether they a r e r a t i o n a l l y 
j u s t i f i e d and as c o n d i t i o n s change new r i g h t s w i l l come i n t o e x i s t e n c e . 
'The s t a t e - m a i n t a i n e d system of r i g h t s , then, i n i t s r e l a t i o n to the 
normal s e l f and w i l l of o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s w i t h t h e i r v a r y i n g moods of 
enthusiasm and ind o l e n c e , may be compared to the automatic a c t i o n of a 
(62) 
human body . One such automatic a c t i o n i s the punishment of any 
v i o l a t i o n of t h a t system of r i g h t s , the negation of the offe n d e r ' s a n t i 
s o c i a l w i l l . But even i n t h i s extremity, the i n d i v i s i b l e u n i t y of the 
i n d i v i d u a l and the s t a t e i s i n s i s t e d upon. ' I t must be l a i d down th a t i n 
as f a r as any sane man f a i l s a l t o g e t h e r to r e c o g n i s e i n any form the 
a s s e r t i o n of something he normally r e s p e c t s i n the law which punishes him, 
he i s outlawed by h i m s e l f and the e s s e n t i a l s of c i t i z e n s h i p a r e not i n 
h i m ' ( 6 3 ) . 
STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN THE REAL WORLD. 
I t can now be seen t h a t the i d e a l i s t view of the s t a t e as an 
i n f l u e n c e which permeates every nook and cranny of s o c i e t y , and shapes 
a l l i n s t i t u t i o n s and persons to i t s end, i s merely the other s i d e of the 
Marxist c o i n . But, whereas r e a l i t y f o r the m a t e r i a l i s t can only l i e i n the 
o b j e c t i v e world, the i d e a l i s t i s f i n a l l y d r i v e n back to the b a s i c P l a t o n i c 
p o s i t i o n of a s s e r t i n g the world of mind as the u l t i m a t e sphere of 
r e a l i t y . However, the i d e a l i s t a l l o w s of no s i g n i f i c a n t demarcation 
between these two worlds, a c e n t r a l weakness which i s i l l u s t r a t e d by 
Bosanquet's ambiguous dualism of ajreal and an e m p i r i c a l s e l f . T h i s could 
r e f e r on the one hand to the a c t u a l d i s t r e s s of men i n t h e i r e m p i r i c a l 
r e a l i t y , as a g a i n s t a ' r e a l ' s e l f which demands r e l e a s e i n a b e t t e r 
world, u s u s a l l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the 'world to come', or on the other hand 
i t may s i g n i f y a depr e c a t i o n of the e m p i r i c a l l i f e i n favour of an 
(18) 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y ' i d e a l ' l i f e of the s t a t e . Hoemle, a d i s c i p l e of Bosanquet, 
e x p l a i n s the p o s i t i o n as f o l l o w s : ( 6 4 ) i the i d e a l i s t has no d e s i r e to deny 
the need f o r reforms, but i s more i n t e r e s t e d i n d w e l l i n g on the p o s i t i v e 
achievement and v a l u e of a c t u a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . I t must c e r t a i n l y be 
admitted t h a t a g r e a t d e a l of i d e a l i s t theory does not come to g r i p s w i t h 
the a c t u a l working of present-day i n s t i t u t i o n s a t a l l , and throws the 
blame of i m p e r f e c t i o n s on the l a c k of c h a r a c t e r and p u b l i c s p i r i t i n the 
c i t i z e n s than on remediable f a u l t s i n the e s t a b l i s h e d order'. Detrimental 
as t h i s i s to: any s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n of the p r a c t i c a l problem of 
p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . Hbemle then p o i n t s out the fundamental d i f f i c u l t y 
'the term 'the S t a t e , as used by the i d e a l i s t , covers two t h i n g s which the 
c r i t i c s i n s i s t on d i s t i n g u i s h i n g : i t covers both the community or n a t i o n 
and the government - both the i d e a l v a l u e s of which the community i s b e a r e r 
and the p a r t i c u l a r arrangements or machinery by which i t s l i f e i s 
' r e g ulated'. I t i s t h i s sense of the term ' s t a t e ' t h e r e f o r e to which a 
p o s s i b l e o r g a n i c theory i s a p p l i e d , as a s o l u t i o n to the problem of 
self-government, the t r u e root of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . But f i r s t , i t i s 
n e c e s s a r y to c o n s i d e r the f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s of Bosanquet's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
the term ' s t a t e ' . 
Taking the case of Bosanquet's d e f i n i t i o n of the s t a t e as 'the 
w i d e s t t e r r i t o r i a l a r e a compatible w i t h the u n i t y of experience which i s 
i ( 6 5 ) 
demanded by e f f e c t i v e self-government , two c r i t i c i s m s immediately 
emerge: ( a ) t h a t Bosanquet's philosophy y i e l d s the i n d i v i d u a l i n t o the 
c l u t c h e s of s o c i e t y as such, or to the s t a t e g e n e r a l l y , whereas i n r e a l i t y 
the i n d i v i d u a l always has to c a r r y on h i s l i f e i n some p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l 
form of s o c i e t y and s t a t e (b) the i d e n t i t y of n a t i o n and s t a t e i s not 
p e r f e c t l y r e a l i s e d i n any known p o l i t i c a l community, because s o c i e t y i s 
d i v i d e d i n t o c l a s s e s and t h e r e f o r e cannot be reasons embodiment to any 
s u b j e c t c l a s s . Bosanquet's t o t a l n e g l e c t of the economic foundations of 
( 6 6 ) 
s o c i e t y and h i s summary d i s m i s s a l of c l a s s as a p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n , 
i n v i t e s the c r i t i c i s m t h a t he i s wanting the b e s t of both worlds, by 
(19) 
a c c e p t i n g what i s good i n ' a c t u a l ' s t a t e s and t u r n i n g a b l i n d eye to those 
elements which no r a t i o n a l theory could s u s t a i n . I f s t a t e s qua s t a t e s do 
not m a intain bad c o n d i t i o n s i t s u r e l y r e s u l t s t h a t the s t a t e i s not the 
a c t u a l organised community, but only so much of the organised community as 
makes f o r good, and the s t a t e i s d e f i n e d by an i d e a l . The i d e a l s t a t e may 
dwell s o l e l y i n the realm of concepts - ' i t i s not one w i t h a c t u a l s t a t e s 
but a measuring r o d ' ^ * ^ - but^the fundamental f a l l a c y i n the method of 
d e f i n i t i o n a r i s e s p r e c i s e l y because the i d e a l i s t s e es the r a t i o n a l 
embodied i n the e x i s t i n g order i n i t s e s s e n t i a l o u t l i n e s , but d e l i b e r a t e l y 
minimises those a s p e c t s i n which i t f a l l s s h o r t of the i d e a l . 
(68) 
I n one of h i s few c e r t a i n r e f e r e n c e s to a c t u a l s t a t e s , 
Bosanquet f e e l s the need to defend h i s a n a l y s i s as opposed to: t h a t of Green 
who contended t h a t the requirements of the s t a t e have ' l a r g e l y a r i s e n out 
of f o r c e d i r e c t e d by s e l f i s h motives'. I n answer to the fundamental 
q u e s t i o n as to whose conception of the g e n e r a l w i l l the i n s t i t u t i o n s rep-
r e s e n t , Bosanquet concedes t h a t the i d e a of/a common good has never been 
the s o l e i n f l u e n c e o p e r a t i v e i n the formation or maintenance of s t a t e s , but 
such i m p e r f e c t i o n s as s e l f - i n t e r e s t and ambition are not a c c i d e n t a l , but 
'inherent i n each p a r t i c u l a r form of human experience'. Hegel's statement 
th a t the ' s t a t e i s no work of a r t , i t ends i n the world' i s o b v i o u s l y 
a p p l i c a b l e here, but a deeper p r i n c i p l e i s a l s o i n v o l v e d summed up by 
(69) 
Bosanquet i n one of h i s l e t t e r s . 'Our l i f e i s a s t r i v i n g a g a i n s t e v i l , 
but i f the e v i l were gone, f i n i t e l i f e would be gone too'. However, i t 
seems as i f the e x i s t e n c e of e v i l i n no way p r e j u d i c e s the s t a t e ' s e s s e n t i a l 
n e u t r a l i t y i n promoting the b e s t l i f e of a l l the members. 
' A l l t h a t we needed to show was t h a t what makes and maintains 
s t a t e s as s t a t e s i s w i l l and not f o r c e , the i d e a o fa common good, and not 
greed or ambition; and t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e cannot be overthrown by the 
f a c t s of s e l f - i n t e r e s t i n o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s , or of s e l f i s h n e s s i n those 
'(70) 
who mould the d e s t i n i e s of n a t i o n s . The E n g l i s h l a b o u r e r f o r example 
may not concern h i m s e l f w i t h a b s t r a c t i d e a s such as the s t a t e or the 
'common good', but Bosanquet argues t h a t he does r e c o g n i s e t h a t h i s c l a i m s 
depend on h i s r e c o g n i t i o n of the c l a i m s of o t h e r s . Furthermore, as a 
( 2 0 ) 
member o f a t r a d e u n i o n , he c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e 'common g o o d 1 , and becomes 
aware o f h i s p l a c e i n t h e w h o l e , h i s t r u e i n d i v i d u a l i t y , w h i l e t h e common 
l i f e he s h ares w i t h h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s evokes a r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e s t a t e 
( 7 1 ) 
1 as a b s o l u t e i n power over t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' 
T h i s complete i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e n a t i o n w i t h t h e s t a t e , 
as a d e s c r i p t i o n o f any h i t h e r t o e x i s t i n g s o c i e t y i s m a n i f e s t l y f a l s e . 
Under modern c o n d i t i o n s o f c a p i t a l i s m where t h e r e l a t i o n s o f p r o d u c t i o n a r e 
t h e key t o p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s , because t h e i n s t r u m e n t s o f p r o d u c t i o n a r e 
i n p r i v a t e hands, t h e power o f t h e s t a t e i s c o i n c i d e n t w i t h t h e power o f 
p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , and cannot t h e r e f o r e be a n e u t r a l agent o f t h e t o t a l 
w e l l - b e i n g o f s o c i e t y . Even i n t h e extreme case o f a n a t i o n u n i t e d by 
war, t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e r e l i g i o u s r e b e l o r p o l i t i c a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y remains 
an anathema t o any concept o f a g e n e r a l w i l l . Bosanquet however, i n an 
a t t e m p t t o a l l o w f u l l p l a y t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i e n c e concedes t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e b e l l i o n as a d u t y . T h i s i s n o t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s t h e o r y 
o f punishment as t h e r e t u r n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e a l w i l l , b u t r e b e l l i o n 
i s p e r m i s s i b l e o n l y a g a i n s t a f o s s i l i s e d s o c i e t y , b u t 'never i n a s t a t e i n 
( 7 2 ) 
w h i c h law can be a l t e r e d by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s ' . Bosanquet's 
s t a t e m e n t t h a t 'the c o n s c i e n t i o u s o b j e c t o r w i l l f o l l o w h i s c o n s c i e n c e t o 
(73) 
t h e end, and i f we b e l i e v e him t o be s i n c e r e we a l l r e s p e c t him f o r i t ' , 
a l l o w i n g t h e i n i t i a t i v e t o l i e w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l , i s i m p o s s i b l e t o 
r e c o n c i l e w i t h h i s g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f o b l i g a t i o n . I n s e t t i n g up t h e f r e e 
development o f t h e r a t i o n a l w i l l , as t h e c r i t e r i o n f o r o b e d i e n c e , i t 
f o l l o w s t h a t t h e r e i s no p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n w h i c h i s n o t s u b o r d i n a t e t o 
m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n and p o l i t i c s a r e s u b o r d i n a t e t o e t h i c s . I t appears 
t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e whim o f s u b j e c t i v e r eason does c o n s t i t u t e i n c e r t a i n 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s a v a l i d c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e embodiment 
o f o b j e c t i v e r e a s o n . S u r e l y , however, i t i s e r r o n e o u s t o c l a i m t h a t t h e 
customs and i n s t i t u t i o n s o f s o c i e t y a r e t h e p r o d u c t o f a u n i t a r y g e n e r a l 
w i l l , o f an i n t e l l i g e n t purpose a l o n e . 'The a c t u a l i n s t i t u t i o n s o f s o c i e t y 
a r e n o t t h e i m p e r f e c t r e a l i s a t i o n o f a r e a l w i l l , w h i c h i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
good and harmonious, b u t t h e r e s u l t i n t o w h i c h t h e n e v e r - c e a s i n g c l a s h o f 
w i l l s has s e t t l e d down w i t h some degree o f permanency, and t h a t r e s u l t may 
embody much l e s s o f j u s t i c e , m o r a l i t y and r a t i o n a l i t y t h a n t h e e x p l i c i t 
( 2 1 ) 
( 7 4 ) i d e a s o f many an i n d i v i d u a l mind' . S o c i e t y t h e r e f o r e , i s t h e outcome n o t 
o f one r e a l w i l l b u t o f m i l l i o n s o f w i l l s t h r o u g h g e n e r a t i o n s . Bbsanquet 
h i m s e l f does n o t seem w h o l l y c o n v i n c e d by h i s own argument. I n d i s c u s s i n g 
( 7 5 ) 
t h e i d e a s and causes advanced by t h e c a r e e r o f Napoleon he w r i t e s : 
'they came i n t o e x i s t e n c e t h r o u g h t h e w o r k i n g o f i n n u m e r a b l e minds towards 
o b j e c t i v e ends by t h e i n h e r e n t l o g i c o f s o c i a l g r o w t h ' . Our c o n c l u s i o n i s 
t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f t h e s t a t e i s t h a t s o v e r e i g n t y e x e r c i s e d 
i n d e fence o f t h e p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p o f t h e means o f p r o d u c t i o n and does n o t 
(76 ) 
' r e s i d e o n l y i n t h e o r g a n i s e d w hole a c t i n g qua o r g a n i s e d whole' , b u t i n 
r e a l i t y i n one element o f t h e whole. I t i s n o t d e n i e d t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a 
common purpose i n p a r t i c u l a r w i l l s , o n l y t h a t t h i s cannot be equated w i t h 
t h e s t a t e . 
Where does such a g e n e r a l w i l l o r common purpose l i e a c c o r d i n g 
t o o u r a n a l y s i s ? The answer i s i n t h e v o l u n t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h o s e v e r y 
examples o f ' p r a c t i c a l l o g i c ' w h i c h Bosanquet admires e.g. Trade U n i o n s , 
L o c a l Government, C h a r i t y O r g a n i s a t i o n s e t c . 'But f o r c o n c r e t e l o g i c , t h e 
c r e a t i v e s p i r i t o f t h i n g s , what i s r e a l l y t h e common b a s i s o f p o l i t i c s and 
p o e t r y , I am c o n v i n c e d t h e r e i s n o t , and n e v e r has been a n a t i o n a l mind 
more h i g h l y endowed t h a n t h e E n g l i s h . I p o i n t t o t h e g r e a t o r g a n i s e d 
i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h have s p r u n g u n a i d e d f r o m t h e b r a i n o f o u r wa g e - e a r n i n g 
( 7 7 ) 
c l a s s ' . But as we have seen, i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h e i d e a o f a common good 
i n v o l v e d i n t h e c r e a t i o n o f o r g a n i s a t i o n s t h a t i s made t h e b a s i s o f t h e 
s t a t e ' s c l a i m o f obedience f r o m t h e w o r k i n g man. I n o t h e r words, t h e s t a t e 
f o r Bosanquet i s t h e e n t i r e s o c i a l f a b r i c whereas we t h i n k o f t h e s t a t e as 
t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n b e h i n d law and government. ' I t i n c l u d e s t h e e n t i r e 
h i e r a r c h y o f i n s t i t u t i o n s by w h i c h l i f e i s d e t e r m i n e d f r o m t h e f a m i l y t o 
(78 ) 
t h e t r a d e , and f r o m t h e t r a d e t o t h e Church and t h e U n i v e r s i t y ' 
However, p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s and advanced s o c i e t y as t h e a n a r c h i s t s c o n c e i v e 
show t h a t t h e s t a t e i s a t p r e s e n t n e c e s s a r y t o s o c i e t y b u t i s o n l y one o f 
i t s c o n d i t i o n s . Moreover, i f t h e s t a t e , i s a ' s i n g l e i n d e p e n d e n t 
( 7 9 ) 
c o r p o r a t i o n among o t h e r i n d e p e n d e n t c o r p o r a t i o n s ' , t h e n s o c i e t y i s 
always s o m e t h i n g w i d e r t h a n t h e s t a t e . The s t a t e i s an a s p e c t o f s o c i e t y 
b u t n o t s o c i e t y as such and man's o b l i g a t i o n s a r e t o t h e l a t t e r . There i s 
( 2 2 ) 
c o n s i d e r a b l e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h i s i s Bosanquet's r e a l p o s i t i o n , and t h a t a 
c o m p l e t e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s t a t e w i t h s o c i e t y i s n o t s e r i o u s l y p r e s s e d . 
The r e l a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n between s o c i e t y and t h e s t a t e i s , I t h i n k , 
( 8 0 ) 
permanent and i n h e r e n t . The s t a t e i n f a c t i s t h o u g h t o f as t h a t o f f i c e 
w i t h t h e power o f c o e r c i a n t o c a r r y o u t t h e g e n e r a l w i l l , ' the c l e a r and 
i r o n w i l l t o d e t e r m i n a t e good and j u s t i c e , w h i c h t h e l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l 
f a b r i c o f t h e s t a t e w i l l e x i s t t o s u s t a i n and t o d e f e n d ' . A n o t h e r example 
i s when he t a l k s o f t h e f a m i l y as something necessary t o s o c i e t y and t h e 
( 8 1 ) 
s t a t e , b u t a b s o l u t e l y d i s t i n c t f r o m b o t h . Thus, Bosanquet's i d e a o f 
t h e s t a t e i n e f f e c t c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e g e n e r a l view w h i c h sees t h e 
e x e c u t i v e and government a s p e c t p r e d o m i n a n t . The s e r i o u s c o n f u s i o n between 
s t a t e and s o c i e t y i s , I t h i n k caused by Bosanque>t's r e a l d i f f i c u l t y i n 
s e e i n g a n y t h i n g ' i d e a l ' i n t h e e f f e c t s o f a c t u a l s t a t e s upon t h e average 
i n d i v i d u a l , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e ' i d e a l ' e x i s t s o n l y i n t h o s e 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s w h i c h have grown up i n s p i t e o f , o r i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s m a i n t a i n e d by t h e s t a t e . To m a i n t a i n a complete i d e n t i t y o f 
i n t e r e s t between these two a n t a g o n i s t i c e l e m e n t s , and f u r t h e r t o r e p r e s e n t 
t h e one as demanding a b s o l u t e p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l by t h e . o t h e r , i s a f a t a l 
weakness i n t h e i d e a l i s t t h e o r y . 
A f u r t h e r p r o b l e m a r i s e s as a r e s u l t o f Bosanquet's 
d i s t i n c t i o n between s t a t e and government whereas i t i s g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i s e d 
t h a t a d e c i s i o n o f t h e government i s a d e c i s i o n o f t h e s t a t e . 'The s t a t e 
t h e n , e x i s t s t o promote good l i f e , and what i t does cannot be m o r a l l y 
i n d i f f e r e n t ; b u t i t s a c t i o n s cannot be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e deeds o f i t s 
(82 ) 
a g e n t s , o r m o r a l l y j u d g e d as p r i v a t e v o l i t i o n s a r e j u d g e d '. T h i s i s 
because ' i t s a c t s p r o p e r a r e always p u b l i c a c t s , and i t cannot as a 
s t a t e , a c t w i t h i n t h e r e l a t i o n s o f p r i v a t e l i f e i n w h i c h o r g a n i s e d m o r a l i t y 
e x i s t s ' , a c o n c e s s i o n t o i n d i v i d u a l freedom n o t u s u a l l y r e c o g n i s e d by 
c r i t i c s . . T h e r e f o r e , because t h e a c t i o n o f t h e s t a t e i s by d e f i n i t i o n , t h e 
a c t i o n o f a g e n e r a l w i l l , t h e s t a t e cannot be g u i l t y o f p e r s o n a l i m m o r a l i t y 
and cannot commit murder o r t h e f t i n t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e s e a r e m o r a l 
o f f e n c e s , war b e i n g e x c l u d e d because i t i s n o t t h e a c t o f a p r i v a t e p e r s o n . 
( 2 3 ) 
However, one may r a i s e t h e o b j e c t i o n o f a s t a t e c a r r y i n g o u t an u n j u s t war, 
o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f an i n n o c e n t man. A g a i n , t o c l a i m t h a t t h e s t a t e cannot 
be bound by t h e honour and c o n s c i e n c e o f i t s a g e n t s , u l t i m a t e l y j u s t i f i e s 
any measures t a k e n by t h e s t a t e . The agent on t h e o t h e r hand i s c o m p l e t e l y 
f r e e o f t h e t i e s o f p r i v a t e m o r a l i t y when a c t i n g on b e h a l f o f t h e i n t e r e s t 
o f t h e s t a t e . The s t a t e as such can be c r i t i c i s e d on m o r a l grounds o n l y 
when i t s agents f a i t h f u l l y c a r r y o u t t h e g e n e r a l w i l l w h i c h i s i t s e l f 
s e l f i s h o r b r u t a l , t o w h i c h i t must be s a i d i n r e p l y t h a t t h e a c t i o n s o f 
t h e s t a t e must be j u d g e d on t h e same p r i n c i p l e as t h o s e o f i n d i v i d u a l s , and 
a r e n o t t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h o s e o f i t s a g e n t s . 
F i n a l l y , a t h e o r y o f t h e s t a t e must a l s o be a t h e o r y o f 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . A l t h o u g h Bbsanquet m o d i f i e d h i s views o v e r t h e 
( 8 3 ) 
y e a r s , h i s b a s i c p o s i t i o n i s as f o l l o w s : ' t h e s t a t e has no d e t e r m i n a t e 
f u n c t i o n i n a l a r g e r community, b u t i s i t s e l f t h e supreme community; t h e 
g u a r d i a n o f a whole m o r a l w o r l d , b u t n o t a f a c t o r w i t h i n an o r g a n i s e d m o r a l 
w o r l d . M o r a l r e l a t i o n s presuppose an o r g a n i s e d l i f e ; b u t such a l i f e i s 
o n l y w i t h i n t h e s t a t e , n o t i n r e l a t i o n s between t h e s t a t e and o t h e r 
c o m m u n i t i e s ' . By f o l l o w i n g Hegel's s t r i c t u r e t h a t one s t a t e i s n o t s u b j e c t 
t o t h e law o f any o t h e r , Bosanquet's t h e o r y p r e c l u d e s any e f f e c t i v e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n such as t h e League o f N a t i o n s o r U n i t e d N a t i o n s 
p r e c i s e l y because such b o d i e s depend upon each member s t a t e a c c e p t i n g some 
d i m i n u t i o n o f i t s s o v e r e i g n t y . H i s a p p a r e n t e n t h u s i a s m f o r t h e League i n 
l a t e r l i f e ( 1 9 1 9 ) : - 'The same p r i n c i p l e demands i n t h e same s p i r i t , t h e 
W o r l d - s t a t e . The u n i f y i n g a c t i v i t y cannotccease w i t h t h e s t a t e , as i t c o u l d 
n o t cease w i t h t h e group' camouflages t h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c y by c a l l i n g 
f o r s u p p o r t o f a t h o r o u g h communal w i l l t h r o u g h o u t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t c o u n t r i e s , 
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t a h e a l t h y s t a t e i s n o n - m i l i t a n t i n temper 
and s u p p o r t s t h e h u m a n i s i n g valv.es o f knowledge, a r t , r e l i g i o n e t c . I n 
o t h e r words t h e concept o f a s u p r a - n a t i o n a l s t a t e i s s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e 
need t o p u r i f y t h e w i l l o f each e x i s t i n g s t a t e , . t h e r e b y i m p l y i n g acquiescence 
i n t h e s t a t u s quo. 'St a t e s a r e p e a c e f u l o r w a r l i k e compared w i t h t h e i r 
( 8 5 ) 
i n t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n b e i n g e i t h e r one o f s t a b i l i t y and s o c i a l j u s t i c e o r n o t ' 
( 2 4 ) 
f 8 6 1 
'Humanity as an e t h i c a l i d e a i s a t y p e o r p r o b l e m r a t h e r t h a n a f a c t ' , 
because 'no such c o n t i n u i t y o f i d e n t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e can be presupposed i n 
a l l mankind as i s n e c e s s a r y t o e f f e c t i v e membership o f a common s o c i e t y 
and e x e r c i s e o f a g e n e r a l w i l l ' . The League o f n a t i o n s i s a c o m b i n a t i o n o f 
g e n e r a l w i l l s b u t t h e y a r e n o t one w i l l because t h e y have n o t t h e same 
o b j e c t o r views o f l i f e i n common. Such an o r g a n i s a t i o n , l i k e t h e i d e a o f 
a u n i v e r s a l language i s v a l u a b l e o n l y as an a d d i t i o n b u t f a t a l as a 
s u b s t i t u t i o n f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e . 
The s t a t e m e n t s t h a t ' the s t a t e i s t h e supreme community' and 
g u a r d i a n o f t h e whole m o r a l w o r l d have v e r y i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r an 
o r g a n i c t h e o r y , f o r t h e y s u g g e s t t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e m o r a l community i s t h e 
p o l i t i c a l community, and t h a t m o r a l i t y i s t o be equat e d w i t h c i t i z e n s h i p , 
b u t c i t i z e n s h i p t h o u g h t o f i n terms o f c o n f o r m i t y t o t h e r u l e s and 
c o n v e n t i o n s o f s o c i e t y i s n o t r e g a r d e d as a sphe r e o f r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y . 
T h i s i s t h e l i f e o f s e l f - c o n s i s t e n t human achievement w h i c h n e c e s s i t a t e s 
t h e human community as t h e supreme community, and t h e c i t i z e n ' s l o y a l t y 
i s t o t h e l a t t e r o v e r and above t h e p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e , and w o u l d c e r t a i n l y 
i n v o l v e some, m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e t e r m ' o r g a n i c ' f o r such a t h e o r y i . e . t h e 
good l i f e w h i c h t h e s t a t e e x i s t s t o m a i n t a i n i s s o m e t h i n g more t h a n m e r e l y 
t h e l i f e of. c i t i z e n s h i p . T h a t t h i s i s i n d e e d Bosanquet's u l t i m a t e p o s i t i o n 
w i l l be shown i n t h e f i n a l s e c t i o n . A t t h i s s t a g e i t must be remarked t h a t 
one o f t h e v i c e s o f t h e i d e a l i s t t h e o r y i s t h a t i t does n o t c o n c e i v e t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f t r a n s c e n d i n g s t a t e l i m i t s . M o r a l , r e l i g i o u s and commercial 
r e l a t i o n s e x i s t between a l l human b e i n g s i r r e s p e c t i v e o f s t a t e b o u n d a r i e s . 
The c e l l s o f a human body a r e w h o l l y bound up w i t h t h a t body, whereas t h e 
c i t i z e n o f an ind e p e n d e n t s t a t e o f t e n has c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n d i v i d u a l 
members o f o t h e r s t a t e s t h a n w i t h h i s own countrymen e.g. t h e E n g l i s h 
c a p i t a l i s t w i t h h i s money i n v e s t e d i n South A f r i c a e t c . Bosanquet's s t a t e 
may be a m o r a l b e i n g w i t h a c o n s c i e n c e i n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s b u t e x t e r n a l l y 
i t s a b s o l u t i o n i n d i r e c t l y condones t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f war, an e n t i r e l y 
c o n s i s t e n t p o s i t i o n f o r one who a c c e p t s e v i l as a n e c e s s a r y p a r t o f t h e 
permanent scheme o f things.. 
* E v i l i s a l s o n e c e s s a r y t o t h e p e r f e c t i o n o f t h e A b s o l u t e . 
( 2 5) 
THE INFLUENCE OF HEGEL ON BOSANQUET'S PHILOSOPHY. 
We have a l r e a d y had o c c a s s i o n t o n o t e v a r i o u s i n s t a n c e s 
i n w h i c h Bosanquet r e v e a l s t h e d e b t owed t o Hegel as t h e s o u r c e and 
i n s p i r a t i o n o f h i s own p h i l o s o p h y , n o t a b l y i n t h e i d e a t h a t t h e s t a t e i s 
t h e s p i r i t o f t h e p e o p l e i n r e a l i s e d r a t i o n a l i t y and a c t u a l i t y and t h a t 
t h e i n d i v i d u a l has h i s t r u t h , e x i s t e n c e and e t h i c a l s t a t u s o n l y as a 
member o f i t . I n a l e t t e r t o Hoemle Bosanquet w r i t e s * ^ : - 'To me Hegel has 
v n o t , and never had f r o m t h e f i r s t t h a t foreign'ess o r e s s e n t i a l d i f f i c u l t y . i\ 
Not t h a t I can ' e x p l a i n ' h im any more t h a n o t h e r s can, b u t t h a t when I do 
seem t o u n d e r s t a n d he speaks t o me as t h e o n l y w r i t e r I can u n d e r s t a n d . 
What he says seems t o come s t r a i g h t o u t o f one's h e a r t and e x p e r i e n c e ; e v e r y 
one e l s e seems d i s t a n t and a r t i f i c i a l b e s i d e i t ' . However, t h e s u g g e s t i o n 
t h a t Bosanquet f a i t h f u l l y adheres t o t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f Hegel's p o l i t i c a l 
p h i l o s o p h y i s s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i s e d by Marcuse i n h i s book ' Reason and 
( 8 7 ) 
R e v o l u t i o n ' : 'The B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s s e i z e d upon t h e a n t i - l i b e r a l i d e a s 
i n Hegel's 'P h i l o s o p h y o f R i g h t ' . From T.H.Green t o B e r n a r d Bosanquet, t h e 
crescendo o f emphasis f e l l i n c r e a s i n g l y upon t h e i n d e p e n d e n t p r i n c i p l e o f 
t h e s t a t e and on t h e pre-eminence o f t h e u n i v e r s a l . The more H e g e l i a n i n 
w o r d i n g , t h i s i d e a l i s m became, t h e f u r t h e r i t removed i t s e l f f r o m t h e t r u e 
s p i r i t o f Hegel's t h o u g h t ' . Such c r i t i c i s m i s n o t i n f a c t b orne o u t by 
t h e e v i d e n c e . I n two chapters: d e v o t e d t o Hegel i n t h e ' P h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r y 
.(88) ( 8 9 ) , o f t h e S t a t e , Bosanquet observes : x t i s a sxmple f a c t t h a t t h e 
whole p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y o f Kant , Hegel and F i c h t e i s founded on t h e i d e a 
o f freedom as t h e essence o f man, f i r s t announced - such was Hegel's 
d i s t i n c t judgement - by Rousseau.^ Of c o u r s e , b o t h f o r H e g e l , and Bosanquet 
n o t h i n g s h o r t o f t h e s t a t e i s t h e a c t u a l i s a t i o n o f freedom, b u t Hegel's 
s a f e g u a r d s a r e c a r e f u l l y p r e s e r v e d . ' I t . i s j u s t freedom w h i c h i s t h e s e l f 
o f t h o u g h t : one who r e p u d i a t e s t h o u g h t and t a l k s o f freedom knows n o t what 
.(90) 
he i s s a y i n g . A g a i n , i n t r e a t i n g t h e modern s t a t e as a c h a p t e r i n t h e 
' P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind', b o t h w r i t e r s a c c e p t t h e u n i v e r s a l as t h e s p i r i t , t h e 
( 9 1 ) 
s u b s tance o f t h e whole- n o t as an e x t e r n a l n e g a t i v e power . 'We do n o t 
deny t h a t mind may be more t h a n s o c i a l ; b u t i n as f a r as i t i s s o c i a l i t i s 
s t i l l r e a l mind, and t h a t means t h a t i t i s n o t s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n what we 
( 2 6 ) 
know as i n d i v i d u a l l i v e s . However, t h e i m p u l s e s o f t h e ' f r e e i n i n d * cannot 
be o r d e r e d , i t s purposes cannot be made d e t e r m i n a t e , e x c e p t i n an a c t u a l 
system o f s e l v e s . For b o t h p h i l o s o p h e r s t h e u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y o f t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l i s i n c o n c e i v a b l e . 'The l i f e o f t h e members i n t h e whole i s t h e 
'(92) 
essence o f what we r e a l l y v a l u e . 
So f a r f r o m ' s e i z i n g upon t h e a n t i - l i b e r a l views i n Hegel's 
p h i l o s o p h y ' Bosanquet's c o n c e s s i o n s t o t h e freedom o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
i n e v i t a b l y c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s t h e o r y o f o b l i g a t i o n . I n d e a l i n g w i t h Hegel's 
c o n c e p t i o n o f r i g h t 'the r e a l m o f r e a l i s e d freedom, t h e w o r l d o f mind 
produced o u t o f i t s e l f , as a second n a t u r e ' o f t h e t h r e e p o i n t s o f view. 
i n v b l v e d , ( 1 ) t h e l e t t e r o f t h e l a w , ( 2 ) t h e r e v o l t o f c o n s c i e n c e , ( 3 ) 
s o c i a l e t h i c s , t h e utmost i m p o r t a n c e i s a t t a c h e d t o t h e second. 'There 
s u r v i v e s t h e permanent n e c e s s i t y t h a t an i n t e l l i g e n t b e i n g can a c q u i e s c e 
o n l y i n what e n t e r s i n t o t h e o b j e c t o f h i s w i l l .... he i s a b s o l u t e l y 
d e b a r r e d f r o m r e p o s i n g i n a n y t h i n g w h i c h does n o t a p p e a l t o h i s w i l l . 
( 9 3 ) 
The s u b j e c t i v e w i l l i s t h e o n l y s o i l on w h i c h freedom can be a r e a l i t y ' 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o i m a g i n e a more l i b e r a l s t a t e m e n t o r one so c o m p l e t e l y 
f a t a l t o t h e s p i r i t e x p r e s s e d i n t h e t h e o r y o f t h e g e n e r a l w i l l , a l t h o u g h 
Bosanquet h i m s e l f h a r d l y seems aware o f any a m b i g u i t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t i s 
l e g i t i m a t e t o ask why i f B o s a n q u e t ' s ' t h e o r y has f e a t u r e s t h a t make t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l a v i c t i m o f t h e h y p o s t a t i z e d s t a t e u n i v e r s a l , so c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
( 9 4 ) 
o f t h e l a t e r F a s c i s t i d e o l o g y ' , does he agree w i t h Hegel a g a i n s t P l a t o 
on t h e p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a l c h o i c e , i n i t i a t i v e , and p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , 
t h e l a t t e r b e i n g t h e means by w h i c h t h e w i l l f i r s t becomes a f a c t i n t h e 
m a t e r i a l w o r l d . I t w i l l be remembered t h a t c r i t i c s have g e n e r a l l y i g n o r e d 
Bosanquet's d i c t u m t h a t t h e s t a t e cannot a c t w i t h i n t h e r e l a t i o n s o f 
p r i v a t e l i f e . A l l i d e a s o f t h e s t a t e n a t i o n a l i s i n g p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , o r o f 
a ' w e l f a r e s t a t e ' a r e r e g a r d e d w i t h h o r r o r because i f t h e s t a t e were t o 
assume t h e d u t i e s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h c h a r a c t e r , i t w o u l d d e s t r o y t h o s e 
m o r a l q u a l i t i e s i t i s t h e d u t y o f t h e s t a t e t o m a i n t a i n . P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , 
d e v elops c h a r a c t e r because i t e n a b l e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o o r g a n i s e h i s l i f e , 
t h r i f t b e i n g an e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t y . F o r t h i s r e a s o n Bosanquet opposed such 
( 2 7 ) 
measures as t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f f r e e s c h o o l meals, o l d age p e n s i o n s , because 
t h e y w o u l d d e s t r o y t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s sense o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . However, i t was 
a t l e a s t o b v i o u s t h a t t h e s t a t e was f a i l i n g t o promote t h e b e s t l i f e f o r t h e 
poor and needy and i f r e m e d i a l a c t i o n was n o t w i t h i n i t s p r o v i n c e , t h e 
i n i t i a t i v e must r e s t w i t h t h e s o c i e t y ' s more f o r t u n a t e members. T h i s was t h e 
purpose o f t h e C h a r i t y O r g a n i s a t i o n S o c i e t y , an o r g a n i s a t i o n f u l l o f upper 
c l a s s condescension whose aim was t o d e v e l o p ' i n d u s t r y , f o r e t h o u g h t and 
h o n e s t y ' i n t h e l o w e r o r d e r s , o f w h i c h Bosanquet was a p r o m i n e n t member. The 
i m p o r t a n t p o i n t h e r e i s t h a t on t h e q u e s t i o n o f p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y and c h a r i t y , 
Bosanquet's assignment o f a b s o l u t e v a l u e t o t h e s t a t e i s c l e a r l y i n c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h i t s e l f . I n b o t h cases p r i v a t e means come t o t h e r e s c u e o f p u b l i c 
inadequacy. 
Perhaps even more damaging t o Marcuse's argument i s Bosanquet' 
a t t i t u d e t o t h e f a m i l y . Hegel's t r i p a r t i t e d i v i s i o n o f s o c i a l e t h i c s , ( t h e 
l a t t e r d e f i n e d as ' t h a t s y s t e m a t i c c h a r a c t e r t h a t i s e n a b l e d t o connect 
t h e i n d i v i d u a l o r p a r t i c u l a r w i l l w i t h t h e u n i v e r s a l s p i r i t o f t h e community) 
i n t o t h e f a m i l y , b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y and t h e s t a t e i s f a i t h f u l l y f o l l o w e d 
by Bosanquet. Whereas 'the d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e s t a t e 
i s c l e a r i n t e l l i g e n c e , e x p l i c i t law and systems, t h e n a t u r a l b a s i s o f f e e l i n g 
a c h i e v e s t h e s e needs i n t h e f a m i l y as a s p e c i a l organ and n o t i n t h e 
( 9 6 ) 
s t a t e as s u c h 1 . The f a m i l y meal has t h e 'fundamental elements o f a 
( 9 7 ) 
sacrament' , and 'the f a m i l y , o r a n a t i o n i s a f a r more s a c r e d t h i n g t h a n 
any Church, because t h e s e a r e what p r e s c r i b e o u r d u t y and educate o u t w i l l ' 
( 9 8 ) 
. On t h i s a c c o u n t t o o , P l a t o ' s ' R e p u b l i c ' i s c r i t i c i s e d f o r b e i n g t o o 
t o t a l i t a r i a n . However, t h e f a m i l y and b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y a r e n o t s e p a r a t e 
r e a l i t i e s , b u t f a c t o r s i n a r a t i o n a l w hole, r e p r e s e n t i n g i d e n t i t y 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and f i n a l r e - i n t e g r a t i o n i n t h e s t a t e . I t i s i n t h e i d e a l i s t ' 
v i e w o f b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y , a d m i t t e d t o be a w o r l d o f cash- H €X*/J and s e l f -
i n t e r e s t , t h a t t h e s t a t e c o n c e i v e d as a n e u t r a l o r g a n o f t h e common good i s 
( 9 9 ) 
shown t o l i e o n l y i n t h e r e a l m o f t h e o r y . Bosanquet w r i t e s : ' I t i s 
p o s t e r i o r t o t h e s t a t e i n t i m e . I t i s o n l y w i t h i n t h e s t a t e p r o p e r and 
r e s t i n g on i t s s o l i d power, t h a t such a w o r l d as t h a t o f b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y 
c o u l d a r i s e o r be c o n c e i v a b l e ' . T h i s c o n t a i n s t h e s t r a n g e i d e a o f t h e s t a t e 
as s o m e thing s t a t i c , w h e r e a s i n r e a l i t y t h e s t a t e i s t h e s u p e r s t r u c t u r e upon 
( 2 8 ) 
t h e economic base, and adapts i t s e l f t o t h e l a t t e r s c h a n g i ng needs. The 
j u s t i c e i t a d m i n i s t e r s i n t h e b o u r g e o i s w o r l d must be b o u r g e o i s j u s t i c e , 
i . e i t must p r o t e c t t h e c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s o f p r o d u c t i o n . A g a i n , t o 
d e s c r i b e t h e t r a d e u n i o n s as t h e second b a s i s o f t h e s t a t e a f t e r t h e 
family^ 1 0°^shows a s t r i k i n g l a c k o f a sense o f p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s , tor 
Bosanquet such i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e c o n s t i t u e n t elements o f t h e s o c i a l mind, b u t 
t h i s depends on t h e groups b e i n g t h o u g h t o f as c o m p l e t i n g whereas t h e y , a r e 
m a n i f e s t l y c o mpeting. I t i s t r u e t h a t i n such o r g a n i s a t i o n s a members 
p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t becomes a common one, b u t common w i t h h i s f e l l o w members 
n o t w i t h t h e s t a t e , v i z , t h e r e c e n t c l a s h o f i n t e r e s t s o v e r an Income P o l i c y . 
The g r e a t opponent o f t h o s e t h e o r i s t s o f t h e f i r s t l o o k has now j o i n e d t h e i r 
r a n k s . I n a c c e p t i n g t h e s u p e r f i c i a l u n i t y o f t h e s t a t e as t h e r e a l i t y , 
Bosanquet has d e p a r t e d f r o m t h e t h e o r y he had so f a i t h f u l l y adhered t o . For 
H e g e l , t h e u n i t y o f t h e s t a t e was always a d i a l e c t i c a l u n i t y ; i t 
c o n t a i n e d t h e seeds o f i t s own d e s t r u c t i o n . The s t a t e i s s u b j e c t t o t h o u g h t , 
t h e same element t o w h i c h i t owed i t s e x i s t e n c e , because Hegel saw as a 
g e n e r a l law o f h i s t o r y t h a t s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y cannot f o r any 
l e n g t h o f t i m e c o n f o r m t o t h e demands o f r e a s o n , f o r t h e s t a t e seeks, t o 
m a i n t a i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h a t w h i c h i s and t h u s f e t t e r s t h e f o r c e s w h i c h 
seek a h i g h e r h i s t o r i c a l f o r m . Bosanquet's g r e a t v i c e was t h e f a i l u r e t o 
r e c o g n i s e t h a t t h e f r e e r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h o u g h t had l o n g s i n c e come i n t o 
c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e g i v e n o r d e r o f s o c i e t y . The s t a t e i n w h i c h t h e freedom o f 
t h e s u b j e c t i s i n c o n s c i o u s u n i o n w i t h t h e wnole remains as y e t i n t h e w o r l d 
o f mind. 
AN ORGANIC THEORY ? 
I n o u r a t t e m p t t o e r a d i c a t e t h e c o n f u s i o n w h i c h s u r r o u n d s 
Bosanquet's use o f t h e 'term' ' s t a t e ' , we were l e d t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t 
f o r any p r a c t i c a l t h e o r y , f o r such i n essence t h e ' P h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r y o f 
t h e s t a t e ' p u r p o r t s t o be, t h e s t a t e must denote t h a t o r g a n i s a t i o n as i t 
e x i s t s i n t h e r e a l w o r l d and i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t a s p e c t o f s o c i e t y t o w h i c h 
belongs t h e l e g a l and e x e c u t i v e power t o c a r r y o u t t h e g e n e r a l w i l l . 
(290 
A l t h o u g h t h e s t a t e i s n o t h i n g a p a r t f r o m i n d i v i d u a l s , i f i t i s o r g a n i c , i t 
e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s a p a r t f r o m s o c i e t y a r e n o t h i n g . The s t a t e 
must e x i s t f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f i t s component p a r t s , and t h e y l i k e w i s e must 
also: e x i s t f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e s t a t e . Moreover, i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o 
s e p a r a t e t h e w e l f a r e o f t h e whole f r o m t h e w e l f a r e o f t h e members and 
v i c e - v e r s a . A l l t h e e v i d e n c e h i t h e r t o p r e s e n t e d . b e a r s p u t t h a t a u n i t y o f 
t h i s , k i n d forms t h e b a s i s o f Bosanquet's s t a t e . 'The d i s t i n c t i o n between 
such a sum o f w i l l s , and a w i l l w h i c h aims a t a t r u l y common i n t e r e s t o r 
good, r e s t s upon t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n t r a s t between a mere a g g r e g a t e and an 
o r g a n i c u n i t y , w h i c h i s embodied i n t h e o p p o s i n g v i e w s o f s o c i e t y w h i c h we 
have been d i s c u s s i n g ^ " 1 ^ ^ . 'The s t a t e i s , as P l a t o t o l d u s, t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
mind w r i t l a r g e , o r as we have s a i d , p u r mind r e i n f o r c e d by c a p a c i t i e s w h i c h 
a r e o f i t s own n a t u r e , b u t w h i c h supplement i t s d e f e c t s ' , 'Punishment 
i s a r e t u r n o f t h e o f f e n d e r s a c t upon h i m s e l f by a c o n n e c t i o n i n e v i t a b l e i n 
t h e m o r a l o r g a n i s m ' I n t h e o r g a n i s m o f t h e s t a t e i . e . i n so f a r as we 
f e e l and t h i n k as c i t i z e n s , f e e l i n g becomes a f f e c t i o n a t e l o y a l t y ' ^ 1 0 4 ^ Our 
judgement must t h e r e f o r e be t h a t Bosanquet's t h e o r y i s o r g a n i c in-^so f a r as 
he i s a t t r a c t e d by t h e u n i t y o f t h e l i v i n g o r g a n i s m and t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
o f t h e whole as b e i n g more t h a n a mere sum o f i t s p a r t s . The ' i n so f a r as' 
r e p r e s e n t s t h e c o n f u s i o n i n Bosanquet's use o f t h e o r g a n i c a n a l o g y , because 
he r e f u s e s t o a c c e p t t h e n e c e s s a r y c o r o l l a r y summed up i n t h e c r i t i c i s m o f 
Hobhouse ' t h a t a l l c o n s c i o u s beings, t h a t l i v e under t h e shadow o f t h e 
A b s o l u t e seem t o have j u s t as much o r as l i t t l e e n t i t l e t o i n d e p e n d e n t 
( 1 0 5 ) 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n as t h e c e l l s o f t h e human body. T h i s i s q u i t e t h e r e v e r s e 
o f Bosanquet's r e a l view w h i c h never a c c e p t s t h e t o t a l i t a r i a n - o r g a n i c 
e q u a t i o n a f a c t w h i c h e x p l a i n s why he never draws any p r e c i s e a n a l o g y 
between t h e body n a t u r a l and t h e body p o l i t i c . For h i m t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
remains t o t h e end a s e l f c o n s c i o u s o r g a n o f t h e common good so t h a t t h e 
s o c i a l o r g a n i s m i s an o r g a n i s m o f organisms. I t i s my c o n t e n t i o n t h a t 
Bosanquet i s f u l l y aware o f t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n v o l v e d i n t h e f i r s t p o s i t i o n 
b u t must be c r i t i c i s e d f o r n o t d r a w i n g t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n c l u s i o n . 
* Not so M i l n e ' S o c i a l P h i l o s o p h y o f E n g l i s h I d e a l i s m ' p.261 
( 3 0 ) 
On what e v i d e n c e do I base t h i s c l a i m ? 'The s o c i a l whole i s 
o f t h e n a t u r e o f a c o n t i n u o u s o r s e l f - i d e n t i c a l b e i n g , p e r v a d i n g a system 
o f d i f f e r e n c e s and r e a l i s e d o n l y i n them. I t d i f f e r s f r o m a machine o r f r o m 
what i s c a l l e d an 'organism' p u r e and s i m p l e , by t h e presence o f t h e whole 
i n e v e r y p a r t n o t m e r e l y f o r t h e i n f e r e n c e o f t h e o b s e r v e r , b u t i n some 
.(106) 
degree f o r t h e p a r t i t s e l f , t h r o u g h t h e a c t i o n o f consciousness . I n 
s i m i l a r v e i n : 'We c o n c e i v e d s o c i e t y t o be a s t r u c t u r e o f i n t e l l i g e n c e s 
so r e l a t e d as t o c o - o p e r a t e and i m p l y one a n o t h e r . We t o o k t h e so u r c e o f 
o b l i g a t i o n t o l i e i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e l o g i c o f t h e whole i s o p e r a t i v e i n 
e y e r y p a r t , and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h a t e v e r y p a r t has. a r e a l i t y w h i c h goes 
beyond i t s average s e l f , and i d e n t i f i e s i t w i t h t h e w h o l e , making demands 
upon i t i n d o i n g so'. F i c h t e i s c r i t i c i s e d p r e c i s e l y because h i s use o f t h e 
o r g a n i c a n a l o g y b e i n g c o m p l e t e , t h e i n d i v i d u a l becomes a mere r e c e p t i v e organ 
i n c a p a b l e o f any inde p e n d e n t a c t i v i t y . ' Just as i n t h e n a t u r a l p r o d u c t , 
e v e r y p a r t can be what i t i s o n l y i n t h i s c o m b i n a t i o n and o u t o f t h i s 
c o m b i n a t i o n w o u l d n o t be t h i s , so o n l y i n t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e s t a t e does 
man a t t a i n a d e f i n i t e p o s i t i o n i n t h e s e r i e s o f t h i n g s , a p o i n t o f r e s t i n 
.(108) . . n a t u r e . Bosanquet s s t a t e i n c o n t r a s t i s t h a t c o n n e c t i o n o f f e e l i n g 
and i n s i g h t w o r k i n g t h r o u g h o u t t h e consciousnesses o f i n d i v i d u a l s as p a r t s 
i n a con n e c t e d s t r u c t u r e w h i c h u n i t e i n w i l l i n g a c e r t a i n t y p e o f l i f e as a 
,(109) 
common good i n w h i c h t h e y f i n d t h e i r own . The f r e e e x p r e s s i o n o f 
o p i n i o n by i n d i v i d u a l s i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e i r a c q u i e s c e n c e i n t h e r e a l w i l l , 
t h a t i s , t h e i r r o l e as organs i n t h e m o r a l o r g a n i s m . But Bosanquet a l s o 
t h i n k s t h a t t h e s t a t e i B an i n d i v i d u a l acievement o f r a t i o n a l i t y , a l t h o u g h 
by h i s own arguments as I have shown, i t i s a l s o made up o f i n d i v i d u a l 
achievements o f r a t i o n a l i t y , t o w i t t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f i t s members as members. 
However, i t i s n o t r a t i o n a l i t y w h i c h g i v e s a s t r u c t u r e t o t h e p a r t s o f an 
organism, b u t a m e r e l y e m p i r i c a l o r de f a c t o system, w h i c h p r e c l u d e s any 
s e l f c o n s c i o u s a c t i v i t y i n t h e members. BOsanquet h a v i n g as I b e l i e v e , 
r e c o g n i s e d t h i s , s h o u l d have t h e n d i s s o c i a t e d h i m s e l f f r o m t h e t r a d i t i o n a l 
o r g a n i c a n a l o g y , by showing q u i t e l o g i c a l l y t h a t s o c i e t y i s u n l i k e a l i v i n g 
body because i t i s more o r g a n i c n o t l e s s so. 
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An a r t i c l e by Henry Jones e n t i t l e d t h e ' S o c i a l Organism'^' 1 -^ 0^ 
o f f e r s such a s o l u t i o n . 'May i t n o t be p r o v e d t h a t s o c i e t y i s more c o n c r e t e 
as w e l l as more d i s c r e t e t h a n any p h y s i c a l t y p e o f o rganism; t h a t i t i s 
more c o n c r e t e because i t i s more d i s c r e t e ; and t h a t i t s s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n i s 
more complete because i t s s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s more i n t e n s e ? ' ^ The 
o r g a n i s m o f s o c i e t y i s o n l y p o s s i b l e because i t s components a r e themselves 
o r g a n i c i . e . t h e freedom and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s 
emphasised as t h e o n l y b a s i s o f an o r g a n i s m w h i c h i s n o t o n l y ' s e n s i t i v e ' 
b u t s e l f - c o n s c i o u s i n e v e r y p a r t . Bdsanquet's use o f t h e t e r m ' s e l f -
c o n s c i o u s p u r p o s i v e o r g a n i s m ^ 1 1 ^ i s i n c o n s i s t e n t i n so f a r he f a i l s t o 
amend t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f s o c i e t y a f t e r t h e i n d i v i d u a l has been r e c o g n i s e d 
as a complete o r g a n i s m , w i t h meaning i n h i m s e l f . I t must be remarked t h a t 
freedom f o r b o t h w r i t e r s c o n s i s t s o f 'answering t h e demands o f one's 
s t a t i o n and t o p e r f o r m d u t i e s w h i c h one has n o t chosen b u t f i n d s imposed 
by t h e s o c i a l environment'^' 1' 1 3^. Jones however s u b s t i t u t e d f o r Bosanquet's 
s e l f - t r a n s c e n d e n c e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n , b e i n g opposed t o 
t h e l a t t e r s a p p a r e n t d u a l i s m e.g. f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e r e l a t i v e and a b s o l u t e , 
appearance and r e a l i t y . 'The s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e , t h e s e l f and t h e 
n o t - s e l f , t h e p a r t i c u l a r and t h e u n i v e r s a l , t h e i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y , 
i n t e r p e n e t r a t e and become an o r g a n i c w hole'. ' S o c i e t y i s an o r g a n i s m n o t 
because i t i s l i k e an a n i m a l o r because t h e i n d i v i d u a l components a r e l i k e 
j o i n t s and l i n k s , b u t because t h e i n d i v i d u a l r e a l i s e s h i m s e l f as an e t h i c a l 
b e i n g i n s o c i e t y , and s o c i e t y r e a l i s e s i t s e l f i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l . The l i f e o f • 
t h e w hole i s t h e l i f e o f e v e r y p a r t . The i n d i v i d u a l i s f r e e because he i s 
a member o f s o c i e t y and s o c i e t y r e a l i s e s i t s aims i n t h e freedom o f 
i n d i v i d u a l s . Freedom i s t h e l i f e , w h i c h forms t h e u n i t y o f t h e m o r a l 
o r g a n i s m . T h i s I b e l i e v e , t o be t h e essence o f Bosanquet's o r g a n i c 
t h e o r y , a l t h o u g h t h e c o n c l u s i o n s w h i c h such a t h e o r y i n v o l v e d , were never 
so e x p l i c i t l y f o r m u l a t e d as i n t h e essay o f Jones.. I t s h o u l d be n o t e d 
however t h a t Bosanquet sees t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e comparison o f s o c i e t y 
w i t h an i n d i v i d u a l o r g a n i s m . Human s o c i e t y c o r r e s p o n d s i n many o f i t 
f e a t u r e s r a t h e r t o a l o c a l v a r i e t y <-qf a s p e c i e s t h a n t o an i n d i v i d u a l 
Gag) 
o r g a n i s m . I t i s e s s e n t i a l l y d i s c r e t e , n o t i n d i v i d u a l , and t h e r e f o r e , t h e 
a n a l o g y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l o r g a n i s m g i v e s way t o t h a t o f a group o r s p e c i e s . 
I n c o n t r a s t t o Jones, Bosanquet sees o n l y one a s p e c t o f s o c i e t y as more 
c o n c r e t e because i t i s more d i s c r e t e i . e . t h e s t a t e , whereas i n t h e w i d e r 
sphere o f human s o c i e t y he f a l l s back on t h e a n a l o g y o f a w hole a n i m a l 
s p e c i e s , because such a D a r w i n i a n s u r v i v a l o f t h e f i t t e s t ^ i s i n c o m p l e t e 
accordance w i t h h i s own t h e o r y o f i n e v i t a b l e c o n f l i c t between n a t i o n - s t a t e s . 
The s t a t e r i g h t however, i s s t i l l n o t t h e f i n a l r i g h t , b u t 
must answer as w i t h H e g e l , t o t h e ' r i g h t ' o f t h e W o r l d Mind w h i c h i s t h e 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l a b s o l u t e . The p r o s p e c t o f e t e r n a l c o n f l i c t between s t a t e s cann-
o t r e m a i n t h e l a s t word. Bbsanquet's w o r l d - w i d e view i s d e t e r m i n e d c h i e f l y 
by l o g i c a l and a e s t h e t i c m o t i v e s ; l o g i c a l i n h i s q u e s t f o r t h e o r e t i c a l 
s a t i s f a c t i o n t h r o u g h t h e removal o f e v e r y t h i n g c o n t r a d i c t o r y and i r r a t i o n a l ; 
a e s t h e t i c i n t h e harmonious c o m p l e t i o n o f h i s system i n a symphony o f t h e 
A b s o l u t e i n w h i c h a l l d i s c o r d s f i n d t h e i r f i l i a l s o l u t i o n . H i s t h e o r y was 
s e v e r e l y t e s t e d by t h e F i r s t W o r l d War, as i s r e v e a l e d by t h e a u t h o r 
h i m s e l f w r i t i n g i n 1919 . Then a l l t h e o l d t h i n g s were t r u e . I t i s t h e n 
o n l y s p i r i t u a l good t h a t i s r e a l and s t a b l e ; e a r t h l y and m a t e r i a l aims a r e 
d e l u s i v e and dangerous and t h e r o o t o f s t r i f e . By s p i r i t u a l goods; we mean 
such as can be s h a r e d by o t h e r s w i t h o u t o u r p o r t i o n b e i n g d i m i n i s h e d , b e a u t y , 
t r u t h , r e l i g i o n . He r e g a r d s as f u n d a m e n t a l t h e i d e a t h a t s o c i a l l i f e 
presupposes a g u i d e and cr.iteTlfonbeyond i t s c u r r e n t a c t i v i t i e s . ' A r i s t o t l e 
was s u r e l y r i g h t when he made r e l i g i o n t h e u l t i m a t e aim and q u i n t e s s e n c e o f 
c i v i c l i f e , and i t i s o n l y d e v o t i o n t o t h e s e supreme v a l u e s t h a t can g u i d e 
d e s i r e a r i g h t , and keep p a t r i o t i s m c l e a n and sweet. The s t a t e i s n e i t h e 
u l t i m a t e n o r above c r i t i c i s m b u t s u b o r d i n a t e t o what Bosanquet c a l l s ' t h i s 
u l t r a - s o c i a l and a l s o u l t r a - i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l o f l i f e w h i c h r e p r e s e n t s t h e 
h i g h e s t f u l f i l l m e n t a t once o f s o c i e t y and t h e i n d i v i d u a l . But i f such 
v a l u e s a r e i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e s o c i a l medium i s i t p o s s i b l e f o r t h e p r i e s t , 
p o e t o r p h i l o s o p h e r t o r e a l i s e t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s qua human a p a r t f r o m 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e l o w e r o r d e r r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e s t a t e ? The answer 
g i v e n by Bosanquet i s an emphatic 'no'. The human mind must be 
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' c o n s o l i d a t e d and s u s t a i n e d by s o c i e t y b e f o r e g o i n g f u r t h e r on i t s p a t h i n 
r e m a i n i n g c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and s h a p i n g i t s w o r l d and i t s e l f i n t o u n i t y ' . ^ ^ " ^ 
A r t , p h i l o s o p h y , r e l i g i o n , t h o u g h i n a sense t h e v e r y l i f e - b i p o d o f s o c i e t y , 
a r e n o t and c o u l d n o t be d i r e c t l y f a s h i o n e d t o meet t h e needs and uses o f 
t h e m u l t i t u d e , and t h e i r aim i s n o t i n t h a t sense s o c i a l : t h e y s h o u l d r a t h e r 
be r e g a r d e d as a c o n t i n u a t i o n , w i t h i n and founded upon t h e commonwealth, as 
f u l l e r u t t e r a n c e s o f t h e same, u n i v e r s a l s e l f w h i c h t h e g e n e r a l w i l l r e v e a l s 
i n more p r e c a r i o u s f o r m s . The o r g a n i c t h e o r y , as we have a t t r i b u t e d i t t o 
Bosanquet, demands even i n i t s h i g h e s t sphere t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l has no 
l i f e e x c e p t t h a t w h i c h i s s o c i a l , and t h a t he cannot r e a l i s e h i s own 
purposes e x c e p t i n r e a l i s i n g t h e l a r g e r purposes o f s o c i e t y . S o c i e t y and 
i n d i v i d u a l s f r o m a whole a p a r t f r o m w h i c h t h e y a r e b o t h n o t h i n g b u t names. 
T h e i r u n i t y i s i n d e e d i n v i o l a b l e . 
Here t h e n t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y w i t h t h e s e r v i c e o f 
s o c i e t y b r e a k s down. T r u t h l i e s n o t i n t h e phenomenal w o r l d , t h e s t a t e , b u t 
i n t h o s e r a r e e x p e r i e n c e s w h i c h a i d us i n c o n c e i v i n g t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e 
u n i v e r s e as a b e i n g i n w h i c h r e a l i t y c o i n c i d e s w i t h v a l u e . A l t h o u g h we l i v e 
p r i n c i p a l l y i n t h e m i d d l e r e g i o n o f c o n f l i c t and d i v i s i o n , t h a t r a r e f e e l i n g 
we denote as t h e ' r e a l t h i n g 1 r e p r e s e n t s a w o r l d w h i c h i s one b o t h w i t h 
i t s e l f and w i t h o u r s e l f , o f v a l u e a t i t s h e i g h t and u n i t y a t i t s s i m p l e s t , 
t h e A b s o l u t e . There a r e d u t i e s o f man t o man u n d e r i v e d f r o m any s o c i e t y o r 
common good 'the d u t i e s o f r e l i g i o n a r e t h e same as t h e d u t i e s o f m o r a l i t y ' . 
-On t h e n e g a t i v e s i d e , Bosanquet's b e l i e f i n a b e t t e r f u t u r e i s hampered by th< 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p r e s e n t e v i l on t h e grounds t h a t t h e A b s o l u t e i s p e r f e c t i o n . 
A l t h o u g h t h e l a t t e r i s r e a l , o n l y as d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n t o c o n s t i t u e n t s e l v e s , 
'unique f o c a l i s a t i o n s o f t h e same w o r l d i n each c e n t r e o f e x p e r i e n c e ' , t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l by h i s s e l f t r a n s c e n d e n c e seems f i n a l l y e n g u l f e d i n an 
u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d t o t a l i t y . These d e f e c t s a r e e v i d e n t i n Bosanquet s 
p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h f o r a l l i t s s u p e r f i c i a l t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m , 
u l t i m a t e l y r e g a r d s t h e s t a t e as t h e embodiment o f t h e ' s o c i a l ' n o t ' a b s o l u t e ' 
s p i r i t . 
* Of Moenle : There i s good r e a s o n t o t h i n k t h a t A b s o l u t e I d e a l i s m came t o 
Bosanquet as t h e s o l u t i o n o f g r a v e r e l i g i o u s c o m p l e x i t i e s ' , ( p . 2 4 8 ) . 
** M i l n e argues t h a t t h e I d e a l i s t S o c i a l P h i l o s o p h y has no necessary 
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e A b s o l u t e . I t may be u n s a t i s f a c t o r y b u t I have t r i e d 
t o show t h a t B's m e t a p h y s i c s g u i d e s t h e p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y d i d n o t 
v i c e - v e r s a . a ^ 
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